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JURISDICTION

OF

THE

COURT

OF

APPEALS

This case was "poured-over" for disposition to the Court of
Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court on June 12, 1989-

Jurisdiction

is conferred under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h).
WAT9fiS OF THIS PfiQgSgPXFgS
Plaintiff-appellant David George

(hereinafter "appellant")/

appeals from a Final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court,
Judge Pat Brian presiding, dated March 2, 1989.

The Final Judgment

was based on a Jury Verdict rendered November 9, 1989, by Special
Verdict.

On November 22, 1989, appellant moved for a New Trial or

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Appellantfs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
The Verdict was withdrawn. Appellant's Motion For A New Trial was
heard and denied on January 27, 1989. No written Order denying this
Motion was entered by the trial court.
Appellant's Notice of Appeal was filed on March 31, 1989.
STATSMSNT QF TBS ISS7BS
1.

Where the evidence demonstrated that the hospital staff

failed to alert physicians to changes in the medical condition of
Betty George requiring immediate medical diagnosis and treatment,
did the trial court commit reversible error by requiring appellant
to produce expert testimony as to causation?

Stated another way,

was this not a case "obvious to laymen", in which the jury could
have found negligence and causation without the necessity of expert
testimony?
2.

In a case alleging negligence against LDS Hospital, did the

trial court commit reversible error by instructing the jury that

proof of causation could only come from expert physicians,

as

opposed to nursing and respiratory therapy experts?
3C

Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing or

refusing to submit to the jury, appellant's proposed instructions
which set forth his theory of the case, which was supported by
competent evidence?
4,

Did the trial court commit reversible error by inserting

the previously rejected instructions 16A and 21A into the final set
of instructions on the last day of trial, after both sides had
rested, immediately before closing argument?
5.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by overruling

appellant's

objections that LDS Hospitalfs physician

expert's

testimony as to causation was speculative, and without foundation?
In the same respect, did the trial court commit reversible error
when

it

violated

its

own

specific

ruling,

and

allowed

the

respondent's experts to testify as to cause of death.
6o

Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying

appellant's Motion for a Directed Verdict as to Dr0 Lloyd and Dr.
Lahey?
7.

Did the Special Verdict form, submitted to the jury over

appellant's objections, constitute reversible error?
8.

Did the trial court's denial of appellant's

right to

present rebuttal argument constitute prejudicial error?
9.

Did the trial court commit reversible error when it denied

appellant's motion for a new trial?
10 c

Did the trial court err in awarding respondent costs

associated with the taking of depositions pursuant to Rule 54(d),
Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure?

DETERMINATIVE

CONSTITUTIONAL

MP

STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant David George alleged that the death of his wife,
Betty George, was caused by the negligence of respondent LDS
Hospital, through its nursing and respiratory staff, and by the
medical malpractice of Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey, Mrs. George's
physicians. The physicians settled with appellant prior to trial,
and their

participation

in the trial was very

limited. The

physicians were included on the Special Verdict form submitted to
the jury at the close of the trial.
On November 9, 1988, the jury, pursuant to the Special Verdict
form provided by the trial court,

found that Dr. Lloyd and Dr.

Lahey had not been negligent. The jury

also

found that the

respondent LDS Hospital, through its staff, was negligent, but that
its negligence was not a proximate cause of the death of Betty
George.
Appellant's Motion for a New Trial dated November 22, 1988 [R443], was denied by the trial court on January 27, 1989. [R-587]
Final

Judgment

was entered

on March

2, 1989.

[R-709-712]

Appellant's Notice of Appeal was thereafter filed on March 31, 1989.
[R-739]
FACTS
The following f a c t s a r e r e l e v a n t t o t h e C o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n
of t h e i s s u e s on appeal:
1.
hospital

Appellant's

wife,

Betty

George,

was

admitted

on J u l y 27,

1986, by Dr. Kimball Lloyd,

hysterectomy and exploratory surgery of a p e l v i c mass.

for

a

to

LDS

routine

2. The surgery was performed on July 28, 1986, without apparent
complication.

The pelvic mass turned out to be a benign cyst. [R-

270, See, "Operation Report, P's Exh. 1]
3* Over the next several days, Mrs. George developed postoperative respiratory complications.

Her treating physicians, Dr.

Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey (an internal medicine specialist
called in as a consultant by Dr. Lloyd), and various resident
M.D.'s, considered her complications at various times to be the
result of: a) a "normal" post-operative reaction; b) adynamic ileus;
and c) pulmonary embolus. [Id*,
4o

Mrs,

George's

pp. 25-31]

respiratory

condition

deteriorated

significantly on August 1, 1986, and Dr. Lahey scheduled a pulmonary
angiogram for August 2, 1986, to rule out or confirm the working
diagnosis of pulmonary embolus.
5c

[Id.]

By the morning of August 2, 198 6, Mrs. Georgess condition

had deteriorated to the point where Dr. Pat Bearnson, a resident,
classified her condition as "poor". Drc Bearnson ordered that Betty
George be transferred to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Dr. Lloyd
learned of, and agreed with Dr. Bearnsonfs order prior to the
transfer.
6.

[Id.

at 30, 116; R-765, p. 381]

Nurse Anne Etta Terry, the Charge Nurse for the 8th Floor,

and Nurse Mary Ann Schnabel, who was assigned to provide nursing
care to Mrs. George during the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p^m. shift on
August 2, 1986, both agreed that the transfer to ICU was necessary
to assure that Mrs. George would be closely monitored and receive
adequate care.
7.

[Terry; R-764, p. 80; Schnabel; R-764, pp. 137-38]

Following

the

pulmonary

angiogram,

Mrs

transferred to the ICU pursuant to the standing order.

George

was

There, Dr.

Lahey evaluated Mrs. George and determined that her condition did
not warrant admission to the ICU.

However, it was determined that

Mrs. George should be assigned a "special duty nurse" to attend her
at all times after her return to the 8th Floor.

[R-7 67, p. 5 91/ R-

768, p. 695; R-764, p. 86]
8.

Upon Mrs. George's return to the 8th Floor, both Nurse

Terry and Nurse Schnabel were of the opinion that the patient's
condition was worse than it had previously been when the order for
the ICU transfer was made. [Terry; R-764 at p. 86; Schnabel; R-764,
pp. 142-43]
ICU.

The Nurses' notes at 2:20 state:

Patient very distant.

Another note at 2:40 p.m.,

"Return per cart from

Responsive - but incoherent at times."
indicated Mrs. George's "Breathing very

labored." [R-270, P's. Exh. 1, p. 169]
9.

Dr. Lloyd, who was at home on the afternoon of August 2,

1986, received a call from Nurse Terry who incorrectly indicated
that Mrs. George's condition was no different from what it had been
earlier that morning. None of the information contained in the
medical record was provided to Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey, and Nurse
Terry did not inform them that Mrs. George had become "distant and
incoherent."
10.

[Lloyd; R-765, pp. 386-89; Lahey; R-767, p. 615]

At 3:00 p.m., on August 2, 1986,

Nurses Schnabel and

Terry left, and Nurse Peggy Soraghan, the "special duty nurse"
assigned to Mrs. George by LDS Hospital, came on duty.
11.
George.

Nurse Soraghan had had no previous contact with Mrs.
She was not licensed as a Registered Nurse at the time. [R-

766, pp. 425, 431]
12.

Nurse Soraghan's initial notes written between 3:30-4:00

p.m., include the following:

"Patient lying supine in bed - disoriented. Responds
with 'Yeah' to every question, and only after
vigorous arousing.
Skin hot to touch and
diaphoretic*
Vital signs: temperature up (39.5).
Dr. Adams notified and now in to see patient. Blood
pressure difficult to auscultate. Pulse rapid and
strong. (152) . . . Lungs with moist crackles in
lower lobes - apparently history of collapsed lower
lobes. Respiration labored and rapid. . . No bowel
sounds audible. Abdomen distended and taught with
circumference of 110 cm. . . , Patient incontinent of
urine. . . Family given 15 minutes teaching re:
physical condition, and 15 minutes emotional support
to relieve obvious stress and agitation re: patient's
condition and prognosis." [R-270, P's. Exh 1, pp.
169-170]
13.

Nurse Soraghan did not contact Dr* Lloyd or Dr. Lahey to

inform them of the significant deterioration in Mrs. George's
conditionc

Though the record indicates that a resident, Dr. Adams,

visited Mrs. George during Nurse Soraghan• s shift, Dr. Adams was
only made aware of Mrs. George's elevated temperature. [Lloyd; R765, ppe 396-98; Lahey R-767, p. 615; Adams; R-768, p. 722]
14.

Nurse Soraghan's note at 5:00 p 0 mo, August 2, 1986,

indicates that Mrse George's respirations had "slowed to (blank)",
and that further emotional support had to be

given to the family.

Nurse Soraghan again failed to alert Mrs. George's physicians that
Mrs. George's respiration had decreased to dangerously low level.
[R-270, P's Exh. 1, p. 170; R-768, pp. 725-26]
15. From the time of Betty George's return to the 8th Floor at
approximately 2:20 p.m., on August 2, 1986,

until approximately

6:30 p.m., that evening, David George, her husband, and Traci Lee
Huber, her daughter,

who were continually physically present at the

Hospital, demanded and begged the LDS hospital nurses to call Dr.
Lloyd or another physician to provide necessary diagnosis and
treatment to Betty George. [R-766, pp. 495, 499]

16.

Despite her obvious and critical need for appropriate

diagnosis and treatment, no one on the hospital staff informed Mrs.
George's physicians of the adverse changes in her medical condition,
and no physician saw Betty George at all between 5:00-7:00 p.m. on
August 2, 1986.
17.

[R-768, pp. 725-27]

At approximately

7:00 p.m., on August

2, 1986, the

George's daughter, Cynthia Brown, arrived at LDS Hospital to find
her mother unattended, cyanotic, cold and not breathing.

Dr. Adams

arrived shortly thereafter and confirmed that Mrs. George was not
breathing, and was, in fact, in full cardiac arrest. [R-764, pp. 2632]

Emergency resuscitative measures were successful in re-starting

Mrs. George's heart.

She was, however, by that time, brain dead

from lack of oxygen to the brain. [R-768, p. 760]
18.

Following her cardiac arrest and brain death, Mrs. George

was found to be severely infected.

The source of the infection was

not determined, and remains unknown. [R-767, p. 596]
19.

Two days later, on August 4, 1986, Betty George died after

a second cardiac arrest.

[See, Autopsy Report, R-395, D's. Exh. A,

p. 1]
20.

David George, as personal representative of the heirs of

Betty George (himself and 4 adult children), filed an action under
Utah's wrongful death statute, Utah Code Ann., §78-11-7. [R-7-10]
21.
Betty

David George, as personal representative of the Estate of

George, also

filed an action

for the damages

suffered

personally by Betty George prior to her death under Utah's "survival
statute," Utah Code Ann./ §78-11-12. [R-13]
22.

Appellant offered the testimony of two experts:

Nurse

Harriet Gillerman [R-764, pp. 169-218 and R-766, pp. 414-464; and

Donald Owings, a respiratory therapist. [R-765, ppc 276-351]

Both

witnesses were duly qualified by the trial court as experts as to
the applicable standards of care, its breach, and whether

the

hospitalfs negligence was a contributing proximate cause of the
cardiac arrest suffered by Mrs. George on August 2, 1986.

[See,

Addendum V]
23o

There was no evidence or testimony produced by any party

as to the standard of care applicable to Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey, the
breach thereof, or causation.

[Appellant is unable to cite to non-

evidence . ]
24.

At the close of the respondent LDS Hospitalfs case, the

trial court denied appellant's Motion for a Directed Verdict with
respect to Drc Lloyd and Dr* Lahey„
25o

[R-768, p« 793]

On the last day of trial, just before closing arguments

were to begin, the Court, over appellant's objections, inserted Jury
Instructions 16A and 21A in the Jury Instructions provided to the
Jury, [R-511, 518]
26.

Previously, the court had rejected appellant's proposed

Jury Instructions, including Nos. 24 and 32 [R-251, 261], which
accurately

reflected

appellant's theory of the case and were

supported by competent evidence.
SUMMARY

1.

OF

APPELLANT'S

ARGUMENT

Appellant's primary contention is that the t r i a l

court

erred in depriving appellant of his fundamental right to have the
jury consider his theory of the case for l i a b i l i t y against the
respondent LDS Hospital.

This error permeated the t r i a l , but can be

broken down into categories as follows:
a.

Erroneous rulings as to expert witnesses;

b.

Failing to submit appellant's proposed,

legally

correct instructions as to the causation issue which were supported
by competent evidence;
c. Submission of clearly erroneous instructions which
effectively directed a verdict for LDS Hospital on the issue of
causation;
d.

Denying appellant's Motion for Directed Verdict in

favor of Drs. Lloyd and Lahey at the close of the evidence, contrary
to law;
e.

Prejudicial errors in the Special Verdict form; and

f. Irregularities on the last day of trial extremely
prejudicial to appellant's case constituting reversible error.
A. ERRONEOUS RULINGS REGARDING
To

support

appellant

his

introduced

case
the

of

EXPERT WITNESS

liability

testimony

of

against
two

TESTIMONY

LDS Hospital,

experts:

Harriet

Gillerman, an extremely competent nurse with 25 years experience and
impeccable credentials; and Don Owings, R.T., a respiratory therapy
expert.

Both of these witnesses were qualified as experts by the

trial court, and the trial court ruled that they were qualified to
express expert opinions on whether the negligence of the LDS
Hospital staff was a contributing proximate cause of the cardiac
arrest suffered by Betty George on August 2, 1986.
testified.

Both experts so

Nurse Gillerman and Don Owings, R.T. were the

only

witnesses to testify at trial with respect to the standard of care
applicable to LDS Hospital, the breach of that standard by the
Hospital through its staff, and that the Hospital's negligence was a
contributing cause of the damages and injuries claimed by appellant.

In the course

of

discussions

on

appellantss

experts'

qualifications, the Trial Court made very specific rulings that the
underlying medical cause of the death of Betty George was irrelevant
to appellant's claims against LDS Hospital, and that, in any event,
the only persons qualified to testify concerning the underlying
medical cause of her death were those who personally participated in
officially determining the cause of death.
The hospital's defense was that the medical cause of Mrs.
George's

death

responsible.

was

sepsis,

for

which

the

hospital

was

not

After it became clear what the hospital's defense was,

the trial court

ignored

its prior

rulings

and

permitted

the

Hospital's physician experts to testify at length concerning the
underlying medical cause of Mrs. George's death.

The testimony of

respondent's experts regarding causation, was complete speculation,
without

proper

foundation, and

previous rulings.

contrary

B,

court's

This testimony included their unsubstantiated

opinions that medical procedures which
George,

to the trial

were never

performed

on Mrs.

would not have affected her chance for survival*
THE FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON APPELLANT'S THEORY

Appellant submitted legally accurate jury instructions setting
forth his theory that if the jury found that the negligent conduct
of the hospital was a substantial factor, increased the risk of
harm, or was a contributing proximate cause, of the injuries and
damage suffered, that the jury could render a verdict in appellant's
favor.

These instructions were rejected by the trial court, without

explanation.

Co
Not

SUBMISSION
only

did

OF

the

CLEARLY

trial

court

appellant's

theory,

effectively

directed

causation.

The instructions

instructions

were

it

gave

fail

to

Instructions

a verdict

legally

ERRONEOUS

INSTRUCTIONS
instruct
16A

for the hospital

are

and

in

at

jury

21A,

on the

fully described

erroneous

the

which

issue

hereafter.

least

the

on

of
The

following

particulars:
(1)

Requiring appellant to prove the underlying

medical

cause of death, contrary to law and contrary to the court's prior
rulings during trial;
(2)
cause

of

Requiring appellant to prove the underlying

death

exclusively

through

expert

physician

medical

testimony,

contrary to law and contrary to the court's prior rulings

during

trial;
(3)
the

death

of

Stating that all of appellant's damages flowed
Betty

George,

thereby

eliminating

from

one-half

of

appellant's entire case, that being appellant's claims for damages
for the injuries and damage suffered by Betty George prior to her
death; and
(4)
previously

Instructing the jury not to consider the competent,

admitted

testimony

of

appellant's

experts

(the

only

experts to testify with respect to the hospital's negligence) on the
issue of causation.
D.

ERRONEOUS
DIRECTED

Not

one

applicable

RULINGS
VERDICT

witness

ON
IN

testified

to Dr. Lloyd

.APPELLANT'S
FAVOR

OF

DRS.

concerning

or Dr. Lahey,

MOTIONS
LLOYD

the

whether

FOR
AND

standard

LAHEY
of

care

they breached

applicable standard, or whether such breaches caused the injuries

the

complained

of

by

the

appellant.

No

witness

testified

that

the

injuries complained of were the result of the defendant physicians 1
conduct,
other

or that

than

what

Mrs. George's
they

did.

doctors

should

Nonetheless,

have

the

trial

done

anything

court

denied

appellant's Motion for Directed Verdict for Drs. Lloyd and Lahey at
the close of the evidence.

E.

ERRORS

ON

THE

SPECIAL

The Special Verdict
court,

contained

VERDICT

FORM

form, submitted to the jury by the trial

numerous

prejudicial

errors,

including

the

following:
(1)

Failing

to

individually

name

the

heirs

of

Betty

George on the Special Verdict form, and failing to instruct the jury
that

each

was

individually

entitled

to

recover

damages

for

the

wrongful death of Betty George;
(2)

Incorporating

the

legal

errors

contained

in

Jury

Instructions Nos. 16A and 21A in Question 3B of the Special Verdict
from, thereby directing a verdict for the respondent LDS Hospital on
the issue of causation;
(3)

Omitting

from the Special Verdict

form a place

for

the jury to assess and award damages to appellant on his claim for
injuries and damages suffered by Betty George prior to to her death.
F.

PREJUDICIAL

IRREGULARITIES

ON

THE

LAST

DAY

OP

TRIAL

On November 8, 1989, the day before Election Day, the Court and
counsel met specifically for the purpose of agreeing to a final set
of jury instructions to be presented to the jury, A jury instruction
that

contained the substance

of Jury

Instruction No,16A had

been

previously eliminated in discussions between counsel, and was not
discussed in the November 8th meeting.

That which subsequently

became Jury Instruction 21A was specifically rejected by the Court
during that conference. A final set of jury instructions numbered 1
through 53 was compiled.
After the close of evidence the following day, immediately
prior to instructing the jury and closing arguments,

appellant's

Motion for Directed Verdict in favor of Drs. Lloyd and Lahey, was
heard in chambers and denied.

Thereupon, there was

"further

discussion" concerning additional jury instructions submitted by
respondent LDS Hospital.
At that point, despite the trial court's prior rulings that:
(1) appellant's experts were qualified to testify concerning the
hospital's

negligence

and

the

effect

thereof;

(2) that

the

underlying medical cause of Betty George's death was irrelevant to
appellant's claims against LDS Hospital; (3) that the Hospital's
experts were not qualified to testify concerning the underlying
medical cause of Betty George's death;

(4) that the Hospital's

proposed jury instructions on causation did not state the law; and
despite the trial court's knowledge of appellant's theory of
liability against LDS Hospital, the trial court permitted the
hospital to resubmit, and gave, Jury Instruction No. 21A, over the
objections of appellant.
Further, at some point after the conference on November 8,
1988, the trial court was apparently provided, accepted, and gave
Jury Instruction N0.I6A. There was no discussion concerning this
Instruction, nor did appellant have any opportunity to object to

this Jury Instruction prior to the time the trial court read it to
the jury.
At the conference just before closing arguments, there was also
discussion concerning the Special Verdict form wherein the trial
court, over appellant's objections, ordered the use of the form
containing the numerous prejudicial errors described herein.
The obvious and

irremediable

prejudicial

effect

of

Jury

Instructions Nos. 16A and 21A, and the Special Verdict form given to
the

jury by

the trial

court, was to preclude

the

jury

from

considering appellant's theory of liability against the respondent
LDS Hospital, to direct a verdict for the respondent Hospital on the
issue of causation, and to preclude the jury from

considering

appellant's claims for damages.
As the result of these erroneous, surprising and untimely
rulings,

appellant's

counsel

had

approximately

10 minutes

to

restructure his entire closing argument to the jury0 However, no
argument

could overcome the fatally prejudicial effect of the

foregoing Jury Instructions and Special Verdict form given by the
trial court.
Despite the request of appellant's counsel for additional time
for rebuttal in light of the trial court's rulings, the trial court
stuck to its prior ruling limiting closing argument to 90 minutes
per side (equal time despite hugely disparate burdens), and denied
appellant the opportunity to rebut the hospital's closing argument
which

predictably

took

irregularities set forth.

full

advantage

of

the

final

hour

2.

The trial court awarded respondent, as costs pursuant to

Rule 54 r Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the cost of copies of the
depositions

of the hospital

employees

and witnesses

taken by

appellant; the cost of depositions of witnesses who never testified;
the cost of depositions never used or referred to at trial; and the
cost of the depositions of appellant's experts. These rulings were
contrary to law and the purpose and intent of Rule 54, U.R.C.P.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE
An understanding of the theory of liability asserted by the
appellant against the respondent LDS Hospital at trial is crucial to
this Court's review of this appeal. Simply stated, that theory was
that:
a.

The hospital staff attending Betty George in the

absence of her physicians, had a duty to protect her from harm.
This included the duty to be the "eyes and ears" of the physicians,
and to immediately notify them of adverse changes in the Betty
George's condition so that necessary diagnosis and treatment could
be provided [DUTY];
b.

The hospital staff breached this duty on the afternoon

of August 2, 1986, by failing to notify Betty George's physicians of
important adverse changes in Betty George's medical condition which
required immediate diagnosis and treatment [BREACH];
c.

The hospital's negligence

(as found by the jury),

deprived Betty George of any meaningful chance of being diagnosed
and treated, and therefore of survival, and thus was a substantial

factor or contributing cause of her cardiac arrest and subsequent
death.

[CAUSATION]

Appellant

asserts

that

the

trial

court

ignored,

and/or

fundamentally misunderstood, his theory of liability against the
respondent LDS Hospital, which directly precipitated the errors
It was appellant 8s theory that the

complained of on appeal.

hospital's negligence in failing to procure necessary medical care,
directly and obviously contributed to the cause of Betty George's
initial cardiac arrest and subsequent death, regardless

underlying

medical

cause of her

of

the

death.
POINT II

APPELLANT HAD AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO HAVE THE JURY
INSTRUCTED ON HIS THEORY OF LIABILITY AGAINST THE RESPONDENT
LDS

HOSPITAL

Under Utah law, each party is entitled to have his theory of
the case, including his theory on causation, submitted to the jury
for consideration.
submit

jury

It has been uniformly held that the failure to

instructions

setting

forth

a party's

theory

of

liability, where there is competent evidence to support it, is
prejudicial, and constitutes reversible error. Goode v. Dayton
Disposal, I n c . 738 P.2d 638 (Utah 1987);
Pe2d 598, 606 (Utah 1983);
1981); Mikkelsen v. Haslam,

Grgen v. Trj-Q-Arc, 667

Watters v. Ouerry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah
P.2d

, 96 Utah Adv. Rep, 19, 22

(Utah App. 1988); Steele v. Breinholt, 747 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah App.
1987); BisweU v, Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987);

fUUer

v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300 (Utah App. 1987); and Joraensen v. Issa.
739 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 1987).

A.

EXTENSIVE EVIDENCE FROM BOTH APPELLANT AND
R E S P O N D E N T WAS INTRODUCED IN SUPPORT OF A P P E L L A N T ' S
THEORY OF THE CASE.

The testimony introduced at trial by appellant and respondent
was the same in the following particulars:
(1)

The LDS Hospital

staff had

a duty to

contact

Mrs.

George's physicians or other competent personnel to inform them of
adverse changes in her condition;
(2)
condition

There were adverse changes in Betty George's medical

on August

2,

1986/

which

required

that

physicians

be

notified;
(3)
in notifying

The hospital staff failed to notify, or was negligent
Mrs0

George's

physicians

of adverse

changes

in

her

medical condition;
(4)

Deprivation of oxygen to the major organs can cause

serious injury or death in a matter of minutes;
(5)

MrSe George was deprived of oxygen; and

(6)

Even

if

the

underlying

medical

cause

of

Betty

George's cardiac arrest and death was sepsis, the standard of care
applicable to the hospital required prompt notification of relevant
signs

and

symptoms,

in order

to

facilitate

immediate

aggressive

intervention by Betty George's physicians for the purpose of saving
her life;
(7)

No competent physician was informed of M r s . George's

deteriorating condition on the afternoon of August 2, 1986, with the
consequence that she had no opportunity to be diagnosed, treated and
saved.
The extensive evidence in this regard, unanimously supported by
the George family, appellant's experts, Mrs. George's treating

p h y s i c i a n s , t h e h o s p i t a l s t a f f and t h e h o s p i t a l ' s e x p e r t s i s s e t
f o r t h i n Addendum I .
B.

APPELLANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS SETTING FORTH HIS
THEORY FOR RECOVERY WERE IMPROPERLY REJECTED BY THE
TRIAL COURT.

Appellant f s theory was that the negligence of the hospital
staff

deprived Mrs. George of

any chance

for

diagnosis

and

treatment, and was thereby a "substantial factor" or a contributing
proximate cause of her a r r e s t and subsequent death.
proposed

proper

jury

instructions

asserting

this

Appellant
theory.

Appellant f s proposed Jury Instruction 24, [R-251] provided:
If p l a i n t i f f s demonstrate that the acts or omissions
of LDS Hospital increased the risk or harm to Betty
George, such evidence furnishes a basis for you to go
further and find t h a t the increased r i s k was a
proximate cause r e s u l t i n g in the death of Betty
George, and the consequent i n j u r i e s and damage
suffered by her immediate family and Estate.
Similarly, a p p e l l a n t ' s proposed Jury Instruction 32, [R-2 61]
provided:
In this case plaintiffs have alleged that the acts
and omissions of LDS Hospital by and through its
officers, agents and employees resulted in the
failure of Betty George to receive the medical care
necessary to save her life, and ability to continue
living in a normal and productive fashion. Should
you determine that the negligence of LDS Hospital
effectively terminated Betty George's chance for a
normal life, then you should disregard any conjecture
as to the measure of the chance for a normal life
that was eliminated. That is, if you find that the
negligence of LDS Hospital destroyed a substantial
possibility that Betty George might have survived and
returned to a healthy, productive state, then
defendants are liable for whatever injuries and
damage was thereby proximately caused.
The trial court's failure or refusal to give appellant's
proposed jury instructions concerning his theory of the case, is

solely a question of law, and may therefore be reviewed by this
Court de novo.

Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989-)

The recent case of Mikkelsen v. Haslam.

P.2d

, 96 Utah

Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah App. 1988) illustrates the application of this
standard of review.

There, the plaintiff was seriously injured when

she skied several years after a total hip replacement operation.
Plaintiff's theory of the case was that the defendant physician had
approved and encouraged her to ski.
he had given such advice.

The defendant physician denied

After the trial, the jury was instructed

on contributory negligence and assumption of the risk (defendant's
theory), but were not instructed that if the jury believed plaintiff
and her experts, that those defenses would be inapplicable.

This

Court reversed a verdict for the physician and remanded for a new
trial, holding:
A party is entitled to have his theories of the case
submitted to the jury provided there is competent
evidence to support them. (citations omitted)
Failure to give requested instructions is reversible
error if it tends to mislead the jury to the
prejudice of the complaining party or erroneously
advises on the law. [Id. at 22]
It is very important to note that in Mikkelsen, there was
competent evidence favoring the defendant from which the jury could
have arrived at the same verdict.
not determine, as a matter of law,

However, since this Court could
the effect of the failure to

give plaintiff's instructions, a new trial was required.

Thus, the

inquiry as framed by this Court in Mikkelsen, and equally applicable
here, is whether the failure to instruct as to appellant's theory
might

have unfairly prejudiced his case.

entitled to a new trial.

If so, appellant is

The case of Rudeck v. Wright, 709 P.2d

621

(Mont. 1985),

graphically illustrates the trial court's error below.

There, as

here, plaintiffs had sued physicians and a hospital for wrongful
death and survivor claims.

There, as here, settlements were reached

with some but not all of the parties.

There, as here, the remaining

defendant attempted to shift not necessarily the blame, but the
cause to others. The Court held that in such cases, instructing the
jury on the theory of "substantial factor" or "legal cause" rather
than proximate cause is required, defining a "legal cause" of death
as one which is a "substantial factor" in bringing about the death.
[Id.

at 628]

The Court explained its rationale as follows:

The "substantial factor" rule was developed primarily
for cases in which application of the "but for" rule
would allow each defendant to escape responsibility
because the conduct of one or more of the others
would have been sufficient to produce the same
result. It is possible, and even more helpful, to
apply axi alternative formulation that addresses
directly the need for declining to follow the "but
for" rule in this context.
The alternative
formulation is this? When the conduct of two or more
actors is so related to an event that their combined
conduct, viewed as a whole, is a "but for" cause of
an event, the application of the "but for" rule to
them individually would absolve all of them, the
conduct of each is a cause in fact of the event.
[Id.]

A "substantial factor" instruction is perfectly suited to
medical negligence cases involving the combined and completely
interrelated conduct of physicians and a hospital staff.

The Rudeck

court, finding support in Snead v. U.S., 595 F.Supp. 658, 665
(D.D.C. 1984), agreed, stating:
In cases of alleged medical mismanagement of a
patient's existing and potentially fatal condition,
the appropriate test for causation is the
'substantial factor' test.
Under this test,
plaintiffs must show that the defendant's deviation
on

from the standard of care was a 'substantial factor1
bringing about [the patient's] present condition.
In the instant case, appellant's request for the above "reduced
chance of survival" and "substantial factor" instructions, was based
on ample, well-reasoned support from other jurisdictions and legal
authorities.

For example, in Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative

of Puaet Sound. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash 1983), the issue
was whether

a stipulated

14% reduction

(from 39% to 25%) in

decedent's chance for survival was sufficient evidence of causation
to allow the jury to consider whether the failure to provide timely
diagnosis and treatment was a proximate cause of death.
The Herskovits

court reviewed

the

relevant

case

law and

succinctly summarized the persuaisive rationale for the "reduced
chance" theory as follows:
Rarely is it possible to demonstrate to an absolute
certainty what would have happened in circumstances
that the wrongdoer did not allow to come to pass.
The law does not in the existing circumstances
require the plaintiff to show to a certainty that the
patient would have lived had she been [appropriately
treated] promptly. [Id. at 47 8, citing
Hicks v. U.S..
369 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966)]

It is not necessary
evidence to establish

for a plaintiff
to
introduce
that the negligence resulted
in

the injury
or death,
but simply that the negligence
increased the risJc of injury or death. The step from
increased risk to causation is one for the jury to
make- [Id.,
citing Hamil v. Bashline. 481 Pa. 256,
392 A.2d 1280 (1978), emphasis added]
As a proximate result of defendant's negligence,
James was deprived of the opportunity to receive
early treatment and the chance of realizing any
resulting gain in his life expectancy and physical

and mental comfort. No matter how small that chance
may have been - and its
magnitude
cannot
be
ascertained
- no one can say that the chance of
prolonging
one's life
or decreasing
suffering
is
valueless.
[Id.,
citing James v. U.S.. 483 F.Supp.
581 (N.D.Cal. 1980), emphasis in
original]

The Herskovits court correctly stated:

"More speculation is

involved in requiring the medical expert to testify as to what would
have happened had the defendant not been negligent."

[Id.]

In this case, the respondent LDS Hospital relied on the
testimony of three physician experts who testified that Betty George
died of sepsis, and that none of a string of individual

actions by

the hospital staff would have altered the outcome. However, none of
these experts testified that each of the actions in

combination,

would not have increased Mrs. George's chances for survival.

The

Court is encouraged to study the testimony of Dr. Trowbridge [R-7 65,
pp. 518-47], Dr. Weinstein [R-767, pp.637-59], and Dr. Elliot [R768, pp. 739-86] closely.

Never do these experts state with any

certainty what caused the alleged sepsis, when it occurred, or the
point at which Mrs« George's death from the sepsis could not have
been prevented by diagnosis and treatment«,

The clear import of the

testimony of respondent's physicians is that Mrs. George's condition
became irretrievable only at the

time

of

approximately 7:00 p.m. on August 2, 1986.

her

cardiac

arrest

at

Of critical importance

is that no defense witness refuted appellant's primary claim that
the hospital staff's failure to notify Mrs. George's physicians of
the specific signs and symptoms exhibited by Mrs. George upon her
return to the 8th Floor, and thereafter, was a substantial factor,
or contributing proximate cause, of her subsequent cardiac arrest
and death.
In fact,

all of the respondent Hospital's physician experts

supported appellant's claims of negligence on the part of the
hospital staff, by testifying that Betty George's symptoms and
worsening condition required prompt action; that the LDS Hospital

staff should have contacted physicians capable of diagnosing and
treating Mrs, George, and that they each routinely and successfully
treated patient's critically

ill with sepsis, indicating that

diagnosis and treatment could prevent death in patient suffering
from serious sepsis•

[See, Testimony of Drs. Trowbridge, Weinstein

and Elliot in Addendum I]

Given such testimony, the jury should

have been allowed to perform its exclusive function of determining
the factual question of whether the respondent Hospital's negligence
was

a substantial

factor or contributing

proximate

cause of

appellant's injuries and damages.
Numerous decisions support appellant's claim of reversible
error here.

These includes

Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hospital,

566 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977); McBride v. U.S. . 462 F.2d 92 (9th
Cir. 1972); Jeanes v. Milner. 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970); Kaiser
Foundation v. Sharp. 741 P.2d 714 (Colo. 1987); McKellioos v. Saint
Francis HQSPital, 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987); Thompson v. Sun City
Hospital.

141 Ariz.

597, 688 P.2d

605

(1984);

Roberson

v.

Counselman. 235 Kan. 1006, 686 P.2d 149 (1984); Vassos v. Roussalis.
658 P.2d 1284 (Wyo. 1983); Gradel v. Inouye, 491 Pa. 534, 421 A.2d
674

(1980);

Johnson

V,

St. Bernard

Hospital, 399 N.E.2d

198

(Ill.App. 1979) KQlaKQwsKi Y, VQriS, 395 N.E.2d 6 (Ill.'App 1979);
Hernandez v. Clinica Pasteur, Inc.. 293 So.2d 747, 750 (Fla.Ct.App.
1974); Kallenbera v. Beth Israel Hospital. 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974).
These

courts

all characterize

the Hospitalfs

conduct

as

depriving the decedent of a "significant" chance to survive or
recover, rather than requiring proof, as was done in this case, that
the defendant's conduct was the cause of the underlying medical
condition.

The rationale for this rule of law can be summarized as

follows:

" I t is

not

recovery

beyond

realizationf

inevitable."

for

the

wrongdoer

to say afterward

the possibility
that

BerskQvitS v, GfQUP Insurance, supra,

(emphasis added); and "[T]he interest
the

who put

chance

itself,

and the

chance,

which is

a function

jury."

Thompson, supra,

chief

the

of

result

was

664 P,2d at 476.

which the law is protecting

problem

peculiarly

is
within

the

is

evaluation

of

the

the province

of

the

688 P.2d at 616 ( c i t a t i o n s omitted)
POINT

III

THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTIONS 16A AND 21A
CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL
AND REMAND FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Ae

THE INSERTION OF INSTRUCTIONS 16A AND 21A ON THE
LAST DAY OF TRIAL, AFTER THE CLOSE OF EVIDENCE,
CHANGED APPELLANT'S BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE
CAUSATION ISSUE FROM WHAT IT HAD BEEN THROUGHOUT
THE LITIGATION, AND DENIED APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL.

The primary issue in the trial of this matter was, or should
have been, whether the negligent conduct of the LDS Hospital staff
was a substantial

factor,

or contributing proximate cause of

the patient's cardiac arrest and irreversible coma on August 2,
1986.
Addendum II sets forth the numerous instances in which the
trial court ruled that the underlying medical cause of the patient's
death was "irrelevant" or "not at issue."

In reliance on those

correct rulings, appellant's counsel expected that appellant's
theory

on causation,

together

with

the evidence

offered by

appellant's experts, Nurse Gillerman and Don Owings, R.T., would be
considered by the jury on the causation issue.

Consequently,

appellant never intended to, and never attempted to prove the
underlying medical cause of Betty George's death.

Consequently, appellant was shocked when, on the last day of
trial, after counsel for both sides had rested, and only minutes
before closing arguments were to begin, the trial court added Jury
Instructions 16A and 21A to the final set of Instructions.

[R-511,

518]
Jury Instruction 21A provided:
You are instructed that where the proximate cause of
Betty George's death and therefore the injury or loss
claimed by plaintiff is not established by a
preponderance of the evidence based on reasonable
medical probability from testimony of a medical
doctor, but is left to conjecture or speculation and
may be reasonably attributed to causes over which the
hospital or doctor had no control or responsibility,
then the plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden
of proof as to proximate causation.
Jury Instruction 16A, which appears to have simply been a
reformulation Instruction 21A, provided:
The plaintiff in this case cannot recover against the
doctors or the hospital unless it is proven that:
1.
Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS
Hospital's nursing staff or respiratory therapist, or
all of them, based on a degree of reasonable medical
probability, failed to exercise that degree of
reasonable care and skill in caring for the plaintiff
that was ordinarily possessed and used by others in
the respective profession practicing in 1986 in Salt
Lake City, Utah, or similar communities under similar
circumstances;
2.
Based on a degree of reasonable medical
probability established through expert medical
testimony from a duly qualified medical doctor, that
such failure, if any, was the proximate cause of the
death of Betty George, and;
3. That David George personally, and the heirs of
Betty George, and the representative of the Estate of
Betty George, was damaged by the negligence, if any,
of one of the defendants or all of them.
If you do not find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, all of the foregoing propositions with
regard to either Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey
or LDS Hospital, the party or parties, as the case

may be, against whom any one proposition is not found
cannot be found to have committed medical malpractice
and your verdict must be in favor of that defendant
or defendants.
If you find that the evidence is
evenly balanced on any of the above-mentioned issues,
then your verdict should be for the defendant or
defendants on whose behalf the evidence is evenly
balanced.
Instruction 21A had been specifically rejected by the trial
court the day before in an off-record conference held for the
specific purpose of arriving at a final set of instructions.
Tuesday,

November 8, 1989, was Election Day and the court reporter

had the day off. Consequently, the conference was not reported. Jury
Instruction 16A had also been previously rejected.

It was inserted

into the final set of jury instructions on the last day of trial
without discussion.

The version read to the jury does not even

appear in the record until November 14, 1988, five days after the
jury's verdict.

[R-409, 431]

The designation "A" after these

Instructions is proof that they were added after the final set of
instructions was agreed to between the Court and counsel on November
8, 1988.

(The sequence of events regarding Jury Instruction 21A is

fully set forth in PLAINTIFFfS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT - OR FOR A NEW TRIAL [R-443-478, pp. 454-59]/ and the
unrebutted

AFFIDAVIT

OF

PLAINTIFF'S

COUNSEL,

[R-479-493,

specifically 515-31, pp. R-483-87])
It was simply and fundamentally unfair for the trial court to
"change the rules of the game" after the trial had ended, especially
when the last-minute changes adopted respondent's defense and
instructed the jury not to consider appellant's competent, and
previously admitted evidence on causation.

The error in submitting

Jury Instructions 16A and 21A is boldly highlighted in contrast to
the clear, concise and correct statement of appellant's burden as

agreed

to,

and

set

forth

in

Jury

Instruction

16

[R-510].

Appellant's burden, as set forth there, was simply to prove "that
the negligence of LDS Hospital, through its employees, was a
proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs."
B.

INSTRUCTIONS 16A AND 21A REQUIRED APPELLANT TO
PROVE THE UNDERLYING MEDICAL CAUSE OF DEATH, AN
IRRELEVANT ISSUE, THROUGH A PHYSICIAN.

Addendum

II sets forth the trial court's

law-of-the-case

rulings that only the physician who signed the death certificate, or
those actually involved in officially determining the underlying
medical cause of death could testify on that subject.

Pursuant to

those rulings, appellant's experts were precluded from testifying as
to underlying medical cause of death.
properly

permitted

appellant's

However, the trial court had

experts

to

testify

that

the

hospital's negligence was a cause of the crucial event in the case,
that being the initial cardiac arrest suffered by Betty George on
August 2nd, resulting in an irreversible coma and her eventual
death.
Thereafter, in violation of the trial court's prior rulings,
all three of respondent LDS Hospital's experts were allowed to offer
purely speculative opinions on the irrelevant, underlying medical
cause of death.

The repeated violation of the trial court's own

ruling would have been of no consequence, but for the last-minute
insertion of Jury Instructions 16A and 21A which made testimony on
the underlying medical cause of death through a physician, critical
elements of appellant's

burden of proof.

What instructions 16A and 21A did, very simply, was to tell the
jury that they were not allowed to consider any of appellant's

experts' evidence on the issue of causation after both had been
properly qualified and their testimony allowed*

In this case, the

hospital's liability flows directly from the Hospital's breach of
duty to protect the patient from harm.
argument,

that- sepsis

was

the

Assuming for the purpose of

operative

underlying

medical

condition, that would in no way alter the hospital's duty, nor the
proximate

result

from of a breach of that duty.

In fact, it is

quite clear from the evidence that sepsis is dangerous and demands
immediate, aggressive

intervention

in order for a patient to

survive.
The view, apparently adopted by the trial court after the close
of evidence, that qualified nurses and respiratory therapists are
incapable of rendering opinions with regard to the effect of
hospital staff negligence, is contrary to law and common sense. For

example, in Campbell v, Pitt County Memorial Hospital/ 352 s.£.2d
902 (N.C.App. 1987), an obstetrical case, plaintiffs claimed that
the nursing staff's

failure to obtain the patient's

informed

consent, and the subsequent failure to alert physicians as to
adverse changes in the patient's condition was negligence, and a
contributing proximate cause of severe brain damage suffered by the
infant.

Plaintiffs supported their case with the testimony of

several nurse experts.

In affirming a verdict for the plaintiffs,

the Court held:
Nurse Susan Rumsey, another expert for the plaintiff,
testified that a parent who had been informed that
its baby was in the footlong breach presentation and
who had been informed of the risks of a vaginal
delivery ordinarily "would opt for a safer
procedure."
Accordingly, failure to see that
informed consent had been obtained "could have
affected the outcome . . . " here in Nurse Rumsey's
opinion. [Id. at 908]

[W]e hold t h a t p l a i n t i f f s
presented
sufficient
evidence t o show t h a t t h e h o s p i t a l ' s
general
o b l i g a t i o n "to make a reasonable e f f o r t t o monitor
and oversee t h e t r e a t m e n t " . . ., included the
s p e c i f i c duty . . ., t o e s t a b l i s h an e f f e c t i v e
mechanism for the prompt r e p o r t i n g of any s i t u a t i o n
t h a t created a t h r e a t to the health of a p a t i e n t . .
Plaintiffs'
evidence
is also
sufficient
to
demonstrate
that
defendant-hospital
's
failure
to perform
this
duty was a proximate
cause of
Jennifer's
injuries.
[Id. at 90 9, emphasis added]
Consequently, t h e e f f e c t of t h e C o u r t ' s l a s t - m i n u t e erroneous
changes in t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s not only e l i m i n a t e d a p p e l l a n t ' s theory
on t h e c a u s a t i o n

issue,

but a l s o r e q u i r e d

appellant

l e g a l l y erroneous burden of proof which was d i f f e r e n t
been in e f f e c t throughout the t r i a l .
fairness,

and t h e o p p o r t u n i t y

t o meet a

from what had

In a l e g a l system grounded in

for a l l

litigants

t o have a jury

consider t h e i r theory of recovery, the r e s u l t in t h i s case cannot be
allowed t o stand*
C.

APPELLANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SUBMIT THE CASE
ON CAUSATION AGAINST LDS HOSPITAL WITHOUT EXPERT
TESTIMONY FROM A PHYSICIAN.
IF ANY EXPERT
TESTIMONY WAS NECESSARY, THE TESTIMONY OF
APPELLANT'S EXPERTS WAS SUFFICIENT.

In t h e t y p i c a l medical malpractice case, expert testimony i s
r e q u i r e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e a p p l i c a b l e standard of c a r e , i t s breach,
and t h a t the breach was a proximate cause of the i n j u r i e s and damage
in i s s u e .

One e x c e p t i o n

to t h i s

general

rule

is

that

expert

testimony i s unnecessary i f the conduct complained of, or the r e s u l t
of such conduct, would be obvious t o laymen.

Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612

P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980.)
In this case, appellant's theory, fully supported by competent
testimony and evidence, was that the hospital staff failed to
procure the presence of a competent physician(s) for essential

medical diagnosis and treatment when it was obviously necessary.
There was unrefuted evidence that the hospital staff failed or
refused to call a doctor despite the repeated pleas of members of
the George family who were actually present; that critical nursing
observations were not provided to resident Carol Adams who was
supposedly present on occasion; and that the condition of Mrs.
George was allowed to steadily deteriorate, without intervention,
over a 5 hour period to the point of cardio-pulmonary arrest,
despite the presence of a specially assigned one-on-one nurse whose
sole duty that afternoon was to continually monitor Betty George and
make sure that changes in condition were immediately reported.
Evidence in this regard is more fully set forth in Addendum I. [See,
Testimony of Dr. Lloyd, Nurses Terry and Schnabel, and David George]
The failure to procure effective medical assistance in the face
of obvious need is an issue which a jury can understand without the
assistance of expert testimony.

A lay person can reasonably infer

the outcome for a patient with serious respiratory difficulties who,
after more that 24 hours with respirations more than double the
normal, suddenly has their respiratory rate "slowed to

",

and

is thereafter not seen by a physician for two full hours, at which
point the patient's breathing ceases.

There is nothing mysterious

about the need of human beings for oxygen, and what happens if that
supply is severely diminished or cut off for a prolonged period.
Under these circumstances, appellant should have been able to submit
the factual

question

of

whether

the

contributed to the cause of appellant's
requirement of producing expert testimony.

hospital's

negligence

injuries without the

For example, in Brennan v. Lankenau Hospital. 417 A.2d 196 (Pa.
1980), the plaintiff suffered severe injuries when the hospital
nursing staff failed to report adverse changes in the patient's
condition to attending physicians.

The Court held that under those

circumstances the jury could determine the issue of the hospital's
liability without expert testimony, stating
We think it clear that staff failure to notify the
attending physician of the deteriorating condition of
one of his patients falls within the exception to the
requirement of expert testimony.
eDuring the night, no hospital staff member
monitored changes in appellant's condition or
notified Dr. West. Staff failure here to so notify
the supervising physician is a glaring example of
want of care. Thus, it was for the jury to
consider
Lankenau's
liability.
[Id. at 201, emphasis
added]
Appellant, in opening argument, stated that it was the first
and highest duty of LDS Hospital to do whatever is necessary within
the scope of its authority to protect a patient from harm.

This

simple truth, which was later supported by expert testimony and not
contradicted by anyone, elicited an immediate Motion for a Mistrial
by the respondent LDS Hospital. In fact, this duty of a hospital,
which was the pivotal point of appellant's case, is unanimously
supported by legal and medical authorities.

Typical language on

this point is found in Beeck v. Tuscon General Hospital/ 500 p.2d
1153, 1157 (Ariz, App. 1972):
Having undertaken one of mankind's most critically
important and delicate fields of e n d e a v o r ,
concomitantly therewith the hospital must assume the
grave responsibility of pursuing this calling with
appropriate care. The care and services dispensed
through this high trust, however technical, complex
and esoteric its character may be, must meet
standards of responsibility commensurate with the
undertaking to preserve and protect the health, and

indeed, the very lives of those placed
hospitalf s keeping.

in the

Jarvis v. St. Charles Medical Center, 713 P.2d 620 (Or. App.
1986), is a good example of how the causation issue should have been
submitted in this case. There, plaintiff alleged that the failure of
the hospital nurses to alert the patient's doctor of signs and
symptoms of Compartment Syndrome resulted in the subsequent death
and removal of the patient's leg tissue*

Prior to trial, the

plaintiff had settled with the treating physician.

At trial,

evidence was admitted that the patient's physician had been aware
of, and had provided treatment for the condition, but that later
complications went unreported.
similar

to

the

case

at

bar,

The facts of Jarvis are strikingly
with

the

exception

that

the

responsibility of LDS Hospital here would be greater since Mrs*
George's complications were obviously life-threatening.
In Jarvis.

the hospital's theory to avoid liability was that

no doctor testified "to a reasonable medical probability" that the
change in plaintiff's condition had existed long enough to have been
discovered by the nursing staff in the exercise of reasonable care,
and that therefore, the plaintiff had failed to prove that the
nurses' negligence caused his injury.
suffer from even that uncertainty.

The George case does not
Rather, the evidence was

uncontradicted that the change in the Betty George's condition
requiring physician notification was apparent immediately upon Mrs.
George's return to the 8th Floor, five hours prior to her cardiac
arrest.
The Jarvis Court cogently observed that the "it doesn't matter
what we did" defense, if allowed, would be self-insulating.

That

is, the very negligent acts and omissions complained of provide a
*30

built-in defense, since it would be impossible to predict

the

outcome had the hospital complied with the standard of care.
In Jarvis, the trial court also flatly rejected the defense
contention that the plaintiff is required to prove the underlying
medical cause of his complication, where the allegation is that
hospital negligence deprived a patient of necessary diagnosis and
treatment.

In so holding, the Court pointed out the critical

difference between the issue of what the operative medical condition
was [LDS theory], and the issue of whether something could have been
done to prevent the medical complication [George theory].
held that where the issue is the latter,

The Court

all that is necessary to

prove causation is that the evidence provide a reasonable inference
that the hospital's negligence deprived the patient of necessary
treatment*

The Court stated:
[The doctor's] opinion testimony, together with his
description of the surrounding circumstances,
supported the inference that there was a reasonable
probability that the change in the condition of
plaintiff's leg became discernible several hours
before [the doctor] examined [the plaintiff]•
Moreover, [the doctor's] testimony was not the only
evidence that supported that inference. Plaintiff's
chart showed that no tests were performed by the
nurses during the four and one-half hour period
preceding [the doctor's] examination. [Id. at 622,
emphasis
added.]

In Jarvis, the defendant hospital produced expert testimony to
the effect that the doctor was negligent, that the nurses were not
negligent, and that nothing the nurses did or did not do caused the
injury.

Despite the defendant's expert testimony, the Jarvis Court

held:
The argument misses the point. It is true that [the
hospital's ] experts testified that [the doctor] was
negligent, that the nurses were not and that [the

doctor's] failure to respond adequately to the
February 18 symptoms caused plaintiff's injury.
However, their testimony was also relevant to whether
the nurses would have found observable symptoms if
they had adequately examined plaintiff between 4 and
8:30 on the morning of February 20, and, therefore,
it was inferentially probative of whether the nurses1
failure to conduct the examination as well as [the
doctor's] negligence contributed to plaintiff's
injuries. [Id. at 623]
Once again, the facts in the instant case are stronger than
those in Jarvis.
testimony

Not only did all of the respondent's experts'

confirm

LDS hospital's

negligence

and

support

the

inference that it was causally connected to the outcome, there was
also direct testimony of that causal relationship through the
testimony of appellant's experts and the patient's own non-negligent
treating physicians•

Unfortunately, the effect of Jury Instructions

16A and 21A was to prevent the jury from considering the competent
and unrefuted evidence linking the negligence of LDS Hospital to the
cause of Betty George's cardiac arrest and death.

similarly, in utter v, United Hospital Centerr inc»# 236 s.E.2d
213,

216 (W.Va. 1977), the plaintiff was admitted to the hospital

with a broken wrist and elbow.

The nurses there observed and

reported obvious changes in the condition of the limb, but did not
report associated changes in the patient's mentation.

Then, when

the physician failed to act, the nurses failed to protect the
patient

from

authorities.
on appeal.

harm

by

contacting

other

hospital

or

medical

A jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff was reversed
In reinstating the jury verdict, the West Virginia

Supreme Court held:
It is contended by the defendant hospital that the
nurses contacted the treating physician and did all
that their duties required; that they had no reason
to believe that the patient was not receiving proper

care.

The question

of the propriety

of the action

or

inaction of the nurses is one to be decided by the
jury under the evidence before it.
The tenor of the defense's contentions indicates that
the nurses are being treated unfairly and that they
should not be expected to heal the patient's ills.
While registered nurses certainly are not charged
with the responsibility of curing patients, they are
charged with duties clearly reflected in the record.

Nurses are specialists
in hospital care who, in the
final analysis, hold the well-being, in fact in some
instances,
the very lives of patient 's in
their
hands,

The

[emphasis added,]

underlying

factual

predicate

essentially the same as in this case.

for

this

decision

is

Here, the respondent LDS

Hospital made the same "contentions" with respect to the duties and
responsibilities of a hospital .

Given the opportunity to perform

their function to determine if inaction on the part of a hospital in
alerting physicians for necessary diagnosis and treatment is a
proximate cause of subsequent injuries, the jury will respond
positively every time.

Protecting a patient from harm is the

least

anyone expects from a hospital staff, yet it is also the hospital's
most vital

function.

The causal connection

completely obvious. See also,
the Perpetual Adoration.

in this case is

Poor Sisters of St. Francis Seraph of
Inc. v. Catron. 435 N.E.2d 305, 308

(Ind.App. 1982):
[I]f a nurse or other hospital employee fails to
report changes in a patient's condition and/or to
question a doctor's orders when they are not in
accord with standard medical practice and the

omission

results

in injury

hospital will be liable
negligence, [emphasis added.]

to

for

the patient,
its

the

employee's

- and a seminal case in this area of the law, Darling v. Charleston
Community Hospital. 33 111.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
Karriaan v. Nazareth Convent & Academy. Inc, , 510 P.2d 190
(Kan. 1973), is also persuasive precedent relevant to appellant's

contention that the testimony of expert physicians should not have
been required in order to prove that the hospital's negligence was a
contributing proximate cause of appellant's damages in this case.
There, plaintiff sued his doctor and the hospital for damages
suffered as a result of post-operative complications, the cause of
which was unknown.
defendants.

The trial court directed a verdict for both

On appeal the judgment as to the physician was

affirmed.
The issue as to the hospital was its failure to contact the
patient's doctor or secure other medical attention for him, when it
was obvious that his condition was deteriorating. The hospital had
been awarded a directed verdict because the plaintiff had not
secured the testimony of an expert to say that a hospital must do
whatever it can within the limit of its authority to protect the
patient from harmc

Despite the lack of expert testimony, the Court

held that the dismissal of the hospital was reversible error,
observing that:
There remains however, the failure of the nurses to
make more than one attempt to locate Dr. Stone. A
majority
of this court feels that even laymen might
justifiably
find this effort
inadequate
in light
of
plaintiff's
repeated
requests
for a doctor,
his
severe pain, and his apprehensiveness
acute enough
that
he called
for
a priest.
Under
these
circumstances
- with the patient's condition
deteriorating to the point where his doctor found him
"critical" - it does not seem necessary
to
require
expert
testimony
to establish
that
a
hospital
exercising
ordinary skill,
care and diligence
would
have secured a doctor by his bedside.
IfrDr. Stone
could not be reached, the jury might have found it
the hospital's duty to secure the presence of some
other doctor. Failure
to secure a doctor for him
without
question
caused plaintiff
at least
mental
anguish, for which he would be entitled
to recover if
the hospital
had a duty to call one. [Id. at 196,
emphasis added]

The George case again provides more compelling facts.

Here,

members of the family of Betty George who were present as her
condition deteriorated made repeated pleas and demands that the LDS
Hospital nurses get Betty

some help - all to no avail. [See,

Testimony of David George in Addendum I]

The record reflects that

the unlicensed "one-on-one special duty" nurse assigned by LDS
Hospital spent more time trying to reassure the family about Betty
George's condition than she did in attending to the patientfs urgent
needs. [R-270, P's. Exh. 1, pp. 170-71]

Mrs. George's physicians

were not summoned until after she had stopped breathing, and by that
time, Mrs. George was brain dead.
Appellant here strenuously asserts that where the negligent
conduct

at issue is so basic,

so central to the duty

and

responsibility of a hospital, and so vital to the health and well
being of patients to whom the hospital owes a duty, that there is no
need for expert testimony to establish causation. The court so found
in Hiatt v. Grace, 523 P.2d 320

(Kan. 1974), affirming a jury

verdict against the defendant hospital despite the lack of any
expert testimony establishing liability, holding:

"Non-expert

witnesses can testify as to external appearances and manifest
conditions observable by anyone1"; and "It required no degree of
medical expertise for Mr. Hiatt to observe the degree of pain his
wife was enduring and the frequency of her contractions." [Id.
325o]

See

also,

at

Libbee v. Permanent^ Clinic, 520 P.2d 361, 363

(Or. 1974).
The trial at issue in this appeal was against LDS Hospital.
expert

testimony

negligence

was

contributed

required
to the

to prove
cause

that

the

If

hospital's

of appellant's

damages,

appellantfs expert nurse and respiratory therapist experts were
perfectly capable of testifying as to that causal link.
court specifically so foundc
327-28.]

[See,

The trial

Addendum III; and R-7 65, pp*

Thus, there was clear prejudicial error in subsequently

instructing the jury that it was appellant's burden to prove the
underlying medical cause of death exclusively through physicians.
Under the the facts and circumstances in this case, Jury
Instructions 16A and 21A were irrelevant, unnecessary, confusing,
contrary to law and reason, and extremely prejudicial.
De

THE PREJUDICIAL ERROR CAUSED BY INSTRUCTIONS 16A
AND 21A REQUIRES REVERSAL AND REMAND FOR A NEW
TRIAL.

In determining whether the trial courtfs error in submitting
Jury Instructions 16A and 21A to the jury requires remand for a new
trial, the

focus of the inquiry

is not whether the evidence

presented below supports the verdict rendered, but whether it is
possible that the verdict would have been different absent the
error(s) complained of.
the proper inquiry is:

Specifically,

with respect to this case,

Did the submission of Instructions 16A and

21A deprive the appellant of a chance that the jury would find that
the negligence of LDS Hospital was a proximate cause of the death of
Betty George?

If it did, then a New Trial must be granted.

Mikkelsen v. Haslam.

P.2d

,, 96 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 22 (Utah

App. 1988)
Plaintifffs position finds ample support in the case law from
other jurisdictions.

For example, in Roberts Realty v. City of

Great Falls, 500 P.2d 956, 964 (Mont. 1972), a new trial was ordered

after the court gave an erroneous instruction on the doctrine of
ipsa

loquitur.

res

The Court held:

In the appeal before us, we find the giving of the
res ipsa instruction particularly prejudicial because
the jury may have used the doctrine to cast a
presumption of negligence upon the defendant when the
evidence of simple negligence was near equipoise. We
do not know on what finding the jury based its
general verdict.

Where, as here, it is impossible to say upon what
theory or under what part of the court's
instructions
a verdict
is based, error in any one of
the
instructions
which is prejudicial
and which may
influence the jury entitles the unsuccessful party to
a new trial.

[Id.

at 964, citation omitted, emphasis

added.]

This is true regardless of the effect of other instructions,
correct or contradictory.
(Colo.App* 1972).

Koch v. Stevens, 552 P.2d 525, 527

There, as here, the argument was over the

instructions on burden of proof.

Basically, the instructions may

have led the jury to believe that the plaintiff had the burden to
prove something that was not legally necessary in order to prevail.
The Court stated:
An instruction that could lead the jury to place upon
the plaintiff the burden of establishing to what
extent the defendant is not responsible for his
present condition would be erroneous,
(citation

omitted)
Likewise,
because it is impossible
to
determine by which instruction
the jury was guided in
reaching a verdict,
the submission of
conflicting
instructions
upon the burden of proof is
error,

(citations
omitted)
Furthermore, if the effect of an
instruction to which an objection has been made is to
cause the jury to speculate, it is sufficient to
render a new trial necessary, even though the
instruction itself may be technically correct.
(citation
omitted)
The instruction as given here may
well have led the jury to conclude that it was
plaintiff's obligation to show the extent to which
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of
plaintiff's present condition, and that, failing in
this obligation, plaintiff would be entitled to
little or no damages, (emphasis
added.)

see also,

Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage. 718 P.2d 456, 462

(Alas. 1986), "An erroneous instruction is prejudicial if we cannot
say that the jury's verdict may not have been different had it not
been so instructed."
While observing that there is no precise formula for measuring
the effect of a particular instruction on a jury's verdict, the
California Supreme Court has set forth a number of factors which may

be considered in LeMons v, Regents of the University of California,
582 P.2d 946, 950 (Cal. 1978). Such factors include:
1.

The degree of conflict

in the

evidence

on the

critical issue;
2c

Whether defendant's argument to the jury may have

contributed to the instruction's misleading effect;
3.

Whether

the

jury

requested

a rereading

of the

erroneous instruction;
4o

The closeness of the jury's verdict;

5o

The effect of other instructions in remedying the

error.
Applying these factors to this case, the likelihood that Jury
Instructions 16A and 21A had a prejudicial effect is manifest.
First, there was a great deal of conflict on the causation issue.
Proximate cause was, in fact, the critical issue in the George
trial. Second, the Hospital counsel's closing argument to the jury
focused almost exclusively on the precise instructions at question.
The jury was repeatedly told that instruction 21A was the key to
their deliberations. [R-768, pp.878-882]

The effect of respondent's

argument was enhanced by the fact that appellant's counsel did not
have the opportunity to rebut it. The third factor is inapplicable

here, since the jury was allowed to take the instructions with them
during

deliberations.

However,

respondent's

counsel

re-read

instruction 21A to the jury and specifically referred to it in
closing argument.

The fourth factor is unknown.

Finally, no other

instructions given by the Court would have had any curative impact
of Jury Instructions 16A and 21A.
Jury

Instructions

24

and

In fact, appellant's proposed

32, which

specifically

set

forth

appellant's theory as against the hospital, were not given.
In this case, it is impossible to say that the jury's verdict
on causation was unrelated to instructions 16A and 21A, and/or the
failure to specifically instruct the jury as to appellant's theory.
At the same time, it would be perfectly logical for this Court to
assume that the jury did as they were clearly

told

in those

instructions, and held appellant to the burden of proving the cause
of Mrs c George's
physician.

ultimate

death

through

the

testimony

of a

Consequently, the trial court's error in giving these

instructions were not harmless, and a new trial is required in the
interests of justice and fairness.
POINT IV
THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM UTILIZED BY THE TRIAL COURT
MADE THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS 16A
AND 21A UNAVOIDABLE AND CONSTITUTED ADDITIONAL
PREJUDICIAL ERROR
The Special Verdict form submitted to the jury can be found at
R-401-03.

The final judgment is at R-709-12.

Appellant primarily

complains of Question 3B on the Special Verdict Form which read:
If you answered "yes" to No. 3A above (was LDS
Hospital negligent?), then answer the following
question:
Was the negligence of LDS Hospital
including the nursing staff and/or the respiratory
therapists, a proximate cause of the death of Betty

George and the damages claimed by David George and
the heirs of Betty George?
The jury answered this question "No."

The verdict form then

states:
If you answered "No" to question 3A or 3B, or if you
found no preponderance of the evidence either way,
then answer no further questions.
If there were any other instructions which mitigated the
prejudicial effect of 16A and 21A - and appellant asserts that a
careful reading of all the instructions, individually, and as a
group, reveals there was not - the Special Verdict form made the
error inherent in Instructions 16A and 21A unavoidable.
A,

THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM PROHIBITED THE JURY FROM
CONSIDERING THE INJURIES AND DAMAGES SUFFERED
PERSONALLY BY BETTY GEORGE PRIOR TO HER DEATH.
If the

jury

found that

appellant

had not proved the

underlying medical cause of death though a physician, as required by
Instructions 16A and 21A, the jury was then told not to consider any
damages.

A significant part of appellant's case was the claim under

Utah Code Ann. §78-11-12, for the injuries and damage suffered
personally by Betty George prior
injuries

and

damage

there was

to her death.
extensive

In regard to these

unrebutted

evidence

introduced on appellant's behalf to support that claim. [See, e.g.,
Excerpts from the testimony of Molly Brewer, David George, Traci
Ruber and Cynthia Brown set forth in Addendum I.]
Appellant's claim for damages under Utah's Survival Statute was
completely separate and distinct from his claim for wrongful death.
Damages under Utah Code Ann. §78-11-12,

belong to the deceased's

estate, while wrongful death damages under Utah Code Ann. §78-11-7,
flow directly to the statutory heirs. Switzer v. Reynolds. 606 P.2d

42

244 (Utah 1980).

Consequently, it defies common sense to require a

party to prove cause of death as a prerequisite to recovering for
injuries and damage that occurred prior to death.

Further, from the

evidence set for in Addendum I, it is apparent that the hospital's
negligence caused Betty George, at the least, considerable pain and
suffering, mental anguish and emotional distress prior to her
cardiac arrest - all of which are compensable damages.
Karriaan.

510 P.2d at 196, cited supra,

See,

at pp. 32-33.

The Special Verdict form utilized by the trial court over
appellant's objection, eliminated that aspect of appellant's case.
Though there were appropriate jury instruction on this aspect of the
case [See, Instructions 39 and 40, R-539, 540], there was no place
for the jury to decide if the hospital was responsible for pre-death
fn

-

l

damages, and other parts of the Special Verdict specifically

instructing the jury not to consider that significant aspect of
appellant's case if there was a negative answer on the issue of
cause of death. fn- x
fn. 1

Appellant's proposed Special Verdict for would have curred the error.
See, Exhibit 1, attached. Therein Question 3B was framed as follows:
If you answered "yes" to question 3A above, then you should
answer this question: Was the negligence of LDS Hospital . . .,
a proximate cause of the death of Betty George, and the damages
claimed be David George personally, the heirs of Betty George
Si the Estates of Betty George? (emphasis
added)
Appellant's proposed verdict form also includes a separate Question 5:
If you answered "yes" to any of the questions above, then you
should answer this question: What amount of money damages
would fairly and adequately compensate the Estate of Betty
George for the pain and suffering, mental anguish and emotional
distress, if any that Betty George experienced personally
prior to her death?
This format would have allowed the necessary separate consideration of
this element of appellant's case.
A O

This

arbitrary

elimination

of

a

significant

aspect

of

appellant's case and claim for damages on the Special Verdict form,
constituted prejudicial error requiring a new trial.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
AS TO DEFENDANT DOCTORS LLOYD AND LAHEY
Prior to trial, appellant believed that his strongest and
clearest case was against the hospital.

Accordingly, appellant

settled with Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey for an amount which appellant
believed

fairly

reflected

those

comparative negligence. [0-20%]

defendants'

percentage

of

At trial appellant produced no

evidence with respect to the standard of care applicable to the
physician defendants, or the breach of that standard.
Lloyd or Drc Lahey put on any evidence.

Neither Dr.

Respondent LDS Hospital

completely failed to elicit any evidence about the standard of care
applicable to the physicians or its breach. In fact, the physician
experts called by the respondent Hospital all testified favorably
for Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey. [See, Addendum IV]
Consequently, at the close of the evidence, Dr. Lloyd and Dr.
Lahey were absolutely entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of

law.

Farrow yt Health Services, Corp./ 604 p.2d 474, 477 (Utah

1979) .

Appellant moved the trial court for a Directed Verdict in

favor of these physicians, which motion was denied. Discussion on
appellant's Motion for Directed Verdict is contained in the record
at R-787-793; 796-799; and 801-803.

There the trial court makes

clearly erroneous assumptions about the testimony of respondent's

experts, then refuses to consult the record to learn the truth of
the matter.
The jury was required to consider the conduct of the physician
defendants in Jury Instructions 16A, 18, 19, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 35,
37 and the Special Verdict Form.

This was particularly prejudicial

to appellant, since the respondent LDS Hospital relied on physician
experts

for its defense, and Jury

Instructions

16A and 21A

erroneously required proof from physicians to establish appellant's
claim against the Hospital on the causation issue.
error

permeating

the

submission

highlighted in this respect:
allow

the

physicians
instructed
previously

jury

to decide

without
the

jury

admitted

negligence
competent

not

to

expert

of the case to the jury is

While the

any

consider

testimony

The prejudicial

trial

court

and causation
evidence,
appellant
on proximate

was willing
as against

it
's

to
the

specifically
competent

cause against

and
the

hospitalo
The jury proved it was capable of doing its job by finding that
Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey were not negligent.

However, it is

impossible to assess what effect the erroneous inclusion of those
defendants had on the jury's decision of the causation issue as to
LDS Hospital.

For that reason, the Judgement herein must be

reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.

On remand, the

judgments in favor of Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey should be affirmed,
and the matter remanded against LDS Hospital only.

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT
COSTS UNDER UTAH R, CIV. P. 54

DEPOSITION

After trialf the lower court awarded respondent LDS Hospital
the full $2,291.58 it sought for costs under Rule 54,
[R-724-26] *fn°

P.

2

Utah R. Civ.

Since the trial court had properly awarded

plaintiff $1,650,00 for costs incurred pursuant to the Hospital's
deposition of appellant's expert nurse, Harriet Gillerman,
Hospital

was

awarded

Judgment. [R-709-711]

the difference

of

$641.58

LDS

in the Final

Appellant asserts that all but $40o00 for

witness fees was improperly awarded to respondent.
The decision on whether deposition costs are properly taxable
as costs is a matter of discretion with the trial court.
Goodman, 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P,2d 245 (1955).

Hull v.

However, in order for

deposition costs to be awarded, it is clear that the taking

of

depositions must be necessary for the development of the moving
party's case, which is a fact which must be proved,
instance, by LDS Hospital.
Pacific

R.R..

in this

Highland Construction Co. v. Union

683 P*2d 1042, 1051

(Utah

1984).

Obviously,

depositions of LDS Hospital witnesses and employees taken by
appellant's

counsel

are not necessary

to the development

of

fn. 2

These costs can be broken down as follows:
- $841.23 for the cost of LDS Hospital*s chioce to obtain a copy of
depositions of defense witnesses taken by appellant, [Bearnson, Adams, Hoff,
Kaufman, Flinner, Greenway, Schnabel, Taylor, Lahey, Terry, Wilkerson, Davis and
Moulten]
- $283«70 for LDS Hospital's share of the cost of deposing the George family
members. [David George, Traci Huber and Cindy Brown]
- $1,126.65 for LDS Hospital's deposition costs associated with its taking of
appellant's nures experts. [Gillerman and Ferguson]
- $40.00 for witness fees of Jollensten and Brewerton.
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respondent

's

case.

Appellant has found no authority

for the

illogical proposition that a party may be awarded costs associated
with depositions taken by an opponent, and none was advanced below.
A review of the depositions taken by appellant [R-746-762] reveals
that respondent's counsel asked no questions of the witnesses.
While counsel for respondent certainly should be able to obtain a
copy of depositions, that is not an expense which appellant should
later be ordered to bear*
Utah

law has developed

sensibly

to

limit

the taxing of

deposition costs to those instances where a deposition was necessary
to preserve testimony, and was subsequently utilized for that
purpose at trial.
witness1

Thus, it is generally held that the cost of a

deposition who subsequently testifies at trial is not

taxable as costs.

Hull v. Goodman, supra.

Depositions in this

category include Bearnson, Adams, Schnabel, Lahey, George, Huber,
Brown, Terry, Wilkerson and GiHerman.
Similarly, the cost of depositions not used or referred to at
trial are not taxable as costs, unless necessarily incurred for the
preparation of the moving party's case. Nelson v. Newman. 583 P.2d
601 (Utah 1978) . Depositions in this category include Kamman, Hoff,
Flinner, Greenway, Taylor, Davis, Moulten and Ferguson. In any
event, respondent introduced no specific evidence below that any of
these depositions were necessary for the preparation of their case.
[See,

PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR COSTS AND

EXPENSES, R-694-697.]
On remand, the Judgment awarding appellant $1,650.00, should be
affirmed.

If the Judgment is not reversed, appellant should still

be awarded $1,610 0

[$1,650 for Gillerman's deposition less $40

properly awarded for witness fees.]

CONCLUSION
The trial which is the subject of this appeal was against LDS
Hospital.

Appellant proved that the hospital had a duty to protect

Betty George from harm, and that it completely failed to carry out
that vital responsibility.
decide were thus:

The factual questions for the jury to

Was the hospital's negligence a substantial

factor or contributing proximate cause of the injuries and damage
complained of?
harm

to

Did the hospital's negligence increase the risk of

the patient?

The

evidence

on these

questions

was

unanimously in the affirmative, and appellant submitted legally
appropriate Jury Instructions setting forth his clear and simple
theoryo

Appellant's proposed Instructions were rejected, and

consequently, appellant was denied the fundamental right of having
his theory for recovery presented to the jurye

In so doing, the

trial court committed prejudicial, reversible error.
Instead of appellant's proposed instructions on causation, the
trial court, after the close of evidence, inserted Jury Instructions
16A and 21A, which, in addition to being factually and legally
erroneous, were also contrary to the numerous rulings made by the
trial court with respect to the causation issue during the course of
trial. The trial court's alteration of the Jury Instructions after
the

close

of

evidence

was

totally

unfair,

and

constituted

prejudicial, reversible error.
The combined effect of the erroneous Jury Instructions and
Special Verdict form made it impossible for the jury to consider

appellant's very substantial claim on behalf of the Estate of Betty
George, for the injuries and damage she personally had suffered
prior to her
appellant's

death.

case

This

is unheard

summary
of

in

amputation
the

law,

of one-half of
and

constituted

prejudicial, reversible error.
Finally, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding
respondent the cost of obtaining copies of the depositions

of

hospital witnesses and employees taken by appellant, the cost of
depositions never used or referred to at trial, and the cost of
deposing appellant's expert witnesses.
For all of the reasons stated herein, appellant respectfully
requests that this Court AFFIRM the Judgments entered below with
respect to Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey; REVERSE the Judgment entered
below with respect to respondent LDS Hospital and REMAND that aspect
of the case for a NEW TRIAL; REVERSE the trial court's final
judgment with respect to costs awarded LDS Hospital; and award
appellant the costs associated with this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this ****- day of

HM^^'i~

, 1989.
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Exhibit 1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID GEORGE,

SPECIAL

VERDICT

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil NOo C-87-4199

LDS HOSPITAL, KIMBALL LLOYD,
M.D., and MICHAEL LAHEY, M.D.,

Judge Pat Brian

Defendants.

Your function as jurors in this case is to answer questions.
Your answers will constitute your verdict, and based on your
answers the Court will enter an appropriate judgment or judgments
with respect to all of the parties in accordance with the law.

If

there is a preponderance of the evidence in favor of the question,
indicate by finding "yes."

If there is a preponderance of

evidence against the question, indicate by finding "no."
The same individuals need not agree as to every question so
long as there are at least 6 who do agree.
The questions you are to answer are as follows:

QUESTION

Ac

1

Was Dr. Kimball Lloyd negligent in his care of Betty

George?
ANSWER:

B.

YES

NO

If you answered "yes" to question #1 above, then you

should answer this question:

Was the negligence of Dr. Kimball

Lloyd a proximate cause of the death of Betty George, and the
damages claimed by David George personally, the heirs of Betty
George, or the Estate of Betty George?
ANSWER:

YES

NO

OTB3TTW Z
A.

Was Dr. Michael Lahey negligent in his care of Betty

George?
ANSWER:

B.

YES

NO

If you answered "yes" to question #3 above, then you

should answer this question:

Was the negligence of Dr. Michael

Lahey a proximate cause of the death of Betty George, and the
damages claimed by David George personally, the heirs of Betty
George, or the Estate of Betty George?
ANSWER:

YES

NO

QiregTIQN 3

A.

Was LDS Hospital, through its employees including nurses

and respiratory therapists, negligent in its care of Betty George?
ANSWER:

B.

YES

NO

If you answered "yes" to question #5 above, then you

should answer this question:

Was the negligence of LDS Hospital,

through its employees including nurses and respiratory therapists,
a proximate cause of the death of Betty George, and the damages
claimed by David George personally, the heirs of Betty George, or
the Estate of Betty George?
ANSWER:

YES

NO

QUESTION 4
If you answered "yes" to any of the questions above, then you
should answer this question:

What is the amount of money damages

which would fairly and adequately compensate plaintiffs
following damages:
be calculated

for the

(Note - Damages for Loss of Consortium should

separately

for David George, and each of the

children of Betty George).
a.

Funeral and Burial Expenses:

$

bo

Medical Expenses:

$

c.

Lost income, benefits and
household services

$

d.

5.

Loss of Consortium:
David George, Sr.

$

Gail Hoover

$

David George, Jr.

$

Cynthia Brown

$

Traci Lee Huber

$

If you answered "yes" to any of the questions above, then

you should answer this question:

What amount of money damages

would fairly and adequately compensate the Estate of Betty George
for the pain, suffering, mental anguish and emotuional distress,
if any, that Betty George experienced personally prior to her
death?
ANSWER:

$

6.

Assessing a percentage only to those parties found to be

negligent,
attributable

what
to

percentage
the

of

negligence

following:

(Note:

do

you

find

The

sum

of

your

percentages must equal 100%.)
Dr. Kimball Lloyd

%

Dr. Michael Lahey

%

LDS Hospital

%

TOTAL

Dated this

100 %

day of

FOREPERSON

, 1988.

is
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Addendum 1

ADDENDUM

I

Collected here for the Court's reference is some of the evidence
produced at trial tending to show that the negligence of LDS Hospital, as
found by the jury, was a substantial factor or contributing proximate cause of
the arrest and subsequent death of Betty George.

This evidence is submitted

as proof that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to plaintiffs
theory of the case, compounded by submitting erroneous instructions such as
16A and 21A, constituted prejudicial error requiring that the judgment be
reversed and the matter remanded for a New Trial.

MOLLY BREWER testified as a fact witness for the appellant.
testimony is set forth in R-7 64 at ppc 3-14 and includes the following:
Pages 5-12
Q0 Were you aware of when Betty George actually did go into
the hospital?
A, Yes.
Q, Did you made any attempt to contact or visit Mrs. George
in the hospital?
Ac
Yes. I called her on Thursday, after her surgery.
called her from my office.

I

Q. For the benefit of the jury, let's get the dates lined
up.
Thursday would have been July 31?
Is that your
recollection?
A.

Yeah, I believe so.

Q. I guess we could get out a calendar, if need be*
say you called her?

You

A. Yes, We had a rather short conversation. She had told
me that she was in a lot of pain, that she was having
problems breathing, that she was on some type of a breathing
device, the incentive spirometer.

1

Her

Q. Spirometer.
A. And that she was having a hard time using it, and it
hurt her to use it.
Qc

Do you recall about what time that phone call was?

Ac

About 3:00 in the afternoon.

Q. Do you recall anything that Mrs. George told you about
what her hospital course had been?
A.

I believe she said that

—

A. She had stated that she was in a lot of distress and a
lot of pain, having problems breathing, and that the doctors
and nurses just didn't seem to do anything. They just donft
seem to care.
Qo Can you tell the jury, can you describe what she sounded
like over the telephone?
A* She was gasping for — it was like she was gasping for
breath, just more short sentences.
That's why our our
conversation a little short, because she was having a hard
time talking. And we finally cut the conversation off. She
just couldn't talk any longer.
She told me she just
couldn't get enough air to even talk.

Q. That question was, do you remember the substance of your
conversation with Betty George on the telephone on August 2
—• on August 1?
A.

On Friday?

Q.

Yes.

A.
I had called her on the telephone again, and I was
really upset, just talking to her, I could tell that she was
in a lot of distress.
She told me that she now had an
oxygen mask on. She was in a considerable amount of pain,
in her abdomen, away from where her surgery was. She was
having a hard time breathing. She just couldn't get — she
said it was like she couldn't get enough air.
Q.

Did you do anything after you talked to her?

A. I called my husband at work, and met him at work, and we
went up to the hospital.

0

Q.

Did you go to LcD.S. Hospital on Friday August 1, 1986?

A,

Yesc

Q0

What time did you arrive?

Ac

Right around 6:00.

Q.

Where did you go?

A.

Right up to her room.

Q. Who was present in Betty George's room while you were
there?
A.

Her husband, Dave, and my husband, Doyle, and myself.

Qc

Anyone else?

A.

Just the four of us.

Q6

How did Mrs. George look to you when you arrived?

Ao When I walked to the room, I was shocked•
pale* she looked like death.

She was just

Qo Did you have any discussion with Betty George about how
she was feeling, or what was happening with her condition?
Ac Yes. She told me that she was still experiencing a lot
of pain in her abdomen, that her breathing situation had
gotten worse, that there were times she would even take off
-- while I was there she took off the oxygen mask, trying to
get enough air. She felt it didn't feel like there was any
air coming through the oxygen mask, and she lay there,
gasping for breath.
Q. How long did you spend at the L.D.S. Hospital on the
1st?
A.

Between two and two and a half hours.

Q.

So you were there until 8:00 or 8:30?

A. Yes.
Q. Did Mrs. George's condition visibly change at all during
the time that you were there?
A. It had gotten worse during the couple of hours that we
were there. It was hard for here to continue to carry on a
conversation. She never said like a complete sentence. It
was more, you know, just disjointed words, because she was

^

having a hard time talking and breathing. I spent a lot of
time just sitting be her bed, holding her hand, and doing
most of the talking.
Q. Was Mrs. George able to understand you when you would
talk to her?
A.
Yes, she was. As a matter of fact, while I was there,
a call came in for her, from her daughter Cindy, and she
told me not — you know, to tell the girls not to come up,
because she didn't want them to see her like that. But I
told Cindy on the telephone that she had better get up
there, because I was in fear for Betty's life, the way she
looked.
Qc Were you in Mrs. George's room continually from 6:00 to
Approximately 8:00 or 8:30 when you left?
Ac

Yes, I was.

Q.

During that time did you see any L.D.S. Hospital nurses?

A. A nurse had come in one time, spent just a few minuted,
just checking her pulse. I don't know, she didn't seem to
be too concerned. While I was there, we had buzzed for the
nurse, and she never came. Finally I helped Betty get more
comfortable, lifted her up in the bed, tried to sit her up
so she could get more air. I even helped get a bedpan for
her, because we couldn't get anyone to come in and help.
Q. During the two, two and a half hours while you were
there, did you see any L.D.S. Hospital respiratory
therapists?
A. There was a gentleman that came in for a few seconds,
came in, looked at the tubes, sort of checked the dials on
the machine, and turned around and walked out, didn't say
anything to Betty at all.
Q.
Did you have any impressions as to Mrs. George's
condition, or what was going to happen to her when you left?
A.
Well, I was really afraid for her, because her
condition, for such a fairly simple operation, her condition
had deteriorated. She should have been ready to come home
by Friday. when I had helped her with the bedpan, I had
also noticed that she had had quite a large bruise on her
hip, and when I had asked her about it, she wasn't aware of
how it had gotten there, she said she didn't have it before
she came into the hospital. But I was a little afraid,
because there did seem to be a lack of attention.
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CYNTHIA BROWN is a daughter of Betty George.

Her testimony is set forth

in R-764, ppc 14-41, and includes the following:
Pages 25-32
Q,
Did you go to the hospital on Saturday, the 2nd of
August?
Ae Yes, I did. Traci called me at workc I had come home
for lunch, and Traci had called again, and left a message,
and for a reason that I can't remember, I didn't call her
backc Then when I got back to work, she called me there.
As soon as she called, I left work early and went up to the
hospital.
I got to the hospital approximately 6:45,
therabouts•
Qe

Where did you go?

Ac

I went straight to her room.

Qo

Who was in the room when you got there?

A„

Nobody o

Q„

No nurse?

Ac

No nurse.

Just my mother.

Qe Cay you describe for the jury your mother's condition
when you arrived?
Ac I stood in the doorway, and I looked at Mom, and she had
the tube down her nose, and she was laying there in bed.
She had a light on above her. She was gray. She was —• I
could see blue in her fingernails. Her hands were down by
her side. I could see blue in her fingernails and blue
around her mouth.
I went closer because I was thinking
maybe it was the light. I tried to hold her hand, and she
was cold to touch. And as you can normally bend a hand or
get it to bend easily, I had to pry my mother's had around
mine so I could hold her hand,
I did notice that her
fingernails were in fact blue and she was blue around her
mouth.
Q.

What was her breathing like at the time?

A. Her — she would open her mouth and try to get air in,
and I believe she was getting some air in, but you know how
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your chest normally rises and falls.
Her chest wasn't
rising and falling.
It seemed like it would go down to
maybe her throat and come right back out again. And it was
very fast and very, very heavy.
Q.

Did you try to talk to your mother?

A*

Yes, I did,

Qe

Was she able to talk to you?

Ae

No. I don't even know that she knew that I was there.

Q.

What did you do?

A. I, in a fit of despondency, practically, I ran out of
the room and I found two nurses. There was my mother's
room, and then across the hall and slightly down a little
bit there was like an ice station with some water there, and
there was like a ledge that came out from the wall, and
there were two nurses there sitting on something.
And I went over and I asked the nurse, Where is the nurse
that is supposed to be with my mother? And one nurse said,
She is not in the room? And I said, No, she is not. And I
asked her — this one other — the other nurse said that
maybe she was with the other patient. And the other nurse
said, Well, she could be on break. I said, Tell me about my
mother. And she said, Your mother is a very sick woman.
And I said, I want to talk to somebody. They said, I will
get a nurse into the room as soon as I can.
I went in and I used the bathroom. When I came out, there
was a nurse standing on the opposite side of her bed.
Q. Let me stop you there for a second. Can you describe
your emotional state as you were talking to the nurses by
the nurses* station?
Ao

I was hysterical.

Q. Did you tell the nurses by the nurses' station what
condition you had found your mother in?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What were t h e y doing out t h e r e ?

A.

They were w r i t i n g and t a l k i n g back and f o r t h ,

Q.
What d i d t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n about

n u r s e s do when you
your mother?
£

gave

laughing.
them

that

Ac

Nothing

Qe

Did they get up?

A.

No

Qe

What did t h i s nurse do, t h a t you saw?

A„
F i r s t of a l l ,
she t r i e d t o calm me down, and
then through t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n back and f o r t h
she
t r i e d t o t e l l me that Mom was doing b e t t e r now that
she was e a r l i e r today.
And I t o l d her t h a t I c o u l d n ' t
see how anybody in t h a t condition could be doing any b e t t e r
than, say e a r l i e r today.
Q
The
better?
A.

nurse

told

you

your

mother

was

doing

Yes

Qc
She made
mother was?

that

comment

in the room

where

your

A,
She made that comment right in the room, I was
on one side of my mothers s bed, and she was on the
other sidec
Qc
Was your mother still in the condition that you have
described her, when she made that comment?
A„ Yes.
Q.

What did you respond to that?

A. I told her that I couldn't believe that my mother was in
any better condition now than she could have been earlier.
She was terrible.
Qc

What did the nurse do in response to that?

A. She told me if I didn't believe her I could call
my father. Then she asked me if I wanted to alk to my
fathero And I said yes, I did. And I went around to the
side of the bed, and there was a phone right there, and I
used that phone, and I contacted my father.
Qo Let me stop you there for a second. The nurse told you
if you didn't believe her about your mother's condition,
that you could call your father?
A.
Yeah.
I was a little upset with this, because
obviously, she was there, and my father wasn't. How was he
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going to tell me she was doing better, when she was standing
right there in the room?

Q. Prior to the time that the nurse told you if you wanted
to find out about you mother's condition to call your
father, did she do anything to check your mother's
condition .
A.

Qc

No, she didn't.

What was the next thing that happened?

A. I was holding Mom's hand, and had the phone in the other
hand, and the two nurses ceime in, the same nurse that was
there when I came out of the bathroom. She came in with
another nurse, to help sit Mother up in bed.
And they had
lifted her up once, under the arms, and Mom slid down. And
when she slid down the second time she wasn't breathing
anymore.
Q.

What did you do?

A.
First of all, I told dad that Mom is not breathing
anymore. I think she is dead. The two nurses were just
walking out of the room.
I turned to one nurse and I
said, She is not breathing anymore.
And the other
nurse said, Your mother is just fine.

Q

ANNE ETTA TERRY, was one of Betty George's nurses on August 2, 198 6.
Nurse terry was also the Min-chargeM nurse responsible for the 8th floor.
was called as a witness by appellant.

Her testimony appears in R-7 64, pp. 42-

128, and includes the following:
Page 48
Qe
It is also the responsibility of the nurses in L.DoS.
Hospital to report changes in the patient's condition to the
patient's doctor, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q.

That's also a very important function, isn't it?

A.

That's true,,

Q0 In order for a doctor to be able to know what to do for
a patient* he has to know what the patient's condition is,
doesnBt he?
A,

That's true*

Qe And if you, as a nurse taking care of a patient, have a
substantial question about a patient's condition, you take
that question to someone who can give you an answer, don't
you?
A,

That's righto

Q.

That's what you are supposed to do, is it not?

A. Yes.
Page 50
Q. And the nurses can call the respiratory therapist any
time they want to?
A.

That's true.

Go
If a patient is having a problem breathing, that the
nurse has a question about, they are supposed to call
respiratory therapy, right?
A.

She

Right o

Q

Page 80
Q.
[On the morning of August 2nd]
that the transfer was due to the fact
had gotten worse and because it was
somewhere where she could be watched
true?

Dr. Bearnson told you
that Betty's condition
necessary to have her
more closely; is that

A.

That's true.

Q.

You thought that was a good idea, didn't you?

Ac

Yes.

Pages 86-88
Q.
You could see, when Mrs. George came back, just by
looking at her, that her condition was worse, couldn't you?
Ac She was really tired. Yes, she had changed. I wouldn't
say how much worse, but she definitely had changed.

Q. You didn't — when Mrs. George came back, you didn't
immediately call someone up and say, 'This woman's condition
is worse than it was when she left, did you?
A. No. Because I had been informed of the physician seeing
her in intensive care, and I felt comfortable with what they
had said and what they ordered for herc
Q. You had felt comfortable earlier that day with the fact
that Mrs. George was going to go to ICU?
A. Yes.
Q. Now here she was backin worse condition than you had
seen her, right?
A. Yes. But I feel like after what the doctors had found
out from angio, and also a complete evaluation in intensive
care, and they felt she could come back, I felt comfortable
with it.
Q. You didn't get any information about that evaluation,
did you? They didn't give you any numbers, did they?
A. No. But they told me they had spoke to the physician
about it.
He felt comfortable, so why shouldn't I
feel comfortable with her coming back?

i r\

Page 98
Q. You could see when Mrs. George returned to the floor in
the afternoon that her respiratory status definitely needed
some improvement, couldn't you?
A. Yes.
Q.
You didn't call the respiratory therapy department
though, did you?
A.

No, I didn't.

Page 123
Qo If a doctor thinks a patient's condition is not serious
or not critical, and a nurse, who is with the patient, can
see that it is . . . That they might stop breathing. What
does the nurse do?
Ac

Go to the physiciano

Qo

She tells somebody about it?

A.

YeSc

Qo

As fast as she can, doesn't she?

A.

Yese

Qo

And that's a basic requirement of nursing?

A c Right•
Qo

You would expect that of any nurse, wouldn't you?

A.

Yes.

MARY ANN SCHNABEL, R.N. was the nurse assigned to Betty George's care
from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on August 2, 1986.
appellant.

She was called as a witness by

Her testimony appears in R-764, pp. 128-169, and includes the

following:
Page 138
Q. It was your opinion and agreement that Mrs. George would
benefit from ICU care, wasn't it?
Ac

Well, yes, she would benefit. .

Qo You told David George that in ICU Betty would be able to
be observed more closely and that ICU had the facilities to
take care of her, didn't you?
A.

Yes.

Page 142
Q. It was obvious to you when Mrs. George got back that her
condition was worse than it had been before, wasn't it?
Ac Well, she was — she was very distant. She was a little
bit incoherent. But she had been gone from our floor from
10:30 to 2:00. And she had gone to angiography, and she had
gone to ICU.
So she could have been very, very tired,
because she acted tired when I asked her questions.
Page 156
Q. What nursing care plan did you give to the one-on-one
special duty nurse?
A. That she would have to be observed closely, . . .that
she was to notify the doctor if she had questions concerning
the patient's health.
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HARRIET GILLERMAN, R.N., testified as an expert for the appellant.
was the only nurse qualified as an expert to testify at trial.

She

Her testimony

appears in R-764, pp. 169-218; and R-766, 414-463. Her testimony includes the
following:
Pages 187-191
Q. You are still under oath, Nurse Gillerman. As part of
your education and training, did you learn about human
physiology?
A. Yes.
Q.

Did you learn about the human pulmonary system?

A. Yes.
Qo Do you know how the pulmonary and respiratory systems
work?
A.

Yes, I do.

Qc
Do you know, from your training and experience, what
happens to people if they stop breathing?
Ao

Yes, I do.

Q.

What happens to them?

A. When a patient stops—when a person stops breathing,
they no longer have oxygen profusing their body:
their
brain, their heart, their kidneys, their lungs, their liver,
their entire body.
They also have a build-up of carbon
dioxide and a build-up of carbon dioxide also causes
specific signs and symptoms.
Q. What is the range of things that can happen to a person
from prolonged lack of oxygen?
Ae I like to describe it on the basis of anything from what
I call respiratory distress to respiratory failure to death
of cells.
Excuse me.

I an sorry.

What is respiratory distress?
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A. Respiratory distress is defined in signs and symptoms
that have to do with decreased oxygenation of the cells of
the body. When we speak of respiratory distress, we think
of someone who is having difficulty in exchanging air, both
oxygen and carbon dioxide.
Q. Are there objective sings and symptoms associated with
respiratory distress?
A.

Yes, there are.

Q.
Are those objective signs and symptoms things that
nurses learn and are expected to know?
A.

Absolutely.

Q.

What is respiratory failure?

Ac
Respiratory failure is when the body can no longer
compensate for the distress that's being caused. There is a
very specific definition. But mainly it has to do with the
inability of the body to again respond and meet the needs
that are necessary.
Q« Are there objective signs and symptoms for respiratory
failure?
Ao

Yes, there are.

Qc Are those things that nurses learn and are expected to
know?
A.

Yes, they are.

Q.
Is it possible for a patient to suffer respiratory
arrest from lack of oxygen?
A.

Yes.

Qc

Is it possible for a patient to die from lack of oxygen?

A.

Yes.

Q.
Is the effect on a patient of a lack of oxygen any
different, depending on what is causing the patient to have
a lack of oxygen?
A. There are very specific signs and symptoms that have to
do with lack of oxygen, no matter what the cause.
Q. Speaking as an expert, as the Court has designated, can
you tell your jury — tell the jury, based on your 25 years
of experience as a professional nurse, what the function of
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a Registered Nurse is in patient care, of a person in a
hospital?
A. Well, I think there would be different categories. I
would like to go about kind of discussing those categories.
The nurse in a patient advocate.
Q.

What does that mean?

A. It means that the nurse must assure that the patient's
needs are met by the entire health team, that if indeed
there is something going wrong with their condition, that
the nurse has been able to identify, that some help is
gotten for that patient, so harm won't come to that patient,
if at all possible.
It also means that if a patient doesn't understand his
therapy or her therapy, that explanations are given. It
also means that the patient is assured that all members of
the team will have information that will make it so that the
team will be coordinated, so that it won't be fragmented
care, so that the nurse is responsible for the continuity of
care for that patient, from sometimes before the patient
comes in, all the way to when the patient is homec
Pages 192-194
Qc

What is a nursing care plan?

Ac I think even my basic nursing students would be able to
tell you that there are certain components of a nursing care
plan* The first step of the nursing care plan is to assess
the patient, and to make sure that one knows as much
information and what we call a head-to-toe assessment, and
also to know about the family, to know where the patient is
in his or her life. All of the data that one can get about
the patient. So that's assessment.
The second part of a nursing care plan is what we call a
nursing diagnosis or a conclusion that the nurse draws.
The third part of the nursing care plan is to determine the
outcomes. Based on the assessment that one has done, and
the conclusions that one has come to, the nurse develops
outcomes.
Q.

What are outcomes?

A. Outcomes are the goals or where we would hope that the
patient would be able to be.
The next part of the nursing care plan is interventions, or
actions.
The interventions, or actions, as far as the
nursing care plan are concerned, involves all those things

that need to be done for the patient:
the physician's
orders, the respiratory therapy interventions, the things
that need to be done because nurses are meeting a basic
standard of care in what they just know has to be done for
that type of patient. It could involve the — the actions
could involve giving medications, making assessments, and
making sure that the entire medical and health team plan is
being carried out. So that's the next part of the nursing
care plan.
Then there is a very important part, what a nurse knows as
part of the nursing care plan, that doesn't always appear on
like a care plan chart.
And that part is called the
evaluation.
So the evaluation is how the patient is
responding to the medical intervention, how the patient is
responding to . the nursing actions, to the health team
action, and how the patient is doing in response to the
plan.
Then it starts all over, because after you have
evaluated, you have to either revise the plan or you
continue with the plan, based on how the patient is
responding to that plan. So the parts of the nursing care
plan would be the assessment, the nursing conclusions, the
interventions or actions, the outcomes, and the evaluation.
Pages 200 -210
Q. If a nurse is not capable of doing what a patient needs
to be done in a particular circumstance, do you have any
expectation of what the nurse will do in that circumstance?
A. As I have said to my students and to the nursing staff
that I have always worked with, it is okay not to know as
long as one can identify that they don't know. But it is
not okay not to get assistance or help in being able to meet
the patient's needs. We do have to refer to other members
of the health team or to each other, and can't always
remember everything that we need to do. But we need to know
what needs to be done, so that what we do is get assistance,
especially when a patient's condition is deteriorating.
Pages 213 - 215
Q. What would be the effect on the patient, of the nurses
not performing those orders, on the atelectasis condition?
Mr. Burbidge:
Honor.
The Court:

Objection on the basis of competency, your

Counsel will approach the bench.

(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.)
The Court:

Rephrase your question.

Q.
The question, Nurse Gillerman, on a patient with
existing atelectasis, and orders to do the functions that we
have talked to, if the nurses do not perform those orders,
what would you expect to be the effect on that patient?
MrQ Burbidge:

Objection to the form, your Honor.

The

Overruled.

Court:

A I would expect that the atelectasis would increase, that
the patient would be receiving less oxygen for the needs of
his or her body, and that the condition would perpetuate
itself.
Q.
In your review of Mrs. George's medical record and
testimony you have heard in this courtroom, does that appear
to be the case with Mrs. George?
Mr* Burbidge: Objection, your Honor.
to provide that testimony.

She isn't competent

The Court: Read the question back please.
(The pending question was read back by the court reporter.)
Mrc Russell: Your Honor, the medical record talks about the
condition. The nurses that testified this morning talked
about her condition. And they were there.
Mr, Burbidge: Your Honor, it is a matter of competency.
She is not competent to provide testimony as to what the
cause was in this particular case.
The Court:

Read the question one more time please

(The pending question was read back by the court reporter„)
The Court:
answer it.
Ao
Note:

The

objection

is

overruled.

You

may

Yes, it does.

Emphasis was added to illustrate instances where the trial court

specifically ruled that appellant's nurse expert was competent to testify with
regard to the proximate cause of nursing negligence.
Pages 216-217
Qe
Under what circumstances would Registered Nurses be
required to evaluate a patient's neurological status?
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A. At any time that it is ordered, at any time that the
neurological system has been interfered with in some kind of
surgery, at any time there is any possibility of hypoxia, at
any time there is any kind of respiratory distress of any
kind* When a patient is waking up form anesthesia, it is
very necessary.
Q. And those circumstances that you have just enumerated,
is it a requirement of the standard of care that nurses make
neurological assessments?
Ac

Yes, it is.

Q.

Is it important that they do that?

A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

Why is it important?

A.
Because is would be the nurse who would be able to
detect any of the changes that go on in the minute-byminute, hour-by-hour condition of the neurological system of
the patient.
Q. If the proper neurological assessment is made, does the
standard of care require that information be put in a
patient's chart?
A.

Yes, it does.

Q.
In the case of Mrs. George, in your review of the
record, did you find any neurological assessments?
A.
I did find words that were scattered throughout the
nurse's notes, that talked about coherence, or sleepiness,
or anxiety. I didn't really see a neurological assessment,
and I didn't see a consistent recording of what was going on
with her, in her neurological status.
Q. Was Mrs. George's condition on August 1 and August 2 of
the type that would require the nurses to make neurological
assessments, in order to comply with the standard of care?
A. Yes, it was. As soon as one finds that a patient is not
alert or is incoherent or distant or unresponsive or any of
those things, it is important that the nurse carry out the
rest of the neurological assessment, to see what else is
wrong, so that, again, she can be the eyes and ears fo the
physician, and also the patient advocate, to make sure the
condition is not deteriorating, without being noted and some
intervention occurring.
Pages 418-425
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Q. We were referring to the L.D.S. Hospital policies and
procedures, and my question before all of that was whether
you have just found, in your review of the record and
everything you just testified to, areas where the nurses at
L0DoS. Hospital did not follow their own policies and
procedures in taking care of Mrs. George?

Ac

Yes.

Q.

Would you explain those to the jury.

A. As I reviewed the policies and procedures and I reviewed
the chart, I concluded that there were breaches in the
standard of care by Nurse Terry and Nurse Schnabel. The
breaches in the standard of care started before what I am
talking about, but I would like to focus on the time when
the patient returned from intensive care with the oximeter
removed and the decrease in the oxygen.
The patient had gone from the floor on six liters of oxygen,
and having had used the oximeter all morning to determine
how much oxygen that she was receiving and using in her
body*
When she came back at 1420, the oximeter was not
there, and the oxygen was reduced to three liters. There
was no order for that, the doctor's order for that was not
written until 1515.
Qo

Could you use regular time for the jury's benefit.

A.

That would have been 2:20 for 1420 and 3:15 for 1515.

I believe that the nurses should have questioned whether
that was proper liters of oxygen for the patient to have
gotten, because they had no orders, since in had been
previously established that she had a previous order for
that oxygen.
They especially should have questioned in
because she had a change in her condition. The condition
that she had had previously was that she wan coherent, and
that she was having difficulty breathing, but that she was
responsive and able to talk about the fact that she was
short of air.
At this time her condition had changed, and I believe it was
their responsibility at that time to make sure the order
that they knew what was going on with this patient, and why
the order that they had had previously and the
concentrations that were used previously were not at this
time being followed, especially with the change in
condition. I believe, and the patient advocate, that they
should have at that time called Dr. Lahey, Dr. Lloyd, or
anyone, to question this change.
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If indeed Dr. Lahey had been the one who sent the patient
back from ICU, I believe they should have explained to Dr.
Lahey that on 8/1, August 1, the day before, this patient
had been able to talk and respond and make sense, and was a
little bit short of breath, but now the patient's condition
had changed a great deal, and perhaps he didn't know that
since 8/1 and then even the morning of 8/2, August 2, they
should have informed him of how different this patient was.
That's the essence of being a patient advocate, to make sure
that everybody knows that this patient had really changed
conditions. That's being the eyes and ears of the doctor.
They should have even asked what happened in ICU. There is
no documentation on the chart at all about what happened in
ICU* And when she left at 10:20, to go to angiogram, she
was supposed to go to ICU. They should have questioned it,
and made sure that everybody know that she had indeed
deteriorated. According to the policies and procedures, a
deteriorating condition fo a patient is not only reportable
to the physician, but it is to nursing supervisors, to
anyone, to where one can get intervention or help for a
patient whose condition is deteriorating. And probably the
only ones that would have known this is the nurses who had
been at the bed side.
Even if the physicians knew it, it is really important that
a nurse doesn't stop with the fact that things are being
observed. You have got to pull these things together and
assist the patient to get the proper care.

Q.

Are there other policies and procedures?

A. Yes. And that's important for us to know, that another
thing they should have done is to call the respiratory
therapist.
It is their responsibility to inform the
respiratory therapy department of a change in condition, a
change in equipment, and that's written right here in the
scope of services. The nurse who is responsible for the
patient should inform the department in cases of malfunction
of equipment or changes in patient equipment and mode or
frequency of therapy ordered.
They should have also called the respiratory therapists to
report -— or to get some help with assessing this patient.
The patient's condition had changed.
The equipment had
changed. And if they — and they said in their deposition
that they didn't know how to do the complete respiratory
assessment. Then they should have gotten some help to make
sure that somebody that was more qualified or specialized
than them should have been able to help them in assessing
this patient.

on

They should have told Dr. Lloyd, who was really now the
primary physician, about the changes in the patient's
condition. They talked to Dr. Lloyd on the phone. They
called Dre Lloyd. But they didn't inform him of the changes
in condition. They didn't let him know the very important
facts that would have assisted him in caring for this
patient more completely.
They should have also evaluated and established or
reestablished or adhered to the nursing care plan. They had
a very specific plan that had told them that they were to
assess the breath sounds, that they were to assess for signs
and symptoms of hypoxia, and report them. They had a care
plan that assisted them in having outlined what they should
be doing. If that care plan was no longer adequate, they
had the opportunity to establish a new care plan or to
reevaluate the care plan, add to the care plan, subtract
from it, so it would guide them in their care.
Qe Excuse me Nurse Gillerman«
you are referring to;
Ac

Is this the care plan that

Yes, it iSc

Qo The one that was prepared by Nurse Taylor on the evening
of August 1?
A, Yes.
And they should have added to that care plan specifically to
observe for signs and symptoms, and report those signs and
symptoms of deteriorating condition, because this, indeed,
is a change in the patient's condition. They really should
have investigated the goals of Dr. Adams. Dr. Adams wrote
orders at 1515, She wrote a note at 1700. And on the note
at 1700, she just talked about the things that she had
ordered at 1515. There was nothing to intervene, nothing to
assist this patient, at this particular time, with making
sure that she was properly oxygenated.
The nurses needed to coordinate.
They needed to bring
together a lot of facts. On 8/1, August 1, in the morning - I mean, this patient was able to talk. She was able to
make sense. She was having trouble respiratory-wise. But
on 8/2, she wasn't making as much sense in the morning. She
was having trouble getting enough air. And then on — at
1420, she wasn't even able to respond. She was incoherent.
They should have been able to report and get somebody to
listen, that this patient came in without any respiratory
problems in —• for her surgery. Now she was deteriorating.
Instead of improving at all, she continued to deteriorate.
And everybody is — everybody is looking at this patient.
They are assessing them —
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Q. Do you have any observations with regard to the standard
of care, about the assignment of Nurse Soraghan during the
shift?
Ac
The assignment of Nurses Soraghan was as a one-to-one
nurse o I was up to Nurse Terry to assure that this nurse
was a one-to-one nurse that understood her duties, that she
was competent, experienced, and was able to care for a
patient who was in a deteriorating condition.
The
assignment of Nurse Soraghan to this particular patient, as
I see it, was a breach of standard of care, in making sure
that a critical patient was assigned properly, by way of
level of preparation and acuity of patient.
Nurse Soraghan was not a licensed nurse.
Pages 432-434
Q0 Now that we have gotten that out of the way, did Nurse
Soraghan comply with the standard of care applicable to nay
nurse during her shift?
Ac

I believe she did not.

Q. In what respects did she deviate for the standard of
care?
A.
She failed to go up the chain of command, despite
ominous signs and symptoms of her patient.
Q. Should Nurse Soraghan have informed Dr. Lloyd of the
notes that she made in the patient's record?
A. She should have informed Dr. Lloyd, or, if she informed
anyone to inform Dr, Lloyd, she must have also gotten
something that would assist her in giving better care to her
patient.
Q. Is there any indication in the record that anything was
done to address the respiratory distress that Nrs. George
was suffering during Nurse Soraghanfs shift?
A. No, there isn't, until she got CPR and ventilatory
assistance.
Q. Do you have other areas that you have located, where
Nurse Soraghan violated the standard of care applicable to
her?
A. Yes, I do. Nurse Soraghan was a one-to-one nurse. A
one-to-one nurse continuously monitors her patient, unless
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relieved by another nurse, When Nurse Soraghan was assigned
as Dr. Lloyd said, it was to assure that there would be
continuous monitoring of the patient, in order to alert a
physician or anyone to intervene.

A. Dr. Lloyd was assured, and so was Nurse Terry and Nurse
Schnabel when they left, that Nurse Soraghan would be the
one-to-one nurse, which meant that this would have — this
nurse would continuously monitor the patient, and alert the
physician or anyone to intervene if the patients condition
changed Nurse Soraghan was out of the room. According to
Cindy's testimony, Nurse Soraghan was not in the room at a
very important time, to be able to alert a physician to the
change in condition in Mrs. George.
Nurse Soraghan also did not give the Keflin that was
ordered.
Qc What is Keflin?
A*

It is an antibiotic.

Q„

What is that for?

Ac For infection. There was an order for Keflin, and it
was not administered by her«
Qe
Whose
antibiotic?

responsibility

was

it

to

administer

the

A. Nurse Soraghan1s, Nurse Soraghan also did not notify
respiratory therapy of the change in condition.
Q.

What was she required to do?

A. According to the policies and procedures, the nurse who
is responsible for the patient should inform the department,
in cases of malfunction fo equipment or changes in patient
condition.

11

MR. DON OWINGS, testified as an expert in the field of respiratory
therapy for the appellant.

His testimony appears in R-765, pp. 276-350.

testimony includes the following:
Page 307
Q„ What should Mr. Wilkerson have done in order to comply
with the standard of care applicable to him?
A.
One aspect would be to suggest alternate forms of
therapy, that may increase her ventilation or her
inspiratory capacity. Another standard would be to inform
either the nursing supervisor or the physician of the fact
that this inspiratory capacity has decreased significantly,
and would alternative therapy be appropriate.
Pages 311
Q. In your expert opinion, given Mrs. George's ability to
inspire at 5:30 and 9:45, when Mr. Wilkerson evaluated her -

A.

Yes.

Q0
—Would that have had an effect on whether
atelectasis got better or worse or stayed the same?

that

A. Her ability to inspire would probably contribute to her
atelectasis becoming worse.
Q.
If that condition were not treated for an extended
period of time, what would the effect be?
Ao

In my opinion, it would continue to worsen.

Pages 315-317
Qe What should Mr. Wilkerson have done, if anything, at the
end of his shift?
A. He should have at least notified the physician of the
patient's deterioration, from the stated goals; notified the
nurses, primarily in care/ passed along to the oncoming
shift therapist of the patient's lack of achievement of the
goals in maintaining ventilation; and if supervisory
personnel were available, notify them.
Q.

What was the purpose of that notification?

A.

To get something done for the patient at that time.

His

Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether the failure of Mr.
Wilkerson to conduct himself in that fashion at the end of
his shift contributed to the cause of Mrs. George's arrest
the following day?
A. Yes.
Mr. Burbidge:
The Court:

Objection, competency and foundation.
Overruled.

Read the question back.

(The pending question was read back by the court reporter.)
The Court:

You may answer.

A. Yes.
Q.

What is your opinion?

A. My opinion is that it did contribute to the arrest the
next day.,
Q.

How did it contribute to the cause of the arrest?

A. The patient's continued lack of oxygen had a detrimental
effect on all the body organs, the cells, specifically the
heart, brain, kidneys, liver. All of them ~ oxygen is
necessary for those to function. Her lack of ventilation
and being able to take in adequate amounts of oxygen would
result in a continued deterioration of those organ's
functions.
Note:

Emphasis added where the trial court specifically

allowed

appellant's respiratory therapy expert to testify as to proximate cause.
Pages 319-320
Qo
According to your review of this record and the
deposition of the respiratory therapist who responded to the
code, what time was ventilatory assistance initiated?
Ac

Approximately 1913, 13 minutes after seven.

Q.

How long is that after the code was called?

A.

Nine to ten minutes.

Q. Based on your knowledge, training and experience, if a
patient stops breathing and ventilatory assistance is not
provided for nine to ten minutes, what will the effect be on
the patient?

OR

A.

Anoxic brain damage.

Q.

What is that?

A.

The lack of oxygen to the brain.

Pages 323-325
Q. Have you reviewed the autopsy report that is included in
the medical record in front of you, pages 3-10?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that report contain any evidence that the patient
was indeed deprived of oxygen to the brain?
Mr. Burbidge:
for itself.
The Court:

The document speaks

It is in evidence isn't it?

Mr. Russell:
The Court:

Objection, your Honor.

No.

Mr. Burbidge —

The objection is sustained.

Q. Have you, in formulating the opinion that you just gave
us — that is, that the ventilatory assistance, the lack of
ventilatory assistance contributed to the coma and deathdid you rely in part on the autopsy?
A. Yes.
Q. What in that autopsy supports your opinion?
Mr. Burbidge:
The Court:

Sustained.

Mr. Russell:
The Court:

Objection, again, hearsay.

Your honor, an autopsy

—

Would you like to approach the bench?

(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.)
The Court:

The objection is sustained.

Q. Mr. Owings, would you look at page 80 of the medical
record, which is Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1.
A.

Okay.

Q. Those records are blood gas reports?

A. Yes, sir.
Qo Do you see the report at 7: 12, at the bottom of the page?
Ac

It says 1912.

Q„

That's 7:12

A.

Right.

Q.

That would be during the code procedure?

A.

According to the record, yes.

Qc What does that indicate about whether or not the patient
was receiving oxygen?
Mr. Burbidge:

Objection, foundation.

The Court: Overruled.
A. It indicates that the patient is not ventilating, and
that their oxygen is below normal values, severely hypoxic.
Qc
Is that proof, in your opinion, that lack of oxygen
caused Mrs. George's arrest and death?
Ac

Yes.

Mr. Burbidge:
foundation.
The Court:

Objection, your

Sustained.

Mr. Burbidge:

Honor, competency

and

Is there a motion to strike?

Yes, your Honor.

The Court: Granted.
Mr. Burbidge: If we please the Court, could we have the
witness wait until an objection is entered, before the
response comes back?
The Court: The Court is going to take a five minute recess.
The Court will see counsel in chambers, on the record.
(The

following

The Court:

proceedings

occurred

ruled

chambers.)

The record will reflect that counsel and the Court are in

session, out of the presence of the jury.
previously

in

that

the

cause

of

on

For the record, the Court has

death

may

not

be

testified

to

except

for

someone

who

in

and

determination of cause of death.

official

capacity

participated

You may proceed.

Page 327-331
Mr. Russell:
The way I understand it, the Court is
requiring us to bring such a person in here to testify about
it. Mr. Owings, by his training and experience, can look at
the record, can look at the autopsy, and he knows — he can
form an opinion that lack of oxygen was the cause of death.
The Court:
Not the cause of death.
He had already
testified, and the Court has listened carefully to the
framing of the question and to the responsive answer. The
question was, did it contribute?
The answer was, in his
opinion, it did contribute.
There is nothing wrong
with the question or the answer.
The last question
posed to the witness was, in your opinion, did it cause the
decedent's death? It is an inappropriate question, and the
Court has previously ruled on it. That's the reason the
Court sustained the objection and granted the motion to
strike.
The Court:
The Court is not suggesting that, A,
cause of death is an issue in this case.
The Court
has never taken that position.
But if you contend
that it is an issue, the Court has ruled that in order for
competent testimony to be presented to the trier of fact,
someone who is competent to so testify must come into court
and testify.
And a nurse from Long Beach State or a
respiratory therapist from Long Beach State is not competent
to testify as to the cause of death of the decedent. They
can say that I would expect if this and this and
this and this and this were present in this woman' s
life, that she would die.
She didn't get enough
oxygen, she quit breathing, she was brain dead, and
she would die. And that's their opinion.
And that's
based on everything they have heard and read about the case.
But they can't say that, in their opinion, she died solely
and exclusively for that reason. If that is an issue —
Mr. Russell:

I don't think it is.

The Court:
I don't think
think it is an issue.
Mr. Burbidge:
The Court:

it

is

either.

I

don't

May I be heard on the matter, your Honor?
As opposed to a contributing cause.

Ms. Collard: We are talking about the cause as opposed to a
contributing cause?

r\ r\

in

The Court:
question.

The Court has permitted counsel to ask that

Mr. Russell: My concern is that when we get done with our
evidence, defense counsel is going to jump up and move for a
directed verdict because nobody has said that anything that
someone did caused or contributed to the cause of death. We
have that now through Mr. Owings and we will have it through
Nurse Gillerman. To tell you the truth, I am just unsure in
these discussion we have about whether the Court is saying,
in order to -- because we do have the burden to prove that,
that violations of the standard of care contributed to the
cause.
The Court:
The record is replete at this point with
both of our expert witnesses on that.
Mr. Russell:
The Court:

I want to make sure that —

Isn't it?

Mr. Russell:

I think so.

The Court: The Court is not suggesting to either Counsel
how they proceed with their case in chief or their defense
or rebuttal.
The Court is suggesting, in its own
opinion, the cause of death is not an issue.
You
have talked all along in this case about standard of care,
and that's the basis that these two experts you have called
from Southern California have been designated or
acknowledged by the Court as experts. They are dealing with
the standard of care.
And they are perfectly within
their right as an expert witness to say if the
standard of care in not adhered to, I would expect
as an expert, that this is what would occur.
But
they can't say with specificity that that's in fact what did
happen to this particular woman.
Mr. Burbidge:

May I be heard, please, your Honor?

The Court: Yes.
Mr. Burbidge: I would move for a mistrial at this time, and
the basis of the motion is that prejudicial testimony,
incompetent testimony, and testimony without foundation has
come in with regard to the cause of death and the
contributing causes of death. In the State of Utah, medical
doctors are restricted — such issues are restricted to the
testimony of medical doctors. They are the only authority
to treat and to diagnose. And the diagnostic function of a
medical doctor is the exclusive -— or the determination of
cause of death or contributing cause of death is in the
exclusive province, pursuant to statute and case law, of
medical doctors.
And the Court's ruling, allowing

on

these
unqualified
experts
to
testify
as
to a
contributing cause of death, is a prejudicial error
that cannot be corrected through any kind of instruction to
this jury, and I would move for a mistrial at this time, and
request the Court give direction to counsel for the
plaintiff that he is not to pursue that line of questioning
with these witnesses again.
The Court:
The motion for mistrial is denied.
The
Court has previously ruled that this witness nor
any other expert witness who was not involved in
determination
of
cause
of
death
could
not
so
testify.
And the Court has granted defense counselfs
motion to strike.
Further, if there is a problem, and
should cause of death become an issue in this case, the
Court is of the opinion that the error made, if in fact it
occurred, is not prejudicial, and is curable.
Anything further?
Mr. Russell:

No, your honor, thank you.

The Court:
The Court will, on the record instruct
counsel not to ask this witness not any other
expert witness as to the decedent's cause of death,
who
did
not
participate
in
making
that
determination, so that there is no misunderstanding
on that part. And the Court has stated previously, on the
record, out of the presence of the jury, that that's the
Court*s position, and so instructs counsel for the plaintiff
again.
Page 348
Q. If the respiratory therapy department has established a
therapeutic objective, and the therapy being provided by the
respiratory therapists is not achieving the objective, does
the standard of care require the therapist to do anything?
A. The standard of care would be to do something for that
patient, whether it be contacting a physician, contacting
the nurse, notifying their supervisor, notifying their
medical director.
Something — if the goals are not
attained, to try to do something for the patient.

KIMBALL LLOYD, M.D., was Mrs. George's treating physician.
called by appellant as a fact witness.

He was

His testimony appears in R-7 65, pp.

351-411, and in R-767, pp. 632-636, and includes the following:
Pages 357-359
Q. You, as an outside physician, [with] a practice of your
own and a family of your own, depend on the hospital
personnel to tell you what is happening with your patient
when you are not there, don't you?
A.

Yes. I do.

Q.

You have to depend on them for that, don't you?

A*

That's correct.

Qc You have to depend particularly on the hospital to tell
you about changes in your patients' condition?
A c

163 e

Q0 Because a change in the patient's condition may signify
an event that you have to respond to?
Ac Yes.
Q.
The hospital staff has the benefit of continual
observation of the patients you have admitted?
A. Yes.

Qc
The p o i n t being, i f you a r e u n a v a i l a b l e , and your
p a t i e n t needs some a t t e n t i o n ,
i t is the
hospital's
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to see t h a t someone i s n o t i f i e d ?
A.

That's correct.

Q. You would not expect, would you, t h a t a p a t i e n t t h a t you
a d m i t t e d t o L.DoS. H o s p i t a l would be l e f t alone in an
emergency s i t u a t i o n ?
A.

No, I would not expect t h a t .

Pages 360-362
Qc
When you have a patient admitted to a hospital like
L.D.S. Hospital, your role as the attending physician is
basically to react to changes that occur in your patient's
condition?
A.

That's correct.

Q.
You can't address
aware of, can you?
A.

a

problem

that

you

are

not

No, I can't.

Pages 371-373
Q.
In the meantime, these orders dealing with what the
nurses were to do with the respiratory status were still in
effect, weren't they?
A„

Yes.

Q.

You expected them to be done?

A. Yes.
Q. You expected when the nurse did them to write it down in
the chart, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. If the nurses weren't going to do that, you wanted them
to talk to you about that?
A.

That's correct.

Q.
In any event, as of the 1st, the functions that the
hospital personnel were to perform were that much more
important because of the patient's respiratory status; is
that correct?
A.

Yes, they were very important„

Page 374-375
Q. You do expect, when respiratory therapists interact with
your patients, that they write down what they do and what
the effect of what they do is, so that you can get some
information from them?
A.

Yes, they know that.

^o

Qe
In July and August of 198 6, the respiratory therapy
department was utilizing computer-generated records, weren't
they?
A.

That's what I understand, yes.

Qe

No one told you about that, though, did they?

A.

I was not aware of it at the time,

Q. Nobody from the respiratory therapy department told you,
if you want to know what we are doing and what the result
is, this is where you need to look?
A.

Yes, I didn't know that at the time.

Qe So you never saw any of the notes that the respiratory
therapy department generated, did you?
A.

No.

Only subsequent to her hospitalization.

Qe
During the entire time that Betty George was in the
hospital, you never spoke to any of the respiratory
therapists, did you?
A0

I didn't

Q„
Nobody from the respiratory therapy department ever
contacted you about anything, did they?
A.

Not that I am aware of.

Pages 380-382
Q.
Did Nurse Schnabel inform you that the patient had
indicated she wasn't able to get enough oxygen?
A.

I don't know who Nurse Schnabel is.

Q0 Did any nurse inform you of that on the morning of the
2nd?
Ao

I don't recall that specifically being mentioned.

Qo You learned on the morning of the 2nd that Dr. Bearnson
had determined that Mrs. George should be transferred to the
intensive care unit?
A.

Yeso

Q.

You agreed with that, didn't you?

-^

A.

Yes, I did.

Q. As you say, you still were worried about the pulmonary
embolism?
A«

That ' s correct.

Qo
It is also because nurses Terry and Schnabel felt
inadequate to take care of the patient, didn't they?
A.
I think they felt like they would prefer that
she not be on the gynecology floor, and there was
no question there was some nursing input into that.
I agreed with that. If a nurse would suggest to me that she
didn't feel she could adequately take care of a patient, I
think a step would be done to correct that.
Q. That was another good reason to send the patient to ICU,
wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Pages 385-391
Qo
When you left, though, no one told you that Mrs.
George's transfers to the ICU were going to be handled by
volunteers with no medical training, did they?
A.

No,

Q. When you left the hospital on Saturday morning, no one
told you that there was going to follow a four-hour period
in which no information about the patient's condition would
be entered in the record, did they?
A. No.
Q. And you have subsequently reviewed the record, haven't
you?
A.

Yes, I have.

Q.
Other than the fact that Mrs. George did
have
a
pulmonary
embolism,
as
shown
by
angiogram, you don't know what her condition
from 10:20 to 2:20, do you?
A.

not
the
was

No.

Q. When you made that call, you believed that your patient
went to the ICU after the test, didn't you?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And was admitted?

A. Yes.
Q. Did you later get a call at your home, from a nurse in
L.D.S. Hospital?
A. Yes,
Q.

Was that approximately 3:00?

A.

3s00 or 3s30, but right around that time.

Q.

That was Nurse Terry, wasn't it?

A. Yes.
Q. Nurse Terry told you that the hospital had not had a bed
available in the ICU for your patient, didn't she?
A8

Yes, she did.

Q.

So she told you that Betty was back on her floor?

A.

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Go
So you asked Nurse Terry haw Betty was doing, didn't
you?
Ac

Yes, I did.

Qc And Nurse Terry told you that Betty looked fine, didn't
shec
A.
She said about the same.
She was still breathing
rapidly, but she looked about the same.
Q.
was
had
A.

She conveyed the impression to you that Betty
in no worse condition than the last time you
s^Bn her?
That's

correct.

Q.
Nurse Terry didn't tell
was very distant, did she?

you

that

your

patient

A.

No

Q.
was

Nurse Terry didn't tell you that your patient
responsive but incoherent at times, did she?

A. No.

Q.
Those are changes in Betty's condition that you
expect to be told about by the nurses,
aren't they?
A.

Yes.

Q,
Those are the kind of changes that you have to
be told about by the nurses,
in order to make
decisions?
Mr. Burbidge:
answered.
The Court:

Argumentative,

your

Honor,

asked

and

Overruled.

A. Yes, the nurses will inform a physician. I am perhaps
out of line in suggesting that the nurses will contact a
physician, but it might not necessarily be the attending
physician, because of the nature of a teaching hospital at
LDS Hospital. They will go through the house staff first
with many things, and then the house staff will then contact
me, in turn. Or if they are not able to reach the house
staff, they may call me directly.
Q.

Nurse Terry had you on the phone?

A.

But she had me on the phone.

Q.
that

Here is a change in your patient's
she didn't tell you about, right?

A.
No,
same *

I

was

reassured

that

she

was

condition
doing

the

Q.
Did Nurse Terry inform you that your patient was
exhausted?
A.

I don't believe so.

Q.
For a patient who has had preexisting respiratory
problems, a change in mental status can indicate that oxygen
is starting not to be delivered to the vital organs; is that
correct?
Ac

Yes, it can mean that.

Q.

You later heard from the resident Carol Adams?

A. Yes.
Q.

She called you at home?

A. Yes.

Q. She gave you the same kind of information that Nurse
Terry did, didn't she?
A. Yes.
Q. She didn't say anything about your patient's change of
mental status, either did she?
A.

No, she didn't.

Q. Would you look at page «— we are still on page 169 of
the medical record. Dr. Adams called you at what time?
A.

I believe about 4:00.

Q.

Had you received any calls from other nurses?

A. No.
Q. Did Dr. Adams inform you that at 3:30 your patient was
lying supine in bed, disoriented?
Ac

No.

Qc Did she inform you that Betty was responding "yeah" to
every question, and then only after vigorous rousing?
Ac

No.

Qe
Did Dr. Adams tell you that your patient's blood
pressure ~ she couldn't hear your patient's blood pressure?
A. No.
Qc

That's all important information, isn't it?

A.

Yes, it is.

Q.
That indicates the possibility that a very serious
complication is occurring with you patient, doesn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. They had you on the line, and they didn't say anything
about it, did they?
A.

No, not about her mental status.

Q. They did tell you, though, that your patient had an
increased temperature?
A. Yes.

Q. And that made you think Mrs. George was starting to have
an infection?
A.

Yes.

Pages 393-395
Q. Would you look at page 118 of the record.
That's a mistake, Dr. Lloyd. Look at page 32.
A.

Excuse me.

I have it.

Q. That page contains a progress note that Dr. Adams wrote,
time listed is 5:00 p.m., isn't it?
A.

Yes.

Q. Subsequent to Mrs. George's arrest, you appended a note
to it, didn't you?
Ac

Yes, I did.

Q.
That one note that you wrote says, "Suspect urinary
tract infection," doesn't it?
Ac

Versus cuff cellulitis.

Q.

You suspected a urinary tract infection?

A.

Yes.

Q. What did you suspect to the the source of the urinary
tract infection.
A.
In most postoperative patients, it is secondary to
catheterization. I suspected that was a possible source of
her infection.
Q.

Mrs. George had had such a catheter?

A.

Yes.

Q.

On the 29th of July?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Four days ago?

A.

Yes.

Q. Didn't L.D.S. Hospital at the time when the catheter was
removed — weren't they supposed to do a culture on that and
put it in the record?

A. Yes.
Q.

That happened with everybody, didn't it?

A. I believe everybody was being — was part of a culture
study that the infectious disease department was doing at
that time.
Q0 The purpose of that culture is to determine whether or
not an infection exists or might develop?
A.

Correct.

Q. LeDcS. Hospital never did that in Mrs. George's case,
did they?
A.

I couldn't find a record on that.

Q.
If your suspicion about the source of this
infection was correct, then you didn't get the
information that would have told you about that,
true?
Ao
Q.

That's

correct.

It was the hospital's responsibility to do that?

A. The infectious disease department was the one that was
doing the study, I believe.
Pages 395-397
Q. Did you learn from Nurse Terry, when you spoke with her,
that the hospital was going to provide a one-on-one, special
duty nurse for your patient?
A»
Yes. She said they were going to try to arrange
for a one-on-one, private nurse, so that she could
get continual nursing care.
Q. The purpose for providing that nurse was because the
hospital hadn't had space available in the ICU, wasn't it?
A.

I believe it was considered to be the next best thing.

Q*
With that information, you assumed that your
patient was going to be watched at all times,
didn't you?
A.

Yes, I did*

Q.
And that any change in your patient's condition
would be immediately
relayed to you or someone
appropriate, who could deal with it?
A.

Or

someone

appropriate,

correct.

Q. But you had had contact with the hospital nurses by that
time?
Ae

Yes,

Q. They knew where you were and they knew how to get a hold
of you?
Ac

Uh-huh (Affirmative).

Q.

Yes?

A. Yes.
Q.
Did you ever hear from Nurse Soraghan,
on-one, special duty nurse, at all?
A.

the one-

No, I didn't.

Q. At any time on the afternoon of August 2 did you get a
message from anyone at the hospital, conveying to you that
there was a sense of emergency, or that something needed to
be done quickly?
A.

No, I didn't.

Q.
You relied on L.D.S. Hospital to supply a competent
well-trained and experienced nurse for your patient in this
situation, didn't you?
A.

Yes, I did.

Pages 399-400
Q.
. . .what I am trying to get at is that no one said
anything to you, no nurse said anything to you, that made
you think anything other than your patient was going to get
better; is that right?
A.

Yes, I think that's righto

Q.
Did any nurses call you and tell you that
5:00
your patient's
respirations
had
slowed
blank?
A.

No.

at
to

Q- If you have a patient whose pulse rate is in the 150
range for 24 hours, and whose respiratory rate is in the
range of 28 to 32 for 24 hours, and then all of the sudden
their respiration slows to blank, would that indicate that
the patient has become so tired that they can't maintain
that respiratory rate anymore?
A.

That may be one reason.

Q.
That would be a reason you would want to consider,
wouldn't it?
A. Yes.
Q.
Because if that's happening, that means
patient might stop breathing, doesn't it?
h.

That's

correct.

But

the

down may also be an indication
Q

Granted.

respiration
she

is

slowing

improving.

But you didn't get the information

I,.,
But I didn't get the information.
Q<
And you know now that your patient
improving?
Jko

She was not

your

was

—

not

improving.

Pages 401-407
Q
This Note, Dr. Lloyd, at 3:30 in the afternoon
on
August
2,
"Patient
lying
supine
in
bed,
disoriented, responds 'yeah1 to every question, and
only after vigorous rousing," that is a substantial
change in her mental status, isn't it?
A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

And that —

A.

Okay.

this is on page 118, I think.

Q. And that is a pretty good indication that Mr. George's
vital organs, including her brain, are being deprived of
oxygen, aren't they?
Mr. Burbidge:
The Court:
A.

Objection, your Honor, form of the question.

If you know. Overruled.,

Certainly that's a possible explanation.

dl

Q.
If you were informed of that information, that
explanation would have occurred, itself, to you, wouldn't
it?
A. Well, that thought plus a drug-induced narcosis plus
other things I would have considered.
Qe
That kind of change in mental status indicates
the need for some action to be taken, doesn't it?
X.

Yes, it does.

Q.
You were not given the opportunity
action for Mrs. George, were you?
A.

I didn't

to

take

any

know she was unresponsive.

Qe Based on what you can see in the record, in your review
after the fact, you can see that your patient was not longer
an uncomplicated post-op patient, can't you?
A.

That's correct.

Q. You expected Nurse Soraghan to be with your patient all
the time?
A.

Is she the one-on-one nurse?

Q*

Yes

A.

Yes, I did.

Q. If she wasn't there, that she
someone else was there?

was going to make sure

A. Yes.
Q. You received a call from Dr. Adams at you home sometime
shortly after 7;00, informing that your patient had stopped
breathing and suffered an arrest, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q.

And you went to the hospital?

A.

Yes.

Qc And you were involved with the remaining course of Mrs.
George's care, weren't you?
A. Yes.

yio

QD As her attending physician, you attempted to determine
what had happened, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q6 It was your conclusion that Mrs. George arrested because
of hypoxia, wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q.

Hypoxia means lack of oxygen, doesn't it?

A. Yes.
Q.
It is your opinion, as a physician, who admits
patients to L.D.S. Hospital very often, that nurses
who were taking care of your patient on August 2,
should have told you the information that we have
gone over, isn't?
A.

Yes.

Q. And their failure to do that precluded you from taking
action on behalf of your patient, didn't it?
A. I believe they were informing Dr. Adams, which is the
approach that you would expect to see with the nurses
interacting with a patient who is sick and experiencing
complications, that they would go through the resident
physician, who at that time was Dr. Adams. So I assume that
they were informing someone. But I have testified as how
much I was informed.
Q.

Dr. Adams called you, right?

A. Yes.
Q. She wanted your input, too?
A. Yes.
Q.

She was worried about the patient, too, wasn't she?

A.

Yes

Q.

She didn't tell you this information either, did she?

A.

Not about her mental status change, no.

Q.
You found out, after Mrs
George's arrest, that
Dr. Adams hadn't seen her for the last several
hours prior to her arrest, didn't you?
A *3

A.

Yes.

Q.
That indicates, or is an indication that the nurses
didn't call Dr. Adams in those last two hours, doesn't it?
A.
I don't recall hearing that specifically, but I saw
nothing in the note, either the nurse's notes or Dr. Adams'
notes, to suggest that she had been in to see her between
5:00 and 7:00.
Q.
Based on your medical training and experience,
education and knowledge, if a patient is deprived
of oxygen to their brain, a serious complication
can occur in a matter of minutes, can't it?
A.

Yes, it can.

Pages 409-410
Q. Dr. Lloyd if you have a patient who is hypoxic, to the
point where the hypoxia might affect their brain and cause
them to have an arrest and coma and die, you treat the
hypoxia, and then worry about what is causing it, don't you?
A. I don't think there is a sequence you can put on that.
I think you treat the hypoxia and the — as to whatever is
precipitating the hypoxia.
I think you have to treat
everything.
And I don't think you can give a sequence.
Obviously, if you suspect a patient is hypoxic, the first
thing you do is initiate oxygen therapy.
And then you
continue to resolve the thing that's causing her hypoxia.
Q.
On the afternoon of
Mrs. George was hypoxic
records show, did you?
A.

No, I didn't.

Q.
You
didn't
problem, did you?
A.

the 2nd, you didn't know
to the extent that the

know

what

was

the

underlying

No, I didn't.

Q.
Had you known the extent of the hypoxia that
was occurring, you would have initiated measures to
make sure that she was adequately ventilated, or
try to, so she didn't stop breathing, wouldn't you
have?
A.

In addition to other things, yes, I would.

Q,
Sure
When you had the patient breathing, then
you would go in and find out what was causing the
problem, wouldn't you?
A.

Yes,

Pages 635-636
Q0
[Do] you remember your prior testimony about the nurses1
notes that I held up for the jury?
A. Yes.
Q.

That you were not aware of?

Ao

Right.

Q.
You would expect the nurses in
t o be a b l e
to
recognize
when a
hypoxic
that
major
organs
may
affected,
wouldn't you?
ho

Yes,

I think

L.D.S. Hospital
patient
is
so
be
adversely

so.

Qc That's all you expect.
to tell you why, do you?

You don't expect them to be able

A. No.
Qo
You don't care if they know why, do you?
just care that they tell you, right?
A.

Yes.

You

You need their input.

Qo
On the afternoon of August 2nd, you didn't get any
information from any nurse, any respiratory therapist, or
the second-year resident Carol Adams, that immediate action
was necessary for your patient, did you?
A.

Not other than what I have testified.

Q.

You heard about her temperature?

Ac Yes.
Q.

And you thought maybe an infection [was] beginning?

A. Yes.
Q„ You were not given any information that caused you to
become alarmed, were you?
A* No.

Q. You ordered some tests,- and you planned on going in
later that evening to see the patient, didn't you?
A.

That's correct.

Q. You expected when you got there that the patient would
be there and you would be able to evaluate her?
A.

That's correct.

A

c

JOHN TROWBRIDGE, M.D., testified as an expert for LDS Hospital.
testimony is set forth at R-766 at pp. 518-547.

It includes the following:

Pages 519-520
A. I generally provide care for very ill individuals with
extremely complex medical disorders.
I spend a great
deal of time in the intensive care unit, with very
ill patients in multiple settings.
And I am usually
called in response to a problem, an unclear case, to assist
in the diagnosis and management of infectious process.
Pages 521
Qe
They [physicians] receive information from respiratory
therapists, nurses, other health care team members, and then
make their diagnosis based on the information they receive,
correct?
A.

And the patient, correct.

Pages 540-541
Qc If she had been given some kind of mechanical therapy
with increased oxygen levels on the afternoon of the 2nd,
198 6, do you have an opinion, based on reasonable medical
probability, as to whether or not the cardiac arrest would
still have occurred?
A. My opinion is that this data that we have reviewed and
that I have described in terms of — suggests such a
profound involvement, I believe she had a condition called
acute respiratory distress syndrome, that at that time
probably and intervention would no longer been successful.
Pages 544-547
Qc In fact, on the day of her arrest, all of these things
[signs and symptoms of sepsis] according to the doctors,
were negative?
A.

Right.

Qc You said that you reviewed the testimony of Dr. Lloyd in
preparing to give your opinion?
A.

His

Correct.

Qc Did you see where Dr. Lloyd stated that after the arrest
he went and examined Mrs. George for the presence of an
infection?

A.

Yes.

Q.
And he found t h e r e was very
i n f e c t i o n when he looked at her?
A.

little

evidence

of

an

Yes.

Q. And it was Dr. Lloyd's opinion, who was in the hospital
examining the patient, that she didn't have an infection
that was fulminant or snowballing or however you would like
to describe it, until after the arrest?
That was his
opinion, wasn't it?
A. That is the problem of clinical medicine.
opinion.
Q.

He was there, and he looked?

A.

Absolutely.

That is his

Q. You say that you have a lot of practice in dealing with
complex cases, very sick patients, right?
A.

Right.

Q.

Do you have a private practice?

A. Yes,
Q.

Do you admit patients to hospitals?

A. Yes.
Q. When you have a patient in the hospital, do you rely on
the hospital staff to tell you things about your patient?
A.

Certain things.

Q.

Important things?

A.

I am not sure what you are getting at, but of course.

Q.

Changes

A.

Sure.

in the patient's

condition?

Q. If you had a patient in the hospital, and the hospital
had assigned a one-to-one special duty nurse to your
patient, and the one-to-one, special duty nurse was standing
right in front of your patient, and she was incoherent,
semicomatose, would you expect to be told about that?

A.
Well,
about h a l f
of my p a t i e n t s
are on
v e n t i l a t o r s i n the ICU, i n c o h e r e n t ,
semicomatose.
I t depends on in the context i f there was a sudden
change.
Qc L e t ' s assume she wasn't l i k e t h a t before.
expect t o be t o l d about t h a t ?
A.

Yes

Q.

So you could do something about it?

A.

Yes.

You would

Q.
If you have a patient who is in severe respiratory
distress, gasping for air, and you don't know what the
problem is, do you provide ventilatory support first, and
look for the problem, or do you look for the problem first,
and take the chance that the patient stops breathing?
A* It is not that simple. As I said, the reason it takes
ten years to figure out all this is sometimes you would and
sometimes you wouldn't. It depends on one's judgment as to
whether the person needs ventilatory support or not. That
can be frequently a very difficult call, because you have to
look into the future.
And obviously she got put on a
ventilator, you know, after it became very evident
that she needed one.
Q.

After

A.

Yes.

she

stopped

breathing?

Q.
You would like to be in a position to make that
call before a patient stops breathing?
A.
And
it
certainly do.

is

frequently

difficult,

but

you

From this testimony, it is evident that sepsis, assuming it existed in
the patient on August 2, 1986 is treatable; that a physician requires prompt
notification of relevant signs and symptoms in order to be able to treat it;
and the necessary measures for Mrs. George were not taken until too late,
i.e.,

after she stopped breathing.

Dr.

Trowbridge's

testimony

clearly

illustrates

how the

hospital's

negligence deprived Mrs. George of an opportunity to be saved by appropriate
diagnosis and treatment.

TRAGI LEE HUBER, is a daughter of Betty George.
present in LDS Hospital on August 2, 1986.

She was personally

Her testimony appears in R-766 at

pp. 548-555, and includes the following:
Pages 553-555
Q. Did you go with your mother to the eighth floor [on 8-286]?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q. Did you have a conversation with any of the nurses there
about your mother when you got back to the floor?
A.
There was awhile there before I had any kind of
conversationc We were standing in the hall, waiting to get
her into the room. When she had finally gotten into the
room, there was a lady there. I don't know what her name
was. But she was pretty. I was talking to her, and Dad was
there, and she said that she was very nervous to have
somebody that sick on the eighth floor, that they
didn't think they could handle having a lady that
sick on the eighth floor.
She really should be in
ICUo

Q. Did you meet the nurse that was assigned by the hospital
to be the one-on-one, special duty nurse to be with your
mom?
A. Yes, I met her. She was very young, and, I hate to say
it, kind of flaky. She didn't seem very sure of herself.
She went in there, and pulled up her pillow a little bit.
fluffed up her pillow . . . That's all I ever seen her do.
Q. What period of time were you in your mother's room on
eight east on the afternoon of the 2nd?
A.

I was there up until about 6:15, something like that.

Q.

The same time as your dad?

A.
Yes.
We had kind of stood there and tried to con
ourselves into maybe she might be breathing a little bit
better, trying to think of an excuse to go home, because we
were both very tired. I wanted Dad to eat something. He
was very upset, and hadn't eaten for a long time.

K1

Q„ From the time Nurse Soraghan, the one-on-one nurse took
over, did you see Dr. Adams after that?
A.

I don't recall seeing Dr. Adams at all.

MICHAEL LAHEY, MeD., was an internal medicine specialist called in by
Dr. Lloyd to consult with respect to Mrs. George's respiratory complications.
Dr. Lahey was called as a witness by LDS Hospital.

His testimony appears in

R-767 at pp. 566-632, and contains the following:
Pages 570-71
By Mr. Burbidge Q.
The question is, does a nurse
diagnose a patient's condition, in your experience?
A.

The better ones.

Q0
Does a respiratory therapist diagnose a patient's
condition?
A„

Can e

Q,
In the normal course of your care and treatment, do
these nurses and respiratory therapists provide input to a
physician, who, in turn, makes the diagnosis, makes the
differential diagnosis?
Ac Yes. I think that would be a better way of stating the
processc The respiratory therapist might, for example, come
to me and say - These are the facts, and I think this is
what the diagnosis is.
Really, it is up to the
physician to put that together and come to the diagnosis.

Q.
The role of a nurse, providing information to a
physician, as a member of the medical care team, and then
what does the physician do with that information?
A.

Puts the facts together, and come to a diagnosis.

Q. Is that what you were doing in this particular case with
Betty George?
Ac

Yes, it is.

Pages 591-593
Q. In what condition did you find her in the intensive care
unit, when you completed your examination?
A.
Again, very much as I had found her the previous
evening.
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Q. Was there anything else about her condition that you
felt warranted continued care and treatment in the intensive
are unit?
A.

No, there was note

Pages 595-596
Q.

What is a mechanical ventilator?

A.

...

It is a very effective means of providing oxygen.

Q. Was a mechanical ventilator indicated for Mrs. George
[when you saw her in the ICU]?
A.

Not at all.

Q.

What did you find [the next time you saw Mrs. George]?

A.
Indeed, that she had had a cardiac arrest, and was
clearly septic at that time, was requiring an awful lot of
medication to maintain her blood pressure. A cardiologist
was involved in assisting in administrating — administering
those drugs.
She was at that time being ventilated
by a machine totally.
Page 606-607
A. c . . But as a physician, I assessed her condition, and
said she does not need this intensive care unit. It was not
simply because I thought heparin wasn't routinely used up
there. I just did not think she needed it, either. I made
some assumptions, yes, about what they did and did not do,
up on the gynecologic floor. But at the same time, I was
also responsible for assessing a patient.
And if my
assessment was that she was ill and she needed to
be in the intensive care unit, or if anybody else,
any of the nurses or Dr. Adams or any of the others
felt that she needed to be there, they would have
spoken up.
Q. Since you brought up the subject — I appreciate the
fact that you did «— that's the way you operate in a
hospital, isn't it?
You assume the people involved
in the patient' s care are going to let you know if
they think you do something wrong?
A.

Yes, I do assume that.

Q. If they think the patient needs something you haven't
ordered?

A.
Yes.
I appreciate that.
I try not to intimidate
people.
I think I have good communication with various
people around the hospital. They will let me know.
Q.

If the patient needs some help?

A.

You bet.

Q.
You have to
that, don't you?
A.

rely

on

the

hospital

staff

to

do

Yes.

Pages 609-611
Q.
When you saw Mrs, George in the ZCU,
all right to you, didn't she?
A.

Yes.

Q.

She appeared to be nice and stable?

h0

Yes, I believe

Qo

she looked

I used those words.

That her condition was unchanging?

A. With one exception, as I pointed out in the deposition.
She now had a temperature. But other than that, unchanging
is a stable «— is a fair assessment.
Qc
No
there?
Ac

sign

that

Mrs.

George

was

in

shock,

was

Not that I was aware of, no.

Q.
You didn't even consider her at the time to be
very sick, did you?
A,

No, I did not.

Qo Not sick enough, as you have said, to be admitted to the
ICU?
A0

Precisely.

Q.

At that time she certainly wasn't septic, was she?

A. Different people use that term different ways.
would you define your term?

How

Q.
From your evaluation of her, you did not
conclude at the time that she was septic, did you?

RR

A. Septic shock, no.
Septic in the sense of having
infection — some people will say that that wound looks
septic, because it is a little bit red. some people will
say —> they will use the word "septic" when a person has a
temperature. So that's why I asked you to define your term.
I usually use the term when I mean the bacteria is
in the bloodstream and the person's blood pressure
is low.
In that sense, no, she was not septic at
that time.
Q. Let's put it this way. You didn't think, when you saw
Mrs. George, that she was in any kind of critical condition
from which she might die later on that day?
A.
By no means.
Had Z thought that, I would have
left her in the intensive care unit, and formulated
some plan about how we were going to use that
intensive care unit.
Q.
You are the type of doctor, aren't you, that if
you have a suspicion about a change in patient's
condition, you want to go right in and try to find
out what that is?
A.

I believe so.

Pages 613-615
Qc ««. You thought she needed to be closely observed, didn't
you?
A.

Yes, in that context.

Q.

By the nurses?

A. Yes.
Q.

Because of her vital signs and her respiratory rate?

A. Yes.
Q.
At
the time
you
saw her, Mrs.
respiratory status appeared stable to you?
A.

Indeed,

it did.

Q.
If that changed at all, you
about it immediately, didn't you.
A.

George's

wanted

to

know

Yes.

Q.
Because you know that if a patient is using too
much of their energy just to breathe, that you may
have to go in and assist the patient to breathe?
C £

A
Q.
A.

Yes.
Correct?
Yes,

Q. If it seems to you, if you got a call from
that a patient was working too hard to breathe,
to you she was becoming too tired from that
would then rush in and use a ventilator to
respiratory system, wouldn't you?

a nurse say,
if if seemed
effort, you
support her

A. Yes.
Q.
A patient will not stop breathing if they are on a
ventilator, will they?
Ac That's the purpose of putting them on a ventilator.
breathes for them, whether they do or not.

It

Q. At the time, when you saw Mrs. George in the ICU unit,
if you had thought that she was septic then, you would have
made some appropriate orders and done something about it
wouldn't you?
A, Precisely.
Qc

You would have kept her in ICU, wouldn't you?

Ac

Among many other things, yes.

Q. Among many other things designed to take care of that
situation?
A» Right. You don't just put somebody in the ICU. You use
that unit to do something, to treat somebody whose blood
pressure is low, or some such thing.
Q.

That sort of therapy?

A.

Right.

Q.
You would do whatever you thought was necessary
to make sure that that sepsis didn't proceed, say,
to an arrest, wouldn't you?
A.

Precisely.

Qe
From the time that Mrs. George was sent back to
the eighth floor, until the time that she arrested,
you nearer received a call from any of the nurses
down there, did you?
A.

I received no calls.

57

Pages 619-622
Qc

You were involved with her care, weren't you?

A. Yes.
Qe

And the nurses knew that, didn't they?

A. Yes.
Q.

And they didn't call you?

A. But they wouldn't usually.
not call me.

You are right.

No they did

Qe
Would you agree that Mrs. George was having
some respiratory complications on the afternoon of
the 2nd?
A.

Indeed,

she was.

Q.
Would you agree with me that a change in
mentation, confusion, disorientation, is a sign, a
possible sign that oxygen is being deprived to the
brain?
A.

Yes it is.

Q.
And that is the kind of change, for a patient
with
a
respiratory
difficulty,
that
you
would
expect a nurse to convey to someone?
A.

Yes.

Q. Do you have Exhibit 1 there is front of you, Dr. Lahey,
the hospital record?
A. Yes.
Q.

Would you refer to page 169. Do you have that?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q. I have a blow-up of that, part of that page. Do you see
the nurse's note at 2:20 in the afternoon, right after Mrs.
George got back, describing her as very distant and
incoherent at times?
A.

Yes, I do.

Q. That's the kind of change that we are talking about,
isn't it?

A.

Yes, I believe it is.

Q.
That13 the kind of change which, if made known
to you, you would take action on, wouldn't you?
Jk.

Yes,

Q.
You would want to know what was causing that
potentially dangerous change in condition, wouldn't
you?
A.

Yes.

Qc If, Dr. Lahey, you had been made aware of this change in
MrSo George's condition that you have just discussed — if
you had ~ you would have had four and a half hours prior to
the time she arrested to investigate the reason for that
change, wouldn't you?
A. Yes.
Qc
The last time you saw Mrs. George, the thought
did not occur to you that she might be brain dead
five hours later, did it?
Ac

Didn't occur to me in the least.

Q
If you had suspected that she had a respiratory
condition or an infectious condition that might
result in that, you would have navaz
let her out of
ICU, should you have?
A.

I shouldn't be practicing medicine

right now.

Pages 623-630
Q, You have already testified on direct that that oxygen
level of 50-51 is low, below normal?
A.

Yes, it is.

Q.
When you saw Mrs. George in the ICU, you weren't
thinking that that was going to get worse, were you?
A. No, I had no reason to believe that it was going to get
worse.
Q. Because you know that if a P02 drops below 50, that a
patient can have permanent damage to their heart, brain or
lungs?
A.

If it stays below 50 for very long, indeed.

SQ

Q.
So a patient who has a base
is
particularly
important
for
condition to be communicated?
A.

That's a fair

line of 50-51, it
changes
in
her

statement.

Q. There has been a lot of talk about the ability of nurses
to diagnose, whatever that word means. It is true, isn't
it, that you wouldn't expect a nurse to be able to look at a
patient like Mrs. George, when you saw her in the intensive
care unit, and be able to rattle off a differential
diagnosis, including infection, atelectasis, poor lung
volumes and all that kind of thing?
A. I would not expect her to be capable of doing that
her or him.

—

Q.
You do, though, expect the nurses to be able to
look at a patient, and report what they see?
A.

Yes.

Q.
And whether or not a nurse knows what the
particular
cause
of
a
change
in
a
patient's
condition might be, you still expect her to report
those changes?
A.

Yes.

Q.
out

Because that' s the only way that you can
what's causing the change, correct?

A.

Yes.

figure

Q.
And i f t h e r e i s a s i g n i f i c a n t change i n
p a t i e n t ' s c o n d i t i o n , and i t i s not reported t o
physician,
then the p h y s i c i a n might not g e t
chance t o diagnose and t r e a t , correct?
A.

a
a
a

Exactly.

Q.
Did anyone call you at 3:30 in the afternoon of
August 2, and inform you about Mrs. George's vital
signs?
A.

No, they did not.

Q. Did anyone call you at about between 3:00 and 3:30 on
the afternoon of August 2, and tell you that the nurses had
been unable to get Mrs. George to bleed for a glucose test?

Ac No, they did not. It would surprise me if they had. I
would not have been the appropriate person to say such
things to.
Q0
I understand your testimony about that. So you didn't
know, from any source, that at 3:30 in the afternoon of the
2nd, that Mrs. Georgefs blood pressure was 110 over question
mark?
A. No, I did not know that. I found that out later on. But
I did not know at the time.
Q. You have stressed here several times the importance of
the blood pressure in making the diagnosis of sepsis,
havenst you?
Ac

Yes.

Q
And t h i s blood p r e s s u r e would be a very
important p i e c e of information for a p h y s i c i a n t o
have i n order t o make that d i a g n o s i s , wouldn't i t ?
Ac

Yes.

Q.

That was a very critical piece of

information?

A.
But that's not when she arrested.
critical piece of information.

Zt is a very

Q
She didn't
hours, did she?

a

Ao

arrest

for

three

and

half

more

That *s correct.

Q.
If you had been aware of this blood pressure at
3:30, you would have done what was necessary to
find
out
why her blood
pressure
was
in
that
condition, wouldn't you have?
Mr. Burbidge:
The Court:

Objection, calls for speculation.

Overruled.

Do you understand the question?

The Witness: Yes, I do.
The Court:

You may answer.

A. Again, the primary change of command would have gone
from the nurse that detected that, to the house officer, the
resident who was on call for the gynecologist, and then
probably to the gynecologist. And if they saw a need to
bring me in, they would have promptly.
So it would be
unlikely for them to have informed me of that.

61

Q.
I r e a l i z e t h a t ' s your p o s i t i o n .
But i t i s not the
question.
I am j u s t asking you, as a p h y s i c i a n ,
if
you
had
been
given
this
critical
piece
of
information,
that
would have been something
that
would have motivated you t o act?
A.

Yes, I am s o r r y .

I misunderstood the q u e s t i o n .

Q. This i s the kind of t h i n g t h a t you previously t e s t i f i e d
would induce you t o keep the p a t i e n t in ICU, i f you were
aware of i t ?
Ac

Yes.

Q. In your review of this case, your detailed review, and
your involvement in it, you don't know what happened to Mrs.
George for that next three and a half hours, do you?
A. I have read through the notes, and I now know what the
nurses say, what the physicians have said. So, sure, I have
read it since. At the time that they called me, they told
me what had happened. But at 3:30 that afternoon, when they
found that, I didn't know that piece of information. I
guess I really didn't understand the question.
Qo

You knew she arrested at 7:00?

A,

Yes. They called me shortly after.

Q.
You didn't have any information about the
intervening three and a half hour period, form 3:30
to 7:00, about Mrs. George's condition.
A.

That

is correct.

Q. There has been some discussion about blood gases. I
would like you to refer to them. specifically, page 80 of
Exhibit 1. Are you with me?
A. Yes.
Q. The blood gas at the very bottom of that page was taken
at 7:12 p.m.?
A. Yes.
Q. From the record and from the testimony, we know that
that was during Mrs. George's code.
A.

Exactly.

Q.
The information from that blood
drastic change in her condition from
you saw her, doesn't it?

gas reveals a
the last time

A.

Yes, it does.

Q. It indicates a level of oxygen, 40, which is below the
point which you have testified can cause permanent damage to
the heart and the brain?
A. Yes.
Q. As between the time that you last saw Mrs. George and
7:12, during code, you can't say when that change took
place, can you?
A.

No, I cannot.

Qe You know that although Mrs. George did not die at 7:00,
that when the code was finished she was brain dead?
A.

That's what most of us thought at the time.

Q. And the fact that she had suffered brain death made it
inevitable that she was going to die in the near future,
didn't it?
Ac

Yes.

Q.

You have been practicing for how long Dr. Lahey?

Ac I finished my residency in 1981.
years.

Eight years ~

seven

Q0 During that period of time, you have had patients who
have been infected or septic before, haven't you?
Ac

Yes, many*

Qo

Several of them?

Ac

Many.

Q.
You have had patients who have
worse condition than Mrs. George was
you saw her, haven't you?

been in
in last

A.

Many.

Q.

And they didn't all die, did they?

Ac

God forbid.

Qo

The vast majority of them didn't, did they?

Ac

Exactly.

No, they did not.

63

much
time

Q. There is not one of those patients that you ever gave up
on, is there?
A.

That's right.

Page 631
Q.
With regard to the bLood pressure at 3:30 in the
afternoon, you would expect the resident to be aware of that
blood pressure, wouldn't you?
A.

Exactly.

Q.
And then to take appropriate action based on that
knowledge?
A.

Yes, that's exactly what I would assume.

£A

LEWIS WEINSTEIN, M.D., testified as an expert on behalf of LDS hospital.
His testimony is set forth at R-767 at pp. 637-660.

His testimony includes

the following:
Page 639 [Questions by Mr. Burbidge]
Q.

Have you treated patients with sepsis?

A.

Yes, sir.

Pages 642-644
Q. Mrs. George then, during the afternoon of August 2,
198 6, experienced a change in her condition, and ultimately
a cardiac arrest; is that correct?
A.

That is correct.

Q0 Based on you review of the record, your background and
experience in the area of infections in gynecological
patients, do you have an opinion as to what caused that
arrest?
Ae

I believe I do*

Q„

What is that opinion?

A.
I think it was
bacterial sepsis.

related

to severe, overwhelming,

Q.
On the afternoon of August 2, 198 6, do you have an
opinion as to whether or not mechanical ventilation, if
instituted in the ICU unit or upon return to the eighth
floor that afternoon, would have altered the course that led
to the cardiac arrest?
Mr. Russell: Objection, foundation.
bench, your Honor?
The Court:

Could we approach the

You may.

(An off-the-record discussion at the bench)
The Court:

Read back the last question, please.

(The pending question was read back by the court reporter)
The Court:

Do you understand the question?

The Witness:

Yes, sir
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The Court:

You may answer it.

A.

Yes, I do have an opinion.

Q.

What is that opinion?

Ac That use of mechanical ventilation would not have made
any difference in the outcome to Mrs. George.
Q. Would the use of incentive spirometry have altered the
outcome?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

Would the use of IPPB therapy have altered the outcome?

Ac

No, sir.

Q.
Would the institution of turning, coughing and deep
breathing with Mrs. George during that period of time have
altered the outcome?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

Why?

A. This patient, because of the profound bacterial sepsis
that she had, was at a point that there was no therapy that
would have helped her.
Q.

Explain, if you will, the reason for that opinion.

A.
When a patient like this experiences such profound
bacterial shock, which affects all organs in the body, the
use of ventilation or the use of any of the different tests
that were mentioned would not make any of difference,
because one cannot alter the course.
The course is
essentially set at that particular time.
Q. Would an increase in oxygen during that period of time,
from three liters to six liters, on the afternoon of August
2, 1986, have altered the course of her illness?
A.

No, sir.

Pages 645-647 [Questions by Mr. Russell]
Q.

Do you treat patients with infections?

A.

Yes, sir, I do.

Q.

Do you treat patients with sepsis?

CC

Ac

Yes, sir, I do.

Q. Are you aggressive, when you have a septic patient, in
their treatment?
A.

I am sorry, I don't know what you mean.

Q.

Do you try to take care of the problem?

A.
I try to take care of the problem as I see it,
yes, sir.
Q0 You try to get rid of the sepsis, or whatever is causing
it?
A. It is very difficult to get rid of it. Sometimes it
requires extensive surgery.
Z try to offer the best
treatment I can.
Qc
The patients that you have with infection or sepsis
don't all die, do they?
Ao Most patients I have do not have bacterial shock.
an extremely uncommon condition.

It is

Q. All your patients who have infection or sepsis don't all
die, do they?
A6 Those patients don't have bacterial shock, and very few
of them ever die*
Q,
you

If you have a patient with bacterial sepsis, do
simply not treat them, because they are doomed?

A.

No, sir.

Q.
Bacterial
i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y , does
A.

No,

sepsis
it?

doesn't

happen

sir.

Pages 651-655
Q.
Isn't it true Dr. Weinstein, that in patients
who become septic, particularly a serious sepsis
condition like bacterial sepsis, the sooner that
treatment cam be provided, the better the chance
that the patient will recover?
A.

That is true.

Q.
If
you,
information that

That is correct.
as
a
would

£7

treating
lead you

physician,
to believe

had
that

your patient was septic, and you didn't know it
before, and that it was having an adverse effect on
her vital organs, like her brain, you could do
several things to treat that condition,
couldn't
you?
A.

I could try, but it might not work.

Qc ICU has specialized personnel, qualified personnel, and
special equipment to deal with serious complications that a
patient has, doesn't it?
A.

It does.

That is correct.

Q. For a patient who is septic, for a patient who is having
changes in mentation, due to anoxia to the brain, you can
provide ventilatory support, can't you?
A.

If I felt it was necessary, that is correct.

Q. It is important, when a patient is severely infected or
septic, to maintain the circulating volume in their
bloodstream, isn't it?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

And you would do that, too, wouldn't you?

A,

That is one of the things, yes, sir.

Q. And would you start a patient on antibiotics, or some
appropriate medication to attack the bacteria, wouldn't you?
A. I might. It depends on if I knew where the source was.
But I would add antibiotics sometime in the early course,
yes.
Qc
If the infection was particularly severe, you can
actually go in and operate on the patient, and remove
infected tissue. Or if you know what the source of the
sepsis is, you can take care of that surgically, or try to?
A. One has to be very careful, because it is very easy to
kill a patient by doing that. That is a very difficult
decision to make. If you are sure, that's exactly the right
thing to do. If you are wrong, that will be the terminal
event.
Q.

You do treat patients?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

Do you admit patients to the hospital?

Ao

Yes, I do.

Q.
Do you rely on hospital staff to take care of your
patients when you are not there, and report things to you?
A.
It is a team approach.
available to me.

I use everybody

that is

Q.
The hospital staff has a responsibility to report
important things about a patient's condition to you, don't
they?
A.

I think that is correct.

Q. If you have a patient who experiences a severe change
for the worse in their condition, while you are not there,
if you get information about that, you will go right in and
do something about it, won't you?
Ac

It depends.

I would need to know more of the facts.

Q. Have you ever had one of your patients assigned a oneon-one, special duty nurse?
Ac

Yes, sir.

Q*
Have you ever had a patient who is being taken
care of by such a nurse stop breathing, with that
nurse looking right at her, and you never heard
anything about it?
A,
I would expect her to take care of the problem
before she would contact me „
But I would want to
know about it, when whoever had time to tell me„
Pages 656-657 [Questions by Mr. Burbidge]
Qo I believe in your testimony, Doctor, you indicated that,
in treating someone that is septic, the course of action
would — one of the first courses of action would not be to
put the individual in the intensive care unit.
Do you
remember that question from Mr. Russell?
A.

Yes, sir.

Qo Why would you not put that person in an intensive care
unit?
A.
For several reasons.
I believe that my people at
my institution, on my floor, can take care of the
lady.
We understand OB/GYN diseases better than most
people in other
specialties. We can give the kinds of
things that the lady needs.
The time we would not
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keep on the ward
ventilation.

is

when

Q.
In this patient
mechanical ventilation
2, 1986?
A.

she

would

need

mechanical

did you see the need for
on the afternoon of August

Not until the time of the cardiac arrest.

Dr Weinstein's testimony clearly indicates that the vast majority of
septic patients are successfully treated.

In fact, most of his patients are

treated on the OB-GYN floor because the hospital staff knows what it is doing.
Dr. Weinstein clearly assumes that the patient had no objective signs and
symptoms until, virtually, the time of her arrest.
contradicts that assumption.

The evidence clearly

Dr. Weinstein's testimony supports appellant's

position that prompt action by the hospital staff was required, which, if
given, would have most likely saved the patient.

CAROL ADAMS, M.D., was the physician on call on the afternoon of August
2, 1986 when Mrs. George arrested.
Hospital.

She was called as a fact witness by LDS

Her testimony appears in the record at R-768, pp. 679-739, and

includes the following:
Page 695
Q. Were you comfortable with the patient going back to the
8th floor?
Ac

YeSo

Q.

Why?

AIn the midst
of
all
this,
the
nursing
supervisor had come down to the Intensive Care
Unit, to discuss nursing care for the patient, and
she assured us that she could obtain a one-on-one
nurse, who could be with the patient at all times,
and provide constant care for her.
Dre Adams is testifying about her initial impression of Betty George
after her return to the 8th floor on the afternoon of 8-2-86,

NOTE:

These

should be contrasted with the specific nursing notes for the same afternoon at
R-270, P's Exh. 1, pp. 169-171.
Page 697
A. She appeared the same as she did in the intensive care
unit. She appeared tired, sleepy. But if you shook her
shoulder and asked her a question, she would answer it.
Q.

Did she appear incoherent to you?

A. No.
Page 703
Q. How did you find the patient when you evaluated her at
4:15 p.m.?
A. She appeared the same as when I had seen her in the
intensive care unit, and when she arrived on the 8th floor.
Q.

Was she incoherent in your opinion?
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A.

No.

Q.

[Did she] respond appropriately to questions?

A.

Yes.

[cf. p.719-20] Q. Nurse Soraghan notes at 3:30 that Betty
is lying supine in bed, disoriented. . . You didn't think
that, did you?
A.

No, I did not.

Q. And Nurse Soraghan writes, "Responds 'yeah' to every
question, and only after vigorous arousing." That was not
your observation was it, doctor?
A.

No.

[and at p.722] Q.
4:00 and 4:15?
Ao

You say that you called Dr. Lloyd between

Yes.

Q„ And at that time you didn't tell Dr. Lloyd about this
3:30 to 4:00 note of Nurse Soraghan's did you?
A*

NOc

Q0 You didn't know about the note when you talked to Dr.
Lloyd, did you?
Ac

I knew about the temperature elevation.

Page 708
Q.

When was your next contact with Mrs. George?

A.

Around 5:00 in the afternoon.

Qe

You evaluated her respiratory status?

A.

Yes.

Q. Was there anything in that evaluation that indicated to
you the need for additional oxygen?
A.

No.

Q.

And her mentation, was she coherent or incoherent?

A. She was sleepy, but if you shook her shoulder and asked
her questions, she would answer the question.

Qc

Did she answer appropriately?

A. Yes.
Q. In your view, at 5:00 in the afternoon, did she have
diminished mentation?
A. No.
Page 710
Q. Was Nurse Soraghan present when you did your evaluation
at 5:00?
A.
RE:

As I recall, yes.

Dr. Adams1 Progress Note at 5:00 p.m.

[R-270, P's Exh. 1,

Pages 724-26
Qc

That information had been available at 3:30?

A. Yes,
Qc Because all you did at 5:00 here was write down things
that you had already known, isn't that true?
A.

No.

I believe I reexamined the patient at that time.

Q. You wrote down that the respirations are 32. That's 32
per minute, right? . . . There is a contemporaneous note,
there is a note that Nurse Soraghan wrote as well. That
appears at page 170 [R-270, PI. Exh 1] of the medical
record. . . . It talks about what you did.
A. Yes.
Q.

It says that you discussed the patient with the family.

A. Yes.
Q. It doesn't say anything about doing an evaluation, does
it?
A. No.
Q. And the family was very upset about Betty's condition
weren't they?
A.

They were concerned.
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Q.

Very concerned?

A.

Yes.

Q. And Nurse Soraghan then writes, "Respirations slowed to
blank." Slowed to blank. That's not in your note at 5:00,
is it?
A.

No.

Q.

You have respirations at 32?

Ao

Yes.

Qo You didn't know about the fact that Nurse Soraghan had
written in the record that the patient's respirations were
slowed to blank, did you?
A. She would have been writing that note at the same time I
was writing
mine.
So, no, I would not have been able
to
read that at that time.
Pages 709-10

[Referring to R-270, P's Exh, 1, pg. 126]

Q. There is a notation 110 over question mark for the blood
pressure?
A,

Yes.

Q.

Did you discuss that with nurse Soraghan?

A.

That was a blood pressure reading I had taken.

Q.

You took that blood pressure reading yourself?

A.

Yes.

Q.
Were you able to get
pressure?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you know why?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you pursue it further?

A.

No

a reading on the diastolic

Previously, at page 687, Dr. Adams had testified:

Q. What was your understanding as to the signs and symptoms
of sepsis at that time?
Ac Similar to the signs of infection . . . The patient can
also appear with a very low blood pressure, as if they are
going into shock.
Pages 711-712
A. . . . I asked her [Soraghan] how the patient was doing
at 6:30 p.m.
Q0
What did she report to you as to how the patient was
doing?
A. She said the patient was the same as when I had seen her
last.
[cfc Pages 727-28]
Qo When you called Nurse Soraghan at 6:30, and you asked
her about the patient's condition, you testified that Nurse
Soraghan told you that she appeared the same as she had been
before; is that correct?
A*

The same as when I had seen her last, yes*

Q. 5:00 . . . So her respirations at that time must have
still been slowed to blank. Correct?
A0

They were within normal range when I had seen her last.

Q. I am talking about what Nurse Soraghan knew. And the
same as before, to Nurse Soraghan, would mean disoriented
and responding inappropriately, and incontinent of urine,
which she wasn't measuring, wouldn't it? . . . Nurse
Soraghan didn't give you any specific information? She said
she looked the same as last time you saw her?
A.

As I recall.

Pages 715-16
Q. [After the patient's arrest] You called Dr. Lloyd. Did
you have a discussion with the nurse about the patient's
condition?
A.

. . . I asked the nurse, "What happened?"

Q.

What did she say?
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A. She said, I don't know. When you walked in the room,
the patient was breathing. She must have stopped breathing
when you walked in the room.
Pages 726-27
Q. You didnft see the patient again [after 5:00] until
after she stopped breathing, did you?
A. The nurse told me she must have stopped breathing as I
walked in the doorway. So I probably saw her at the instant
she stopped breathing.
Q. When you came through the doorway, and you looked across
the room and saw Betty George, you could see from the
doorway that she was blue?
A.

Yes.

Q. How long does it take for a person to turn blue from
lack of oxygen?
Ac A minute or two. If you are holding your breath, you
can start to turn blue.
Q.

Was Mrs. George holding her breath when you went over?

A.

No.

Qe What was Nurse Soraghan doing — I think you testified
when you got there Nurse Soraghan was standing at the left
side of the bed?
A.

Yes.

CHARLES GREGORY ELLIOT, MoD. testified as an expert witness on behalf of
LDS Hospital.

His testimony appears in R-768 at pp. 739-782.

His testimony

includes the following:
Page 741
Q.

Have you treated patients with sepsis?

A.

Yes.

In pages 753-760, Dr. Elliot opines that Mrs. George's arrest was the
result of overwhelming sepsis.

He is led through a litany of individual

measures and states that each would not have affected the outcome.

He

contradicts the other defense experts by saying mechanical ventilation would
have been ineffective*

[Recall that many of Drc Trowbridge's patients are in

the ICU on ventilators. (R-766, pp. 519-20)

Dre Weinstein uses mechanical

ventilation as soon as it appears necessary. (R-767, ppc 651-52)
did not say that all of the measures taken together

Dr. Elliot

would have been

ineffective, nor did he say that there was nothing a competent physician could
do, assuming prompt notification of signs and symptoms upon the patients
return to the 8th floor on the afternoon of August 2, 1986.

Dr. Elliot never

says the patient was irretrievably doomed at any specific time.

In fact he

testified at page 770:
Q»
Overwhelming sepsis is a dangerous condition for a
patient, isn't it?
A.

Yes, sir.

Qc

Potentially

A,

Yes, sir.

fatal condition? (emphasis added.)
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Q. And respiratory distress and complications to the point
of respiratory failure is also a dangerous condition, isn't
it?
A.

Yes, sir.

Qc

You are a doctor, correct?

A.

That's correct,

Q.

You diagnose and treat, correct?

A.

That's correct.

Q.
If you don't
have information,
diagnose and treat, can you?
A.

you

can't

HO.

Pages 773-74
Q. What is the extent of your knowledge to the information
that the doctors who were there and in a position to do
something, not like yourself — what information did they
get about the patient on the afternoon of the 2nd, do you
know?
A. I don't, without reviewing the details of the record
with you, which I would be happy to do*
Q.

You have had patient's with sepsis before?

A. Yes.
Q9

I guess they're all dead now?

A. No • . o But many of them are dead.
of sepsis.

That's the nature

Q.

You don't

automatically

die

from

X*

You

automatically

die

from sepsis.

don't
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sepsis?

DAVID GEORGE, was the named plaintiff and husband of Betty George.
George was personally present at LDS Hospital at all times relevant to
action.

He testified several times during the trial.

504; R-767 at pp. 667-675; and R-768 at pp. 783-786.

See, R-766 at ppe
His testimony inc

the following:
Pages 489-493
Q.

What happened in the ICU?

A. Well, we got there. I was anxious to get her there. I
knew she was breathing very irregular.
I knew that she
wasn't getting as much oxygen as they had her on in the
room. It seemed like a long ways. We had to up hallways,
up little ramps. Finally we got to ICU. As soon as I got
there, I went over to the nurse at the station. I told her
who I was, and I had Betty here,
We just came from
angiogram, and that she was to be here in ICU* She looked
through her paperwork. She said, yes, she is supposed to be
heree She gave me the room number, which was exactly where
we were headed when we first got there, towards this room.
So I said, Can we get her into bed? We have to get her on
oxygen, because she is not getting as much as she was
getting as when she was in her room. And she has been on it
a long time this morning, because of angiogram,
transporting, that sort of thing. She said, You are going
to have to wait until Dr. Lahey examines her. I said, Well,
can we get that done? She said, Well, he is on the phone
now. You will have to wait until he comes down to examine
her.
So we were just standing there, and Betty was motioning to
me or gesturing. I got close to her, and she said that she
had to use the bed pan. I asked a nurse, I said Betty says
she needs a bedpan. Can we get her one? And she said she
has not been admitted to that room, and you will just have
to waito I said, Look, my wife needs a bedpan. I want a
bedpan right now.
She went into the room that we — she said Betty was to be
admitted to . She got the bedpan from the little stand
right beside the bed. Still had a wrapper across it. She
took the wrapper off, and put the bedpan on Betty's gurney,
and walked away. The two girls that were with me, and me,

79

put Betty on the bedpan.
said she was finished.

She wasn't there long at all.

She

I told this nurse. She said, Mr. George, I am very busy.
You are going to have to wait until I can get there. I
started getting mad, very upset. I know I was. I started - I guess I hollered at the nurse. I told her to get over
here, and help me get Betty off this bedpan. She finally
did. She came over, We took her off the bedpan, and she
done her thing with the bedpan.
As soon as she left, the two girls that were with
me, she said, Mr. George, it is the only way you
can get anything done around here is by raising
hell.
So at that point I guess maybe I wasn't too far
wrong in what I was hollering about.
Q.

Did Dr. Lahey ever come down and evaluate Betty?

A. Yes, finally. I really, in my mind, I never met Dr.
Lahey. I didn't even know that was him on the phone when I
first came in. But finally he came down. Betty was laying
on her right side. I was facing her, standing there, facing
her. He came down. He pulled the blanket down from her
back. He listened to her back with his left ear. He walked
around the bottom of the gurney, felt her big toe. And he
walked away.
Qc

Did he say anything to you?

A.

He never said a word to me.

Qe

What happened next?

Ae I got this nurse. I said, You said that he was going to
examine Betty. I said, I don't think that is much of an
examination. But can we get her into bed? She told me that
they only have one room in ICU. They are going to keep that
for an emergency. And Betty is not sick enough to be in
ICU. So they weren't going to admit her.
Q.

What were they going to do instead?

A.

Going to send her back again to the eighth floor.

Q. What was your reaction to finding out that she was not
going to be admitted?
A. I was ready to start throwing things.
hell.
Page 495-496
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I started raising

Q.

Were you concerned about your wife's condition?

A.

Very much.

Qe

Did you ask the nurses to get Betty some help?

A.

Yes, I did,

Q.

several times.

Tell the jury about what response you got.

A. Well, the main answer I got was I told them, why wasn't
somebody here to — that could go ahead and diagnose this,
to do something to help Betty in some way, that it seemed
like these people that were dealing with her were just doing
a routine thing, to me. Simply taking vital signs, and if
she was to get a shot, they would give it to her. If she
had to give blood, they would take it. But that's all that
was being done, was vital signs, in my opinion.
And I
wanted Drc Lloyd there. I was really upset.
Q0

Did you say that?

A,
Yeso
I wanted Dr. Lloyd
somebody
that
could
make
a
something.
Q8

there.
I wanted
decision
and
do

What did the nurses say to that?

Ac
That was sort of bothering Nurse Terry.
I sort of
called her the head nurse. I didn't know exactly what her
title was at the time. It seemed like she was running the
nurses. I went out and I told her that I wanted Dr.
Lloyd, I wanted somebody there with some authority.
She said — I think she called him at that time. But she
kept telling me that she knows where Dr. Lloyd is, but he is
unavailable, was the words I goto
She knows where he
is, but he is unavailable.
I couldn't see why not.
Page 497-500
Q.
What time was that, the events that you have just
described?
A. Well, it was after we got back* It was probably around
2:00 or 3:00, somewhere in there, I suppose.
Q.
Did you ever see the resident Carol Adams with
your wife after that, on the afternoon of August 2?
A.

After she took her pulse?

Q.

Yes.

A.

No, I don't think so.
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Q. How long did you stay in the hospital on the afternoon
of the 2nd?
A,

Until around 6:00,

Q.

Were you with you wife the entire time?

6:30, somewhere in there.

A.
I was in and out of the room, trying to get
some help for her, talking to anybody that I could
talk to, that would listen to me.
Why isn't Dr.
Lloyd here?
Why is he unavailable?
Can't you get
another
doctor
here,
somebody
that
can
make
decisions?
So I was in and out of the room a good
many times.
Q. Did you meet the one-on-one, special duty nurse that the
hospital had provided?
A. Yes. She was sort of a quiet girl. She sort of stood
back while the other nurses were doing their thing. Such as
when Nurse Schnabel took a sugar count, she was on the left
side, Betty's left side. She, with a needle, pricked her
finger. She couldn't get any blood. And I noticed that she
was rubbing her fingers real hard. She tried again. She
finally got some blood. She put it on a strip. Then she
has a little machine there of some type that she puts the
strip in. She didn't know how to do it. And this -•- that
was when I first not necessarily met — and I understood her
name is Soraghan «— that she showed her how to put this
strip into the machine. But she was a quiet-type girl. She
sort of stood back.
Q. If you left the hospital at 6:00 to 6:30, then you would
have been there for three to three and a half hours of Nurse
Soraghan's shift?
A.

Approximately.

Q.
Was Nurse
entire time?

Soraghan

A.

X think she was.

Q.

What was she doing?

in

your

wife's

room

the

A.
Like I say, I didn't see her do anything.
Sort
of stood there, and looked at Betty.
She might
have fluffed her pillow or tried to pull her up or
something like that.
I am not exactly sure.
I
don't think she done much of anything.
Q.
wife

Did you ever
some help?

ask
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Nurse

Soraghan

to

get

your

A.

Yes.

Qc

More than once?

A.
She said — well, I don't know if it was more
than once.
I know it was sort of continuous.
That
was as it was with other nurses that I had talked
to.
Z don't know how many times I asked them, but
I know I asked them several times.
I did the same
with the one-on-one nurse.
Q
How was your wife doing
shift?

during Nurse

Soraghan's

Ac
Betty was real bad.
Her breathing was worse
than it had been before, even though she was back
on oxygen o
She was very quiet, very distant.
I
couldn't really talk to her and hold a conversation
with her.
She would just say maybe some words that
was hard to distinguish, and then she would fall
back to sleep or go back into her coma, which I
think is what it was.
I don't know, it seemed like
she kept drifting in and out.
Q.

Were

Ac

Very much.

Q0

you

concerned

about

your wife's

condition?

Why did you leave?

A. I said to myself I knew Betty wasn't going to make it.
I knew my wife was going to die. I left the hospital.
I always parked Betty's car in the parking lot across from
the hospital. Walked over there, got in the car, and I just
sat. I don't really know how long it was. But I finally
snapped out of it, I guess, and drove home.
Q.

What is the next thing that happened?

Ac When I got home, 1° come in the back of the house. I
heard the phone ringing. I got in, and I answered it. It
was my daughter Cynthia. She told me that she went up to
visit her mother. I could hear some background noise. She
told me her mother wasn't breathing. I don't know what all
was said after that. It was enough for me. I just hung the
phone up and went back up to the hospital.
Pages 783-784
Q. Would you describe for the jury what the condition of
your wife was from 5:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., when you left the
hospital on the afternoon of the 2nd?
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A. As I mentioned earlier, my wife's condition at that
time was the worst I had S&BII it since she had been
in the hospital. Her breathing was very shallow.
Her
color was pale, towards white, very pale, I will put it that
way. She would just lay on her right side. Her eyes were
closed. I tried talking to her, which I couldn't do. I
really couldn't arouse her and get her attention to talk to
her, which I wanted to do very badly at that time. I also
know that my impression was, when I left at 6:30, that I
knew my wife was going to die there.
Q0

Was your wife responsive to you at all?

A.

No, she wasn't.
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Addendum 2

APPEND™

II

The following portions of the record support appellant's position that
the trial court repeatedly ruled that proof
opposed to proof that the conduct
cause of the patient's initial
issue or irrelevant.

of

cardiac

the

of the medical
hospital

arrest

staff

cause

of death

(as

contributed to the

on August 2, 1986) was not at

This section also demonstrates how the trial court

violated its own ruling.

After specifically instructing appellants' counsel

not to ask his experts their opinion on cause of death, the Court later
allowed respondent's experts, who were not involved with Mrs. George's care or
the determination of her cause of death, to testify on that subject.

The

narrow medical cause of death, separate and apart from the conduct of the
hospital staff as a contributing cause, became, in fact, the focus of
respondent's defense.
R-7 65 at 323-25:

(Testimony of appellant's expert Don Owings.)

Q. [Russell] Have you reviewed the autopsy report that is
included in the medical record in front of you, pages 3-10?
A. [OwingsJ

Yes.

Q. Does that report contain any evidence that the patient
was indeed deprived of oxygen to the brain?
Mr. Burbidge:
for itself.
The Court:

Objection, your Honor.

The document speaks

It is in evidence isn't it?

Mr. Russell: No. Mr. Burbidge —
The Court:

The objection is sustained.

Q. Have you, in formulating the opinion that you just gave
us — that is, that the ventilatory assistance, the lack of
ventilatory assistance contributed to the coma and deathdid you rely in part on the autopsy?
A. Yes.

1

Qo What in that autopsy supports your opinion?
Mr. Burbidge:
The Court:

Sustained.

Mr. Russell:
The Court:

Objection, again, hearsay.

Your honor, an autopsy —

Would you like to approach the bench?

(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.)
The Court:

The objection is sustained.

Q. Mr. Owings, would you look at page 80 of the medical
record, which is Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1.
A.

Okay.

Q. Those records are blood gas reports?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you see the report at 7:12, at the bottom of the page?
A.

It says 1912.

Q.

That's 7:12

A.

Right.

Q.

That would be during the code procedure?

A.

According to the record, yes.

Q. What does that indicate about whether or not the patient
was receiving oxygen?
Mr. Burbidge:
The Court:

Objection, foundation.

Overruled.

A. It indicates that the patient is not ventilating, and
that their oxygen is below normal values, severely hypoxic.
Q.
Is that proof, in your opinion, that lack of oxygen
caused Mrs. George's arrest and death?
A.

Yes.

Mr. Burbidge:
foundation.

Objection,

0

your

Honor,

competency

and

The Court:

Sustained.

Mr. Burbidge:
The Court:

Is there a motion to strike?

Yes, your Honor.

Granted.

Mr. Burbidge: If we please the Court, could we have the
witness wait until an objection is entered, before the
response comes back?
The Court: The Court is going to take a five minute recess.
The Court will see counsel in chambers, on the record.
(The following proceedings occurred in chambers.)
The Court: The record will reflect that counsel and the
Court are in session, out of the presence of the jury. For
the record, the Court has previously ruled that the
cause of death may not be testified to except for
someone who in and official capacity participated
in determination
of cause of death.
You may
proceed.
R-7 65 at 327
The Court: Is Counsel suggesting, by virtue of that
argument, that if cause of death becomes an issue, one who
signs a death certificate is competent to testify as to
cause of death?
Mr, Russell: Not necessarily, your Honor. I think there
would be a lot of circumstances where the person who signs
the certificate doesn't know. Was just told, wrote it down
and signed it.
The Court:

That's the Court's precise observation.

Mr. Russell:
The way I understand it, the Court is
requiring us to bring such a person in here to testify about
it. Mr. Owings, by his training and experience, can look at
the record, can look at the autopsy, and he knows —• he can
form an opinion that lack of oxygen was the cause of death.
The Court:
Not the cause of death.
He had already
testified, and the Court has listened carefully to the
framing of the question and to the responsive answer. The
question was, did it contribute?
The answer was,
in his opinion, it did contribute.
There is
nothing wrong with the question nor the answer.
The
last question posed to the witness was, in your opinion, did
it cause the decedent's death?
It is an inappropriate
question, and the Court has previously ruled on it. That's
the reason the Court sustained the objection and granted the
motion to strike.
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R-7 65 at 328-331 - Conference in Chambers:
The Court:
The Court is not suggesting that, Af
cause of death is an issue in this case.
The Court
has never taken that position.
But if you contend
that it is an issue, . . .
Mr. Russell:

I don't think it is.

The Court:
I don't think it is, either.
think it is an issue . . .
as
opposed

contributing

cause.

Mr. Burbidge:
The Court:

I don't
to
a

May I be heard on the matter, your Honor?

As opposed to a contributing cause.

Ms. Collard: We are talking about the cause as opposed to a
contributing cause?
The Court:
question.

The Court has permitted counsel to ask that

Mr. Russell: My concern is that when we get done with our
evidence, defense counsel is going to jump up and move for a
directed verdict because nobody has said that anything that
someone did caused or contributed to the cause of death. We
have that now through Mr. Owings and we will have it through
Nurse Gillerman. To tell you the truth, I an just unsure in
these discussion we have about whether the Court is saying,
in order to — because we do have the burden to prove
that,
that violations
of the
standard
of
care
contributed to the cause.
The Court:
The record
with both of your expert
Mr. Russell:
The Court:

is replete at this
witnesses on that.

point

I want to make sure that —

Isn't it?

Mr. Russell:

I think so.

The Court: The Court is not suggesting to either Counsel
how they proceed with their case in chief or their defense
or rebuttal.
The Court is suggesting, in its own
opinion, the cause of death is not an issue.
You
have talked all along in this case about standard of care,
and that's the basis that these two experts you have called
from Southern California have been designated or
acknowledged by the Court as experts. They are dealing with
the standard of care.
And they are perfectly within
their right as an expert witness to say if the
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standard of care in not adhered to, I would expect
as an expert, that this is what would occur.
But
they can't say with specificity that that's in fact what did
happen to this particular woman.
MrD Burbidge:
The Courts

May I be heard, please, your Honor?

Yes.

Mr c Burbidge:
I would move for a mistrial at this
time,
and
the
basis
of
the
motion
is
that
prejudicial testimony,
incompetent
testimony,
and
testimony
without
foundation
has
come
in
with
regard to the cause of death and the contributing
causes of death.
In the State of Utah, medical doctors
are restricted —• such issues are restricted to the
testimony of medical doctors. They are the only authority
to treat and to diagnose. And the diagnostic function of a
medical doctor is the exclusive ~ or the determination of
cause of death or contributing cause of death is in the
exclusive province, pursuant to statute and case law, of
medical doctors. And the Court's ruling, allowing these
unqualified experts to testify as to a contributing cause of
death, is a prejudicial error that cannot be corrected
through any kind of instruction to this jury, and I would
move for a mistrial at this time, and request the Court give
direction to counsel for the plaintiff that he is not to
pursue that line of questioning with these witnesses again.
The Court;
The motion for mistrial is denied. The
Court has previously ruled that this witness nor
any other expert witness who was not involved in
determination
of
cause
of
death
could
not
so
testify.
And the Court has granted defense counsel's
motion to strike«
Further, if there is a problem, and
should cause of death become an issue in this case, the
Court is of the opinion that the error made, if in fact it
occurred, is not prejudicial, and is curable.
Anything further?
Mr. Russell: No, your honor, thank you.
The Court:
The Court will, on the record instruct
counsel not to ask this witness nor any other
expert witness as to the decedent's cause of death,
who
did
not
participate
in
making
that
determination, so that there is no misunderstanding on
that part. And the Court has stated previously, on the
record, out of the presence of the jury, that that's the
Court's position, and so instructs counsel for the plaintiff
again.
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NOTE:

Following the repeated assertions of this position, the Court

subsequently allowed Dr. Trowbridge, Dr, Weinstein and Dr. Elliot - none of
whom had provided any care to the patient, nor did they have any involvement
with the determination on cause of death - to offer their purely speculative
opinions on that very subject.

Worse, in instructions 16A, 21A and the

Special Verdict Form, the Court required plaintiff to prove
through

a physician

or recover nothing.

c

the cause

of

death

Addendum 3

ADDENDUM

III

The following portions of the record prove that appal lant's nurse and
respiratory therapy experts were qualified by the trial court to render their
expert opinions as to whether the conduct

the hospitaJ

proximate cause of the arrest .^* •: -u.f.M-o •*.--;t- *~-

-•*--.

staff was a

*- >-«.

HARRIET GILLERMAN,r R.N. - W -c. -*t. * 13-215:
Q„ What would be the effect on the patient, of the nurses
not performing those orders, on the atelectasis condition?
Mrc Burbidge:
Honor„
The Court:

Objection on the basis of competency, your

Counsel will approach the bench.

(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.)
The Court;

Re phra s e yo ur que s t ion.

Q.
The question, Nurse Gillerman, on a patient with
existing atelectasis, and orders to do the functions that we
have talked to, if the nurses do not perform those orders,
what would you expect to be the effect on that patient?
Mr

Burbidge:

The Court:

Objection to the f.orm, your Honor.

Overruled,

A I would expect that the atelectasis would increase, that
the patient would be receiving less oxygen for the needs of
his or her body, and that the condition would perpetuate
itself.
Q.
In you review of Mrs. George's medical record and
testimony you have heard in this courtroom, does that appear
to be the case with Mrs,, George?
Mr

Burbidge:

Objection, your Honor.

She isn't competent

to provide that testimony,
The Court: Read the question back please.
(The pending o-i**sr ; t>n ^ s &*.$ oa, * t - .,*• -^ .-.x;, tepoeve* )
Mr„ Russell: Your Honor, the medical record talks about the
condition. The nurses that testified this morning talked
about her condition,, And they were there<>
1

Mr. Burbidge: Your Honor, it is a matter of competency.
She is not competent to provide testimony as to what the
cause was in this particular case.
The Court:

Read the question one more time please

(The pending question was read back by the court reporter.)
The Court:
A.

The objection is overruled.

You may answer it.

Yes, it does

765 at 282:

By the Court:

She (Harriet Gillerman) , for the record, is a much more
impressive expert witness (than Don Owings).
7 65 at 289:

By the Court:

She (Harriet Gillerman) is an impressive witness.

DON OWINGS, R.T. - R-765 at 292 during a conference in chambers.
Russell:
I am going to ask him if [violations of the] standard of
care resulted in Mrs George stopping to breathe. If the
violations of the standard of care allowed her respiratory
condition to decline to such a state on the afternoon of the
2nd that she had an arrest. Those things are crystal clear
from the record
We are going to look at Dr. Lahey's report and his
testimony, severe bilateral atelectatsis, very poor lung
volumes«
Dr. Lahey described it as amazing atelectatsis.
He (Don Owixxgs) knows what that ™ what the result of that
is, if it Is not treated. He knows that perfectly well,
R-765 at 301:. By the Court:
The narrow issue for the Court and for the trier of fact
will be the weight given to this witnesses' testimony versus
its ultimate admissibility„ Plaintiffs motion to designate
as an expert is granted.
R-"?65 at .K'5

Q. Do you feel comfortable in being able to testify what
effect a severely diminished oxygen supply or a cessation of
oxygen supply will typically have on a patient?
A.

Yes.

R-7 65 at 311
Q„ In your expert opinion, given Mrs. George's ability to
inspire at 5:30 and 9:45, when Mr. Wilkerson evaluated her
would that have had an effect on whether that
atelectasis got better, worse or stayed the same?
A. Her ability to inspire would probably contribute to her
atelectasis becoming worse.
Q.
If that condition were not treated for an extended
period of time, what would the effect be?
A.

In my opinion it would continue to worsen.

R-765 at 315-17
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By Mr.

Q„ What should Mr. Wilkerson have done, if anything, at the
end of his shift?
A. He should have at least notified the physician of the
patient's deterioration, from the stated goals; notified the
nurses, primarily in care/ passed along to the oncoming
shift therapist of the patient's lack of achievement of the
goals in maintaining ventilation; and if supervisory
personnel were available, notify them.
Q.

What was the purpose of that notification?

A.

To get something done for the patient at that time.

Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether the failure of Mr„
Wilkerson to conduct himself in that fashion at the end of
his shift contributed to the cause of Mrs. George's arrest
the following day?
A. Yes.
Mr. Burbidge:
The Court:

Objection, competency and foundation.

Overruled.

Read the question back.

(The pending question was read back by the court reporter.)
The Courts

You may answer.

A. Yes.
Q.

What is your opinion?

A. My opinion is that it did contribute to the arrest the
next day.
Q.

How did it contribute to the cause of the arrest?

A. The patient's continued lack of oxygen had a detrimental
effect on all the body organs, the cells, specifically the
heart, brain, kidneys, liver. All of them — oxygen is
necessary for those to function. Her lack of ventilation
and being able to take in adequate amounts of oxygen would
result in a continued deterioration of those organ's
functions.
R-765 at 319-23
Q.
According to your review of this record and the
deposition of the respiratory therapist who responded to the
code, what time was ventilatory assistance initiated?
A.

Approximately 1913, 13 minutes after seven.
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How Jong is that after the code was called?
A.

Nine tc t *- . minuies.

Q. Based on your knowledge, training and experience, if a
patient stops breathing and ventilatory assistance is not
provided for nine to ten minutes, what will the effect be on
the patient?
A

Anoxic brain damage.

Q.

What is that?
• *••

„;.

whoi wi,i o& tne

Mr, Burbidge:
Honor.
The Court:
Go

O r d x r: .

result of anoxic brain damage?

Objection, foundation and competency,

your

Sustained on foundation.

What is anoxic brain damage?
o< * - i oxyc«n i «. the cells of the brain.

Qc Does lack of oxygen to the cells of the brains have an
effect on the condition -r - .v.«r ftrain of the patient?
Mr, Burbidge

^q*-* , r , competency, your Honor„

The Court Should you i.ke to
Mr. Burbidge:
:-n*- .Jourt:

tdke the witness on voir dire?

Sure.

The Court sustained the objection on foundation,

BY MR. BURBIDGE:
Q.
Mr. Owings certificate do you'1

you

don f t

hold

a

med i caJ , doctor * s

A, tfo sir.
Q. nave you ever diagnosed
with anoxic brain damage?
Ac

* |»atieru

in * h« State of Utah

I don't diagnose, sir.

Q0
You have never make the personal diagnosis of anoxic
brain damage?
A

,

W'', sir.
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Mr. Burbidge:
The Court:

Renew the objection, your Honor.

Overruled.

BY MR. RUSSELL:
Q. Mr. Owings, does it take a medical license to know what
the effect of anoxic brain damage has on a patient?
Mr. Burbidge:
argumentative.
The Court:

Objection, your Honor, that's leading and

Overruled.

Q. Does it?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

Do you learn about that as a respiratory therapist?

A.

Yes, sirc

Qo
Is that something you would expect any respiratory
therapist to know?
A.

Yes,

Q0

What is the effect of anoxic brain damage on a patient?

A.

Death.

Q. Could it cause a patient to go into an irreversible
coma?
A.

That would be an earlier stage, yes.

Q.
Do you have an opinion, based on your knowledge,
training and experience, as to whether the delay in
initiating ventilatory support for the patient during the
code contributed to the cause of her coma and death?
Mr. Burbidge:
The Court:
A.

Objection, competency and foundation.

Overruled.

Would you repeat the question.

Q.
Do you have an opinion, based on your knowledge,
training and experience, as to whether the delay in
initiating ventilatory support for the patient during the
code contributed to the cause of the patient's irreversible
coma and death?
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A. Yes, 1 believe it contributed to the irreversible brain
damage and death.

Addendum 4

Not only was no testimony or evidence offered to establish, the standard
of care appl I cable tc Dr
standard^

Lloyd and Dr

Lahey

c r the breach of the applicable

the testimony of defendants experts was unanimously favorable to

the defendant physicians.
nl

|B- 7 6h |(

TROWBRIDGE

p

"J «. ' |l

iesl;j.fie<j that

Mie treatment

if I' r .

Lloyd and Dr. Lahey was appropriate.
<*.,
Based on your background and experience, were the
physicians attending to Betty George justified in their
diagnosis of pulmonary embolism on the 1st of August, 198 6?
A.

Yes.

Qc Did they institute appropriate procedures to treat and
deal with this condition?
Ao
Yes, they did the tests which I have just described,
which would be normal in any hospital in the country.

D R WE INS TEIN

[ R-"-' 8"? „ \jp

h 4 0 - 41 j •• agreed t ha t t h e de f e ndant phy s i c I a n s *

working diagnosis of pulmonary embolism was correct.
Q0 Would you please review for the Court and for the jury
what your understanding of that record was with regard to
diagnosis of pulmonary embolism and then, ultimately, the
sepsis that she had.
A. The patient entered the hospital the end of July for an
abdominal hysterectomy, removal of the uterus, tubes and
ovaries.
Her early post-op course was essentially not
unusual for somebody to have this kind of major surgery.
But in the middle of the postoperative course, she started
to demonstrate some findings that one could look at and
imply that she was having something going on that was not
usual, for the usual kind of outcome that one would expect
in a patient that had this kind of surgery.
And the
diagnosis that would come to mind would be pulmonary
embolus, because that is not a rare diagnosis in a patient
that had surgery like this0
And a less common diagnosis
would be bacterial shock, or severe shock, from some kind of
organism invading the bloodstream.

1

Q. Doctor, I show you what has been marked defendant's
exhibit F, and it is a list of the symptoms of a pulmonary
embolus c Are these the symptoms you see with a pulmonary
embolus?
A. You can see all of those with a pulmonary embolism, yes,
sir.
Q.

Were these symptoms present with Mrs. Betty George?

A.

At various times, yes, sir.

DR. ELLIOT

[R-768, p. 773] - saw

no problem

with

the

defendant

physicians' conduct.
Q. Assuming, without saying that it is true, that Mrs.
George was dying of sepsis on the afternoon of the 2nd, what
does your review of the record reveal that anyone was doing
about it?
A. That's an important question. The review of the record
indicates that the staff did try to diagnose her sepsis.
They did so with blood cultures. And they did make orders
to initiate antibiotics, when they recognized that sepsis
was likely what was happening with this lady. I think it is
important that people understand that sepsis is often a
difficult diagnosis for a physician, even a well-trainedphysician, to make, because other disorders, like pulmonary
embolism, can be present with many of the same symptoms and
signs.
And I think that's what happened to the physicians in this
case. They thought that this patient was having pulmonary
embolism, to explain the symptoms and signs. So it was only
late on the day of the 2nd that they began to recognize that
sepsis was a more likely diagnosis. They drew the blood
cultures, they started the antibiotics.
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Addendum b

ADDSNPyM

Y

The following are the Instructions given by the Court to the jury with
resp<~- -

*ry-*-• ;^:-< -1 b.i-if-n

r L-u . ? *$ to causation.

As explained below,

irte instructions are contradictory, contusing, in many instances erroneous,
and cumulatively
trial agaiinst I I)S

constitute prejudicial error, requiring

remand for a New

-••-> ;- . .

INSTRUCTION -r {R-5101 provided:
The plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence each of the following propositions:
1.
That LDS Hospital, througn its employees, failed to
comply with the applicable medical standard of care, and
that in so acting or failing to act* LDS Hospital was
negligent„
2.
That the plaintiffs uu
result of that negligence,:

MJ.H

-*;... *«;e

."I-L^:

as a

3*
That the negligence of LDS Hospital, through its
employees, was a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by
the plaintiffs.
40
The nature and extent of the injuries and damage, and
the amount thereof„
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater
weight of the evidence, that is, such evidence as, when
weighed with that opposed to it, is more convincing as to.
its truth.
Instruction 16 is a correct statement of the law and appellant's burden.

INSTRUCTION 16A [F-511] provided:
The plaintiff in this case cannot recover against
doctors or the hospital unless it is proven, that,

the

L
Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS Hospital's
nursing staff or respiratory therapist or all of them, based
on a degree of reasonable medical probability, failed to

1

exercise that degree of reasonable care and skill in caring
for the plaintiff that was ordinarily possessed and used by
others in the respective profession practicing in 1986 in
Salt Lake City, Utah, or similar communities under similar
circumstances;
2.
Based on a degree of reasonable medical probability
established through expert medical testimony from a duly
qualified medical doctor, that such failure, if any, was the
proximate cause of the death of Betty George; and
3. That David George personally, and the heirs of Betty
George, and the representative of the estate of Betty
George, was damage by the negligence, if any, of one of the
defendants or all of them.
If you do not find, by a preponderance of the evidence, all
of the foregoing propositions with regard to either Dr.
Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS Hospital, the party
or parties, as the case my be, against whom any one
proposition is not found cannot be found to have committed
medical malpractice and your verdict must be in favor of the
defendants or defendants. If you find that the evidence in
evenly balanced on any of the above-mentioned issues, then
your verdict should be for the defendant or defendants on
whose behalf the evidence is evenly balanced.
Instruction 16A was inserted into the final set of instructions on the
last day of trial just before the trial court instructed the jury and closing
arguments.

Appellant

has no idea how it got there since there was no

discussion at all about it.

Appellant's counsel never approved it, nor did

they have any chance to object to it until after the jury was instructed.
What

is known is that LDS Hospital's proposed instruction

rejected
erroneous.

out-of-hand

as being

confusing,

contrary

to

[R-293], was

law

and

clearly

Note that the form of the instruction which was read to the jury

was not even filed under November 14, 1989, five days after the trial ended.
[R-409, 431.]
Quite apart from these irregularities, Instruction 16A is an incredible
quagmire of confusion, and created a clearly erroneous and impossible burden
for appellant

on the causation

issue.

2

The error

inherent

in

16A is

p a r t i c u l a r l y highlighted when contrasted to the simple a n d correct

statement

in Instruction ie
p a r a, g r a p h 1 • >f ' ^]l

E o ; e.xan;p.«that

isr physician

testimony

of

death

raq a;;1

through

e a13 i * ^ d -»t> p e 2 1 a n t t o p r o du c e me d I c a 1,

on t.:-:e n u r s i n g

contrary *• o I^w and -^ *IP - correct
[R-52 6 -28.,

T

standard

instructions su--* --

of care,..
r

^r.rj«^ i-*ns 23-30

<-~u... : *-.- i r h - . .

a physician,

something

the

This is

*r
cour t had

-

t < :aJ cause

previously

and

repeatedly ruled was irrelevant and unnecessary. In addition, ine n i d i Court
had also specifically ruled that it would not allow such testimony from any
expert witness.

I See, Addendum II.]

Paragraph 3 required that all eligible plaintiffs h a d to suffer damage
in o r d e r to recover.

This statement is contrary to law since each heir is

entitled to recover damages individually„
Bettv

Georu^

independent

• - i^m^r,«-•--' •* . "''••,-r *- • :-*
of t h e cidi.T

toi w r o n g f u l

Further, the claim rf the Estate of
/
death,

-

~-

The c l o s i n g

- :.-

iTip] e t e l y

paragraph

of

Instruction 16A imposes incomprehension upon error,,
That. ';h'» i"j , nay lnve b e e n confused, or in i s.,1 ed b y I n s t r u c t i o n

3 6A,

resulting in the negative answer to question 3B < ., :. :)e Special Verdict form is
manifest, and requires a n e w trial in the interests of fairness.

INSTRUCTION 21 [R-517] provided:
The p r o x i m a t e cause of an injury is that which r in natural
and c o n t i n u o u s s e q u e n c e p r o d u c e s t h e injury, a n d without
which the result would not have occurred, There m a y be more
than one proximate cause for an injury.
Appellant asserts that t h e correct proximate cause i n s t r u c t i o n in this
case w a s that embracing t h e "reduced c h a n c e " or " s u b s t a n t i a l

factor" test.

After the trial court rejected appellant's proposed instructions in that
regard, this was considered the next best thing.

It at least correctly

informed the jury that "there may be more than one proximate cause for an
injury."

INSTRUCTION 21A [R-518] provided:
You are instructed that where the proximate cause of Betty
George's death and therefore the injury or loss claimed by
plaintiff is not established by a preponderance of the
evidence based on reasonable medical probability from
testimony of a medical doctor, but is left to conjecture or
speculation and may be reasonably attributed to causes over
which the hospital or doctor had no control or
responsibility, then the plaintiff has failed to sustain the
burden of proof as to proximate causation.
This instruction was also inserted on the last day of trial, after the
close of evidence, just before argument.

It had been specifically rejected by

the trial court on the previous day in a conference between the court and
counsel for the specific purpose of agreeing on a final set of instructions.
It is clearly erroneous and confusing in a number of respects:
a.

It contradicts instruction 21 by implying that there can be

only one proximate cause;
b.
plaintiff

flow

It states that all of the injuries and loss claimed by
from

the death

of Betty

George.

This

eliminated

the

substantial claim of the Estate for injuries suffered by Betty George prior to
her death.
c.

It states plaintiff must prove the medical cause of death

through a doctor.

It was thereby contrary to law, as well as the Court's

multiple, consistent rulings throughout the trial.

4

Instruction 16A and 21A had the effect of improperly requiring a verdict
for the h o s p i t a l

as to p r o x i m a t e

cause.

They p r o h i b i t e d

the

jury

from

considering the competent, admitted testimony ot a p p e l a n t , 's expert witnesses.
They required appellant to p r o v e an irrelevant
i mpossi ble to do so,

is^ue at. a : .me when it was

They prohibited the ji iry ' •" .:>^;l i.mi.:c.

its fundamental

function of concluding that the established negligence of the hospital was a
contributing proximate cause of the injuries sustained.

INSTRUCTION 32 [R-530] PROVIDED:
The Court instructs you that LDS Hospital is responsible for
the negligent acts or omissions, of any, of its nurses and
respiratory therapists. If you find from the evidence that
a p r o x i m a t e cause of the d e a t h of B e t t y G e o r g e and the
damage c l a i m e d by D a v i d George was the n e g l i g e n c e of the
n u r s e s or r e s p i r a t o r y t h e r a p i s t s of the d e f e n d a n t , LDS
H o s p i t a l , as n e g l i g e n c e is defined in these i n s t r u c t i o n s ,
such acts or omissions aref
in law, acts or omissions of the
hospital.
In^t

r ic

-

-,

:u

^

**.

-• if »j'^-

h a v e a l l o w e d t.ne jury c,o p e i f o r m its f u n c t i o n avai
the evidence of negligence.

t.*ua

-" •

-

^w„

It

proximate cause

WOUld

from

Unfortunately, the combined effect of 16A, 21A

a nd t h e S pe c i a 1 Ve rd i c t f o rm p i: o h i b i t e d t h e j u ry f r om p e r f o rmi n g 11 s f u i i c t i o n .
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